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SURVEY

a journal of
Soviet and East European studies

Foreign Policy in a Polycentric World



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January 1966 No 58

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Published by

WEIDENFELD & NICOLSON

20 New Bond Street, London, W.1

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A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 58 **January 1966**

Editors: Walter Laqueur, Leo Labedz

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Editorial offices, Summit House, 1 Langham Place, London, W.1.
Subscription office, Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London, W.1.
Subscription rates: £1 10s. or $4 a year. Single copies 7/6 or $1.25.

American Distributors: Franklin Square Subscription Agency, 545 Cedar Lane, Teaneck, New Jersey, U.S.A., with whom subscriptions may be entered.

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TWENTY YEARS AFTER

Leopold Labedz

THE twentieth anniversary of the ending of the first world war was recalled in Europe with melancholy feelings. It came shortly after the Munich agreement, when deep in their hearts few people believed in 'peace in our time'. Both the hope of the war generation—'The war to end all wars'—and the hope of the post-war generation—'*Nie wieder Krieg*'—were grotesque reminders of shattered illusions at a time when the threat of Hitler's war was steadily growing. The historical staccato of the headlines, from re-occupation of the Rhineland to Anschluss and Sudetenland, punctuated the growing anxiety. In the East the nineteenth century ended with the war, the Russian revolution, and the fall of three empires. In the West it had ended too, but nostalgia and mental inertia were perpetuating illusions, preventing recognition of the dangers inherent in the new realities. More than usual, politicians were deluding themselves and the public, generals preparing for the last war, and intellectuals dabbling in politics without understanding. America had been discovered, but not yet the third world.

Twenty years after the ending of the second world war the situation is quite different from what it was twenty years after the first. Politics are no longer 'Eurocentric'; the nineteenth century has receded still further into the past; the stability of the world order is fragile, as it depends on the self-restraint of the national states, but the post-war anxieties about nuclear war have not increased; in the third world, the illusions generated by Bandung are fading, and it is Europe that is being discovered. This time the generals are not preparing themselves for the last war, but for the one after the next (because the next one must not take place), and politicians and intellectuals are somewhat more sober. And so are the public.

In one respect the difference between the two situations is particularly significant: the post-war period proper, when the entire political situation was determined by the immediate consequences of the war, lasted for only a short time after 1918, and rather longer after 1945. It is only now that one can detect both in the general political situation and in the *Zeitgeist* elements which show that we are moving out of the post-war situation (but not into a pre-war one). For twenty years, or almost twenty, the realities of the Cold War looked very much the same in essence as when they dawned on a world expecting post-war cooperation between the Allies, a world which instead got Soviet expansion, bellicose pressures, and peace offensives. Now that the new factors are emerging and are widely recognised as such (polycentrism, multilateral balance of power, etc.), there is no agreement about their significance, and not unexpectedly a plethora of interpretations. The 'doves' believe that old myths are preventing the recognition of new realities, the 'hawks'—that

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new myths will produce new illusions about persisting old problems. National preoccupations loom larger than before. No long-term policy is possible without a broader common perspective, however wrong it may be, but there is no longer agreement in the West as to what this perspective is or should be. After the war such a perspective did emerge; it was defined by the word 'containment'. It is irrelevant here whether it was a right or wrong perspective, the fact is that this is what gave unity and cohesion to Western policy, however much Nato allies may have disagreed from time to time about the assessment of contingencies and the application of the general perspective to given circumstances at a given time.

'Containment' emerged when the illusions generated during the war could no longer be maintained. On a popular level they were rooted in the hope of a brave new world in which the great three would cooperate for the benefit of mankind. On a more sophisticated level such hopes were rooted in the idea of the concert of great powers dividing the world into spheres of influence. In the discussions at the time, the Congress of Vienna was often invoked as a model for the arrangement of a peaceful world and many people looked forward to a stable new Holy Alliance. At Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam the post-war world acquired its shape, but the hopes of political stability proved illusory. The extraordinary thing was how few people grasped the situation and the post-war perspectives clearly, although they were there plain to see by anybody with an elementary knowledge of the factors that had been shaping them for a long time. Mr Kennan's 'containment' came, as Mr Halle rightly observes, when there was no American foreign policy deserving the name. It provided the necessary perspective and thus the premise for a certain political consistency, a framework to relate day-to-day policy decisions.

IT is a misconception to believe that foreign policy is always correlated with military strength. When the United States was militarily strongest in relation to the USSR it had no foreign policy and reduced its forces unilaterally after the war; afterwards it embraced 'containment'; and when it lost its atomic monopoly it adopted for a time the slogan of 'liberation'. If this sequence does not make sense rationally, one should recall that in the two post-war decades 'containment' *did* work. It provided on a global scale the equivalent of the British principle of the European balance of power, at a time when American policy had to achieve a global balance. It was essentially a defensive policy and it was successful only because the nuclear deadlock had frozen the positions in the bilateral balance of power between the Soviet and the American sides. This coincidence underpinned the stability of the Yalta arrangements for post-war Europe more solidly than the Versailles Treaty had done about its own system after the first world war. Once again the wisdom of the French proverb, *Rien ne dure que le provisoire*, had been tested. But it was not a political stability; it was based on a military

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balance of deterrents ('balance of imbalances' had not yet been invented).

In the meantime the forces of change were slowly undermining the basic post-war framework in which the Cold War was taking place. Decolonisation, the recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the de-satellisation of Eastern Europe, and the rise of China, were essential elements shaping the new post-post-war situation. By now, the designation of the resulting process—polycentrism—has been generally accepted, but as with most concepts which become mental clichés, little is gained in understanding by constant repetition of this term, unless its possible and probable implications for the internal evolution of the communist countries and for international relations in general are analysed in depth. To understand such implications is of course crucial for any long-term policy planning. And yet, although the phenomenon itself has been mentally absorbed, there has not so far been enough discussion of the specific problems connected with it, except within the narrow framework of neo-traditional national policies. Polycentrism in the West loosened NATO ties, when the sense of danger from the Soviet bloc abated, and in different degrees underscored the national element in the foreign policies of its members. But they still constitute what is loosely but pertinently called 'the West', just as polycentrism in the East and the Sino-Soviet conflict have not changed the communist character of the states concerned, whatever internal changes they may have undergone. But if it is nevertheless a new situation a number of questions arise which are relevant not only for national policies, but for the West in general, and more particularly for American policy, which is still the pillar of any conceivable Western policy for the next period. Increasingly divergent answers are given to the new questions as well as the old ones. There is no longer any broad agreement, much less unanimity, about future perspectives. Is containment compatible with the need to choose the strategic priorities to be applied to the Sino-Soviet rift? Are we heading not just for a loosening of alliances, but for their eventual reversal? Are we going to see various *raisons d'état* cutting across ideological barriers in the way they sometimes did when medieval and post-medieval Europe faced the threat of 'the infidel'? Are the foreign policies of different states going to be replicas on a global scale of the policies of single states when the multilateral balance of power was the ruling principle in and around Europe? How is the bilateral balance between the two main protagonists in the Cold War going to be affected not just by the rise of China and other manifestations of polycentrism, but by nuclear proliferation? How can the great powers cope *both* with the revival of nationalism *and* the growth of globalism in the space age? Is their mutual antagonism (and the Cold War) really abating, to be replaced by the 'policing of China'? Or is perhaps the concept of the West itself becoming obsolete? If not, can a new perspective be provided for it which will perform in the new situation the function of integrating the foreign policies of the states

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associated with it, as the concept of ' containment ' did in the two decades after the war? Or can the idea of ' containment ' be retained and applied in a more discriminating way to both Russia and China?

These and similar questions can be multiplied. The answers cannot and will not be provided only on the level of inter-governmental exchanges and internal discussion on separate national foreign policies in different Western countries. A Great Debate on an international scale is needed to ventilate and clarify these questions, and to elucidate the answers in their concrete application. A lot has been said about the need for a dialogue between East and West. It seems that a dialogue *inside* the West should be on the agenda, if it is not to drift apart, not only as regards the policies of the countries constituting the West, but in their common perspective based on historical and cultural affinities.

This is not a matter of clamouring for unity of the West in the way good communists clamour for the unity of the ' socialist camp '. The genius of the West lay always in its tolerance of diversity, and it usually managed to achieve a certain degree of unity only in times of danger. It is futile to call for a kind of unity which belongs to the past and cannot be restored in the same form. In any case, on balance, the polycentric disintegration in the East more than compensates for a similar disintegration in the West.

This does not mean, however, that the West, which unlike the East was never monolithic and knows how to cope with variety, should not encourage forces countering the centrifugal tendencies and coordinate its basic perspectives. It is certainly in a better position to do so than the communist states. At the moment this may look like unwarranted optimism, with the ghost of Jacques Bainville hovering over de Gaulle's France and Bismarck resuscitated in West Germany. But on a deeper level anybody who knows the pre- and post-war trends in these two (and other West European) countries can have little doubt that nationalist virulence in Western Europe (though not national sentiments) is not on the upgrade, and that the post-war generation—as all the polls (and conversations) testify—is even less afflicted by it.

In the longer perspective, despite the importance attached to the ' personalisation of politics ', it is the social processes which largely shape the future, rather than smaller or bigger personalities and their cults. This applies not only in the West, but also in the East. Paradoxically, the disintegration of Marxism in the post-utopian era is accompanied by less emphasis on personalities in political analysis, and more on the impersonal processes, emphasis on which is traditionally associated with Marxist analysis.

But this does not apply to international relations seen as a social process. Here the traditional Marxist approach fails altogether to make sense as a framework within which the realities of post-war international developments are perceived, and this makes it more difficult for the communist than for the Western states to adapt themselves to the new

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situation. One has to distinguish here between political adaptation and its deeper ideological level to which the former must be related. The perception of polycentrism and its reluctant acceptance as an inescapable fact in international relations undermines the traditional Soviet perspective and, as Mr Zimmerman shows, finds its reflection in the slow erosion of the traditional Soviet approach to international relations. It is too early yet to say that the Soviet Union has already accepted the idea that it is just one state among other states, a part of the international system (which it is still ideologically bound to overthrow), but attitudes towards international relations usually associated with traditional rather than revolutionary states have begun to appear, vociferous denials to the contrary notwithstanding. Nothing better reveals the embarrassed refusal to face facts than an article by Sanakoev on 'The Basic Stages in the Development of the World Socialist System' (*Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya* (No. 4, 1965)), in which he deals at length with such problems as 'the formation of the Soviet republics—the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Bukhara, Khorezm, and the Far Eastern Republic . . . [which] began to work out the forms and methods of intercourse between sovereign nations in the sphere of inter-state relationships based on the principles of proletarian internationalism', and even with such epiphenomena as the 'fraternal relations between Soviet Russia and the revolutionary Hungarian and Bavarian republics', but fails to mention the problem of its relations with China, surely a constituent part of the 'world socialist system' today.

THE emergence of polycentrism poses for the Soviet Union not only the problem of adjustment to the more diffuse system of the international balance of power, but that of scaling down its universalist ideological pretensions. As such it is one aspect of the need to come to terms with reality, externally as well as internally, notwithstanding the utopian elements in its ideological armour.

Universalist aspirations, as we know from history, die hard. When Byzantium was facing political and military collapse at the end of the 14th century, and needed allies more than ever, the Patriarch of Constantinople sent a letter to the Muscovite prince Basil I, rebuking him for his revolt against the universal authority of the Byzantine Church and the *Oikoumene* of the East Roman empire. Half a century later Constantinople had fallen and the theory of the Third Rome emerged, providing an ideological justification for the appropriation of the Byzantine *Oikoumene* by Moscow.

It is ironic that it is Moscow which is now trying to preserve the ideological universalism of the communist *Oikoumene* in the face of revolt from the East. The situation is of course quite different, but the problem of the failure to maintain universalist doctrinal aspirations is as old as the emergence of universalist ideologies themselves.

The historical *differentia specifica*, as far as universalism versus

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polycentrism is concerned, is the necessity for nuclear coexistence. *A fortiori* this is also the conditioning factor in international relations at present—not a striking thought, but one whose implications in the polycentric situation puzzle the analysts. It is possible that the nuclear deadlock, which froze positions in the bilateral balance of power prevailing after the war, may also freeze them in the multilateral balance which is now emerging. How far nuclear dissemination will go is difficult to predict, but sovereign states cannot be prevented from producing nuclear arms if they have the technology and the means to do so. Therefore in the long run prevention of widespread proliferation will depend less on the attempts of the present members of the atomic club than on the provision by them of security arrangements for those states which may need them. By the same token the eventual emergence of China as a fully qualified member of the club will stabilise its relations with other nuclear powers in the limited sense that Soviet-American relations were stabilised by the same factor after the war. The prospects of political stability, however, are even less promising; they depend not just on the credibility of the nuclear deterrent, but on the voluntary or involuntary renunciation by China of its militant tactics and its use of national 'liberation' movements and guerrilla warfare as 'secret weapons' nibbling away at the substance of its antagonists. The process of its emancipation from the shackles of ideological fundamentalism may take a long time.

A DEBATE on the specific problems of the international situation which will dominate the 70s, if not the 80s, can be related to this general and somewhat abstract framework of the emergent dichotomies: universalist aspirations and polycentric interests, nationalism *redivivus* and a shrinking globe, overall military stabilisation and political instability. But if it is assumed that the supreme question for mankind in the twenty-first century will be how to institutionalise international relations to give them a peaceful basis (dismissing the idea that they can evolve as a result of exhortations or the cranky plans of political idealists), the inescapable conclusion is that only the kind of institution and tradition evolved in the West can be used to secure reasonably peaceful political relations among states. Only they can provide the necessary balance and stability in the new nuclear polycentric world. Universal despotism and empire are not only useless for this purpose, but utopian. Post-war developments have provided conclusive evidence for this.

In this perspective the future of mankind may be bound up with the preservation of Western politico-cultural cohesion, and for this a specific historical perspective is necessary as a minimum premise for a reasonable similarity of direction in the policies of Western states and for the adjustment of their ambitions and interests.

After the war, the disunity of the Greek city states confronted by their common enemies was often recalled to give warning that a similar fate

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awaited the west in face of the communist challenge. That parallel proved defective. What was not sufficiently realised was the relevance of the evolution of Western political institutions which secured peaceful social change internally to the evolution of peaceful international relations. Stalin, who in his last work thought a war among the Western states likely, failed to understand that such a war was virtually out of the question. It was he who provided the necessary external stimulus for the unity of the West. If he had or could have chosen a different policy towards the West he would not have united it or provided the necessary impetus for Western economic development.

But in the polycentric age the historical cohesion of the West can be preserved only by itself and not just by external danger. Nuclear deterrent and technological progress provide enough assurance against the external threat, when it comes to vital interests. Does the containment of Russia and China, even if necessary, provide a sufficient perspective for assuring such cohesion, and hence for the eventual emergence of institutions securing reasonably peaceful relations between states in a polycentric system of power? It would be presumptuous to try to answer this question by suggesting another blueprint for policy. Such processes evolve; they are not planned. But if it is true that a long-term policy is impossible without a vision, and if we come to be suspicious of both utopian plans and blueprints for policy, it is also true that an idea which provides a perspective, which is realistic but not hidebound, is still necessary for any but the most shortsighted type of empirical politics. At present one can only discuss the problems and hope that such an idea will eventually emerge. A debate, providing a confrontation of sharply different and controversial positions on the lessons of the past, the shape of things to come, and the way to face them, is one theme of this anniversary issue of SURVEY, and it will be continued in a future issue. Only confrontation in a Great Debate can provide the necessary clarification of the issues, and it is hoped that this periodical will make a useful contribution. The reunification of Europe, the cradle of the West, seems to be a necessary condition for the eventual emergence of the new Western perspective for the polycentric age. For that reason a special section is devoted to it here.

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ON POLYCENTRISM

Raymond Aron

THE word 'polycentrism' has now entered the language. It is useful, but not wholly unambiguous. Roughly, it denotes the loss by the Soviet Union of the quasi-absolute authority that it enjoyed from 1945 to 1953 within the communist world, or that at least the western commentators and statesmen were ready to believe it did. Retrospectively, it is doubtful whether Stalin was ever in a position to give orders to Mao Tse-tung after 1949, or whether he ever cherished any illusions on this score. From 1950, indeed, Stalin treated China as a great power, as something quite different from the communist countries of eastern Europe. For fifteen years the so-called monolithic communist bloc has had two heads.

Two different phenomena are covered by the term polycentrism, though each is connected with the other—the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the growing autonomy of the east European countries vis-à-vis Russia. A precise date for the beginning of the first is difficult to establish; the second dates from 1956, the year of revolt in Poland and Hungary.

The Sino-Soviet conflict did not take on its full significance for the east European countries and for the West until it came out into the open, and the spokesmen of the two communist great powers began their reciprocal charges of treachery to the faith. The first difficulties between Moscow and Peking may perhaps have preceded Stalin's death. Soviet technicians were withdrawn from China in 1960, but it was in 1963—the year of the test-ban treaty—that the insulting letters between the two central committees were published.

Whether polycentrism began with the first disagreements between Moscow and Peking or only with the disintegration of the international movement, is, after all, a question of definition. The important thing is the fact itself—that although the communist world has had two centres since 1950, polycentrism became an irreversible phenomenon from the day that each of these two claimed to provide the only authentic interpretation of a universal truth. The translation of the conflict into ideological terms involved the two rivals in a series of contradictions. If a universal truth lends itself to conflicting and incompatible interpretations, it ceases to be universal. If one of the parties claims the right to impose its interpretation on the rest, it is dividing them on the pretext of uniting them. Chinese protests against the disintegration of the bloc have the effect of promoting further disintegrations. The Soviet Union tries to put a stop to disintegration by accepting it, but without success. It could succeed only if the Chinese agreed, and this they refuse to do. Perhaps the men of Moscow would be less unwilling to accept an International that stood for no more than a post office if China did not accuse them of revisionism.

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The origins of the quarrel which has become a schism within the world where Marxism-Leninism is the state doctrine, do not lie in the Polish and Hungarian revolts of 1956. These marked an episode in destalinisation. Stalin's successors could not or did not wish to maintain the despotism of a single person who obeyed no law and reigned by fear—to use Montesquieu's phrase. They were ready to modify the relations between the USSR and the east European countries, but were not ready to accept the Hungarian revolution, multiple parties, or declarations of neutralism. The suppression of the Hungarian revolution, however, did not halt the evolution towards autonomy in east Europe.

At this point, several questions arise. Has this greater autonomy brought with it greater diversity in their internal regimes? Or greater diversity in their foreign policy? How are these related to each other? In other words, is the foreign policy of these states a function of the shape given to socialism or to sovietism within the countries of east Europe?

To deal with this last question first. There is no visible correlation between the degree of internal liberalisation and the degree of external diplomatic independence. Rumania, the only east European state to hint at territorial claims against the Soviet Union, the one which has opposed Comecon plans with greater determination than any other country, was much the slowest of the popular democracies in introducing liberalisation at home.

If there is one feature in common in the evolution of these countries over the last few years it is *national affirmation*. I use this vague term deliberately because it covers a multitude of heterogeneous actions and sentiments. All these countries have laid stress on their own culture and their own history. They have rejected the attempt to russify them and have established, with greater or less warmth, intellectual relations with the West. They have all been emphatic about the special character of their own economic problems; they have not denied the possibility of opposing opinions among communist countries; they have quarrelled among themselves about the terms of trade.

The more Moscow's authority weakened, the more national did socialism in these countries become. The men in power, notwithstanding their allegiance to a universal doctrine, wished to act as representatives of one particular nation, conscious of its unique past, solicitous of its interests, and anxious for as great a degree of independence as possible vis-à-vis their protector. One might even say, in dialectical fashion, that the very diversity as between one communist country and another is the expression of their common lot, since it reflects the same nationalisation of socialism which brings them together by separating them (or separates them by bringing them together). But, it will be asked, how far will this diversity go? A precise answer to that question would require a direct and detailed knowledge of the different countries, but a few general observations can be made here.

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ONE kind of diversity arises from the different stages of development through which these countries are passing. In this respect Rumania and Czechoslovakia are at the two extremes, one being at the stage of industrialisation where simple and authoritarian planning methods suffice, while the other appears to face the same difficulties as those encountered in the Soviet Union. A complex industrial economy cannot easily dispense with certain price and market mechanisms, mechanisms which the doctrinaires rejected as inseparable from capitalism, but for which they may soon admit the need while denying that they have any ideological bearing. Socialist economists, such as the late Oskar Lange, have for a long time contended that intelligent planning must make use of the price mechanism. In Rumania the Liberman question does not yet arise; but it does in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary.

A second kind of diversity, also economic, relates to the peasants. Gomulka's Poland has granted a long lease to individual property in agriculture. The efficacy of this tolerance may not be evident from the statistics, but it remains true nevertheless that each government reserves to itself the right to treat problems, including that of property in land, according to its own preferences and to the circumstances.

Diversity in the political-intellectual field represents a third category. What can intellectuals write or say in these countries without endangering themselves? What risks will they run if they pass the limits, in any case badly defined, of the liberty accorded them? Nowhere is the regime openly questioned. Nowhere does the Stalinist discipline survive which obliged everyone to repeat enthusiastically the ravings of the despot in the Kremlin.

Three conclusions may be drawn from this. The first is that the economic-political regimes in the east European countries still belong to the same species, and that the differences in the institutions inseparable from the regime (collective ownership of the means of production, planning, single party) do not yet affect the core. Political life remains concentrated in one party, which is not the authentic expression of society. The planners are only beginning to make concessions to the consumer; they do not yet know how to use the market mechanisms of which they are beginning to suspect the need. These countries are more like one another than are the countries of west Europe, which also share in common a particular kind of economic-political regime.

The second conclusion is that the original national identities have not been destroyed by the temporary domination exercised by the Soviet Union. Warsaw and Prague have retained their distinctive features. As to the climate of culture, I find it difficult to say what exactly it consists in. In Warsaw I have the feeling of living in the same cultural climate as Paris, whereas in Moscow I breathe a different air. The architecture, the religious traditions, the style of personal relationships, some ponderous facts as well as many apparently trivial details, all build up to create an indefinable but lasting impression. In this respect, nationalities endure while regimes pass.

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The third conclusion is the radical failure of the Soviet Union in east Europe. It has not russified the area. It has not converted the peoples to Marxism-Leninism. It has not convinced them of the merits of the institutions built up in Russia since 1917. True, none of the communist parties of East Europe criticise these institutions as such, since all owe to them their power. But all of them, having returned in the baggage trains of a foreign army (except for the minority who fought the Nazis within their own countries), have been trying for the last ten years to give proof of their independence in order to increase their moral hold on the people. They are accepted in the degree to which they are or appear to be national, and not in the degree to which they give proof of their Marxism-Leninism.

DURING the Cold War, in the years 1949 to 1953, the West thought it was facing in Europe a single enemy, consisting of one state and its satellites. In Asia, since the Korean war, it knew that China was not a satellite but an ally of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless it behaved for a long time as if these allies, at one on the basic issue, that is in hostility to the West, had a common strategy. At present this assumption is obviously incorrect. Not only have China and the Soviet Union each its own policy in every part of the world, but each of the two big communist powers attaches extreme importance to their rivalry, an importance which for the moment may be greater than that given to hostility of principle or of ideology vis-à-vis the United States, or ' imperialism '.

It is legitimate to argue that the initial subject of the Sino-Soviet conflict was the choice of a strategy in relation to wars of national liberation, the third world, or the West. That was, at any rate, one of the issues in dispute between the Russians and the Chinese. But even if this was originally one of the main issues at stake, its character and its significance have changed. What is at issue now is control of the communist movement. And here the Soviet Union is caught in a contradiction. It does not wish to disavow the ideocratic nature of its state, nor can it do so. It will not admit to being a state ' like any other state ', with national interests, for this would undermine the foundations of the regime. Since it is Marxist-Leninist, the Soviet Union has to be the enemy of the United States and of all capitalist countries, even if it acknowledges peaceful coexistence. It is afraid that China will gradually acquire a monopoly of the revolutionary idea.

Theoretically, the Moscow leaders might seek a way out of this contradiction in two directions. They can either seek to rival Peking in violence, at least verbal violence, or they can continue, Chinese insults notwithstanding, to pursue a diplomacy of peaceful coexistence and to counter Peking by staking their all on moderation. That is, the Moscow men may put themselves forward as more revolutionary than those of the Forbidden City, or they can try to discredit them in the eyes of the world by making them appear as dangerous firebrands.

Clearly, Mr Khrushchev's successors, like Mr Khrushchev himself,

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have chosen the second alternative. Not only have they kept to that policy, despite events in Vietnam, but everything is happening as though the logic of the rivalry with the dogmatists in Peking had the upper hand over the logic of hostility to the capitalist world. They probably prefer a non-Marxist-Leninist government to a Marxist-Leninist government of the Chinese persuasion.

It is possible that the Chinese see things in the same light. For the moment they do not have the necessary material strength to fight the United States openly. It is likely that they are inciting the North Vietnamese to carry on to the end the battle which is hampering rapprochement between the USA and the USSR. They denounce the inadequacy of the support given by the Soviet Union to a socialist state which is the victim of imperialist aggression. (They themselves give no more support than Moscow to North Vietnam, but to this they can reply that they still have no thermonuclear arsenal.) They probably believe that the United States, bogged down in a land war in Asia, is being weakened materially and even more weakened morally. The Soviet Union would probably like a compromise settlement best of all if that would increase her esteem in the eyes of the world.

In their rivalry, each of the two big communist powers holds cards. China is closer to the proletarian nations; it speaks a language which parties anxious to proceed to violent action understand better. There are —or will be—' Chinese ' or Castroite trends (allied or rival) within most of the parties in the countries of the third world, above all in Asia and within parties still in opposition. In fact, the majority of third-world countries which announce their adherence to socialism but not to Marxism-Leninism have always spoken in favour of peaceful coexistence; they have asked the two big powers to cooperate, and not to fight each other. Moscow's line is not necessarily unpopular among the non-aligned. Everything suggests that the competition between Moscow and Peking will go on for a long time. The West, which has less than ever a common policy, is confronted not by a communist bloc but by two strategies, one shaped in Moscow, the other in Peking, not to mention the multiple strategies of the countries of Europe and Asia which lay claim, more or less, to being Marxist-Leninist.

In Asia, the communist parties would no doubt like to follow the example of the east European countries and get for themselves a certain freedom of manoeuvre by taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split. (The North Koreans are already showing signs of this.)

How real is that liberty of manoeuvre in east Europe? The two blocs have always been mainly concerned with European affairs. They were created by the symbolic encounter of Russian and American soldiers in the heart of the old continent. They have not disappeared; the wall dividing Berlin was added in 1961 to the division of Germany and of Europe. Russian soldiers and western soldiers continue to face each other across the Potsdamerplatz. In the old capital of the Reich there is nothing incongruous in using the ancient term ' the West '. In fact,

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whatever the relations between Paris and Washington, the French and the Americans act together and jointly discuss their strategy when it is a question of what the Russians call ' the consequences of the second world war ', that is at bottom, the German question. Are they facing the Soviet bloc, or just the Soviet Union?

FOR a start, it seems useful to distinguish three spheres of foreign policy for the countries of east Europe. The first is that of trade and cultural exchanges with the West; the second is that of world policy, related to the United Nations and the third world; and the third is that of the German or European question. The order given is intentional; it is the order of diminishing freedom of manoeuvre for the countries of east Europe.

Rumania has its own trading policy and its own policy for cultural exchanges. It has not accepted Comecon directives, and its partners, brothers in socialism, have not made any great effort to force it to do so. The governments of east Europe decide for themselves what their trade and cultural relations with the West should be in accordance with their own requirements and circumstances. Granted that neither in regard to trade nor to culture are the governments or the communist parties entirely free. They must ensure a minimum of ideological discipline. Moreover, their economies are in many ways bound up with each other, and the Soviet Union has no need to use compulsion or threats to safeguard the system so created. The states of east Europe would find it as difficult to withdraw from the system as the states of west Europe would to leave the Common Market or the Free Trade Area. The margin of autonomy left to each is real but narrow.

It is not easy to choose between the two formulations: disintegration of the Soviet bloc in Europe, or stabilisation of the bloc thanks to toleration of national autonomy. Arguments are not lacking in favour of the disintegration thesis. Territorial claims, suppressed for twenty years, are coming to the surface again. Rumania has not forgotten Bessarabia nor Hungary Transylvania. Within Comecon and other communist councils each state takes pride in defending its national interests. The Soviet Union tolerates Rumanian hints about Bessarabia as it tolerates Chinese statements about the Maritime provinces. The successors of Stalin's successor no longer inspire fear. Have the men in the Kremlin lost the characteristic indispensable to the rulers of an imperial state, the will to govern?

On the other hand it can be argued that, at least in Europe, this toleration of nationalism does not imperil what is essential. Stalinist methods could not survive a Stalin. Once the Russian empire had been halted by the refusal of the east European peoples to submit to Russian domination, the regime of licensed liberty, such as that provisionally established, is perhaps the one best suited to Soviet interests and to the communist movement itself. In the next few years the two largest communist parties of western Europe, the Italian one particularly, will

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have opportunities open to them precisely because of the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Until now they stood for the importation of the regime established in the Soviet Union, and submission to that country. Now, in Italy as in France (assuming that the French CP comes to life again), their propagandists can argue that there is no longer any question of the one or the other happening. The Marxist-Leninist churches are becoming autocephalous.

It does not appear that any of the countries of east Europe have, either in the United Nations or in the third world, a foreign policy that differs notably from that of the Soviet Union, even if, from time to time, one or other of them votes differently from the USSR. As far as one can judge, aid from Czechoslovakia or East Germany to the developing countries is the result less of their own initiative than of a common or at least a coordinated policy. In any case, none of these countries is powerful enough to play a cardinal role on the world scene, even if it did have complete liberty of action. They will, then, all remain aligned, and not, like Yugoslavia, become non-aligned. The communist parties there are secure in their power while the present international constellation lasts, the more so as the Soviet Union is so close to them and as they make a show of resisting it. They are concerned both in the maintenance of this system and in the maximum autonomy within it. Most or all of these countries fear Germany and German reunification. On the one question of world politics which concerns them directly, they are in spontaneous accord. When the Moscow leaders ask the West to 'recognise' the DDR, they have no difficulty in getting support from Warsaw or Prague. The division of Germany, the territorial status quo, are not long-term solutions. But to the Poles and the Czechs, any change in the status quo seems charged with danger.

So we reach the following conclusion: the Sino-Soviet split has resulted in two different policies on the part of the two world powers which proclaim themselves Marxist-Leninist. The autonomy of the states of east Europe—in itself a reflection of polycentrism—opens up prospects for the future, but has not yet made any decisive change in the political constellation, and will not do so, so long as there is no general European settlement. Willy-nilly, the Soviet Union leaves to each of them a certain liberty of action not only in running its domestic affairs but also in its commercial and cultural relations with the West. It is a liberty which can be granted without implying any danger. So long as Russians and Americans confront each other in Berlin and Europe, no one, either in the East of the West, can translate verbal subversion or spectacular proposals into action.

SINCE 1947 international relations break down naturally into three separate spheres—diplomacy within the blocs, diplomacy between the blocs, and diplomacy between the blocs and the non-aligned. To conclude this article it is useful to suggest briefly some of the more obvious consequences of polycentrism in each of these three spheres.

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Within the Soviet bloc, the quality that the dispute with China has taken on resembles that of a quarrel between factions within a single communist party. The 'Chinese' and the 'Russians', like the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks of an earlier day, do their utmost to win the hesitating to their side. On the surface, it all looks as though what is at issue is how to win the majority at a congress. The reality is something else. The communist parties in power in Poland or Albania are not like factions within the RSDLP in 1900 or the Italian CP in 1965. The split is of quite a different order. The Russian leaders are anxious to get as many communist parties as possible on their side. Those parties which rule their countries are taking part in an immense contest of which the prize is authority within the communist movement—whether it will rest in Moscow or Peking—and the form the movement will take. This freedom of alignment or non-alignment may be of little interest to the peoples of these countries but it gives the leaders a sense of their autonomy and importance.

Within the western bloc Washington's authority is equally disputed but the challenge, coming principally from France, though it is strengthened by polycentrism within the Soviet bloc, did not have its origin there. General de Gaulle has always been hostile to 'American hegemony', to military integration in NATO, and has always rejected permanent commitments, always striven for as much liberty of action as possible in relation to all other countries, allied or hostile. He often spoke of a Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' before the open rupture between Peking and Moscow. The division of Europe into two spheres of influence, each defined by the internal regime of the countries they embrace, seems to him both a legacy of Yalta and contrary to the nature of things, and therefore detestable on both counts. It is contrary to the nature of things that the domestic regime, and not national interest, should determine alliances. If it is enclosed within a 'sphere of influence', France cannot accomplish its mission in the world.

The question must then be asked whether gaullist diplomacy does or does not coincide with that of the east European states. Does not the unification of the whole of Europe make an anachronism of the attempt to unify the Europe of the Six, or the unity of all the states of west Europe? In short, is the gaullist slogan 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' authentic in the sense of being something actually realisable? Or will it for some years remain a philosophical enquiry or an historical prophecy?

Since the fall of Khrushchev the Kremlin has taken a greater interest in France. The Prime Ministers of Rumania, Hungary, and Poland have been to Paris. Nevertheless, all this is still no more than a matter of visits and conversations. Is the time for real negotiations approaching? I do not think so. When the day for negotiations on German unity and the withdrawal of Russian and American forces arrives, will the states of east Europe be able to remain united and maintain a common front? I doubt it. For twenty years all Europeans have grasped the truth of a typically French saying—'it is only the provisional which endures'.

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And French scepticism would add to this that the provisional endures only if it is asserted, day after day, that it cannot endure.

However that may be, polycentrism in Europe has still worked to relax tension in the present and to arouse hopes of genuine pacification. Since the Cuban crisis in the autumn of 1962 and the Soviet acceptance of the status quo in Berlin, west Europeans no longer even pretend to fear Soviet aggression. Arguments about nuclear strategy have lost their virulence and no longer occupy the front pages of the newspapers. Everyone believes, as it were intuitively, that the Soviet Union, threatened in Asia by Chinese territorial claims and ideological pretensions, has no other ambition but to maintain the security of its western frontiers.

In the third world, and particularly in Asia, polycentrism has had the precisely opposite effects. Neither the war in Vietnam nor that between India and Pakistan was provoked by China. No Chinese soldiers have taken part in them. But the first would not be prolonged, and the second would not have started, if Chinese diplomacy had been other than it is —violent in its language about ' American imperialism ', skilfully using diplomacy rather than force, taking Pakistan's side and humiliating India in order to envenom the Kashmir conflict.

The whole of south-east Asia is threatened with chaos because no stable order has succeeded that of the imperial order of yesterday. Where the Soviet Union and the United States confront each other directly, this ' dual hegemony ' establishes as least an apparent order. Sino-Soviet rivalry inflames local disputes without eliminating the communist—anti-communist confrontation. The two great powers are no longer hostile enough towards each other to be able to impose some sort of discipline on their respective allies, but their interests are still too divergent in many fields for them to reign jointly in south-east Asia or elsewhere. Looked at from the military angle, the diplomatic system is still bipolar but the capacity to convince is not proportionate to the capacity to destroy. To the extent that the number of small wars increases, the fear of a large-scale war diminishes. This world of growing complexity promises to be a paradise for the analysts and a hell for statesmen. In it the first can display their ingenuity and the second will discover the limits of their power.

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AMERICAN GLOBALISM

Z. K. Brzezinski

NOT many years have passed since the days when America was the target of widespread criticism for pursuing its traditionally isolationist policy. It was held to be short-sighted, in view of the vital importance to America of who dominates Europe or Asia, and immoral, given the powerful totalitarian challenge to western values.

Since then the world has become much smaller and more turbulent, while American power and international involvement have grown immensely. It is therefore ironic that today the principal criticism directed at American foreign policy—by both domestic and foreign critics—is that it has become 'globalist' and that American policy-makers are too much inclined to see the world conflict as indeed involving certain basic values. Political realism, it is often said, dictates that America perceive the limits of its power, that in Europe it accept disengagement and a Gaullist 'European Europe', and that in Asia it settle for Chinese predominance which is said by some to be in any case inevitable.

It might be useful to pause and speculate briefly what would happen if Washington were now to revert to such an isolationist posture. What would be the impact on India, were the United States to accept even tacitly 'the fact' of Chinese predominance in Asia? Might this not tempt the Chinese to repeat their success of 1962, thereby further undermining an already weakened India? Where would the Japanese stand, once they became convinced that American power was no longer available for their protection and that America had conceded to China the paramount position in Asia that previously it had denied to Japan? How would the Germans react when they discovered that disengagement had become the official line in Washington and that Europeans were now to solve independently the problem of the European partition and of their relationship to their powerful neighbour to the east? The simple fact is that the world is full of places where the long-established predisposition of neighbours to wish each other ill would rapidly be translated into more direct forms of expression, were it not for the realisation that external force would be forthcoming to counter or contain local conflicts.[1]

It may be objected that the above summary is neither accurate nor fair to the neo-isolationist critics of the post-war American commitment to globalism. Their objection is not to the availability of American

1 One may add, parenthetically, that the Soviet Union performs the same restraining function but only in areas regionally contiguous to it: the Hungarian-Rumanian, Bulgarian-Yugoslav, and Polish-German conflicts are certainly lessened by the presence and availability of Soviet power.

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power for the protection of others, but to the alleged American inclination to dictate policy to those it protects and to disperse American power in futile commitments. Moreover, they might argue, the responsibility for assuring world peace rests with the United Nations and it is this organisation that ought to assume the onerous task of peace-keeping.

Unfortunately, the stark fact of the Cold War era is that the effectiveness of the United Nations is almost nil whenever the interests of the major powers collide. That was shown repeatedly during the postwar years in Berlin, Hungary, Cuba, etc. Hence the choice that the United States at times must face still remains the same as it was in Europe in 1940, or in Korea in 1950, or in Berlin or Vietnam in 1960: either to abstain from becoming involved and passively observe others determining the shape of things, or to apply its power and become involved in the ugly business of world affairs.

The commitment of economic and military power inescapably brings with it the opportunity to shape the future; conversely, if American power is committed without a corresponding degree of political initiative —whether in shaping a new Europe or in providing the impetus for non-totalitarian modernisation in Asia—America's destiny is mortgaged. It is therefore inconceivable that the United States could—or should—give other states a blank cheque for writing American foreign policy simply to avoid the charge of dictation.

Finally, the commitment of American power is not always a matter of convenience or of entirely free choice. Obviously, to the extent that many global crises are not only the products of local spontaneous combustion but are either exploited or even stimulated by those powers that see an interest to themselves in the creation of explosive situations, American power is likely to be involved in areas where it is most exposed and where its technological superiority is minimised. The 'minimax' principle is, after all, an ancient stratagem of political warfare.

IT has become fashionable lately to speak again of spheres of influence. Given new respectability largely by de Gaulle, who has been eagerly echoed by many academic critics of existing American and British policies in the Far East, the notion involves an image of the future in which the world is demarcated into regional spheres of influence: The United States in the Western Hemisphere, a 'European-Europe' somewhere in Europe, China in Asia, and Russia in what remains of Eurasia. Sometimes this concept is even advanced as a statement of existing reality, from which our policy-makers ought to draw the 'right' conclusions.[2]

[2] 'Chinese predominance in Asia is as much a fact of life as is American predominance in the Western Hemisphere, and our attempts to contain Chinese predominance in Asia through local military operations is about as sensible as would be China's trying to contain the American predominance in the Western Hemisphere by committing her military forces in defense of one or the other of the Latin American countries' (Hans Morgenthau, 'War with China', *The New Republic*, 3 April, 1965). This about a continent which contains another nation, Japan, with an incomparably more advanced economy than that of China, which in a mere few years could again make Japan into an advanced military power; and about a continent which contains

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It is doubtful that in the 20th century a sound policy could be based on this highly traditional and static concept. If applied to Asia, it would become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and that is precisely why the Indians, the Thais, and the other Asian neighbours of China are today watching closely how the West responds to China's challenge. Moreover, the traditional spheres of influence concept is not an adequate analytical tool for evaluating the threat to global peace posed by rapid changes and probably intensifying conflicts in the third world. Even if China were to succeed in asserting its revolutionary leadership and in stimulating a violent, radical, anti-western, and even anti-white revolutionary wave, it does not follow that China would become, in the traditionally accepted terms, a dominant power within its own sphere of influence. Rather, it would have succeeded in becoming the stimulating force and the leading centre of a revolutionary movement cutting across societies and even continents, capitalising on the self-exacerbated conditions of international chaos, perhaps in turn prompting even a negative feedback on the relations between the western powers and the Soviet Union.

The pervasive unreality inherent in much of the criticism directed lately at American foreign policy and the inadequacy of the analysis accompanying the criticism explain why the recent debate about President Johnson's foreign policy did not result in the appearance of any practical alternatives to existing policies; nor did it articulate new guiding principles for American involvement in international affairs. What was lacking was a mature understanding of the dynamics of our age and a clearer western definition of historically relevant political purposes.

THE American-Soviet confrontation after 1945 temporarily created an illusion of new international stability. Two global blocs, locked in nuclear stalemate, provided a seeming balance of power and reduced the risks of a new conflagration. That bipolar condition, however, is fast disappearing. The two blocs are gradually dispersing, while the nuclear stalemate is yielding to nuclear proliferation, with weapons of mass destruction soon to be possessed by highly unstable, volatile, and often irresponsible elites. At the same time a portion of the communist world, making the best of its economic and military adversities, has become actively dedicated to the promotion of revolution and guerrilla warfare within the less-developed parts of the world, hoping thereby also to intensify Soviet-American hostility and to revive the gradually waning Soviet revolutionary morale, badly shaken by the trauma of the Cuban missile crisis of late 1962.

another power with an enormous population, India, one whose economic progress has been at least equal to that of China. (*Cf.* D. Wilson, 'The Tortoise and the Hare', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 April 1965.) The comparison with the United States in the Western Hemisphere (stated as a fact) is particularly ill-chosen. The disparity in power between the USA and any other hemispheric nation is enormous; and for that matter, it is also between the USA and China. Hence the argument advanced above falls down on every count advanced on its behalf.

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In that setting, it cannot be the purpose of American foreign policy simply to stamp out the revolutionary wave or to create a sort of American-Soviet condominium. To attempt the first would be to refute what the American Revolution traditionally has represented to the rest of the world. Moreover, America cannot opt out of the revolutionary age without bequeathing the future to the communist states. To strive for the second would inevitably create fissures in the western alliance, thereby providing additional opportunities for Soviet efforts to divide the West; hence it would not be a stable nor a constructive solution to the problems at hand.

American global engagement must have three fundamental and interrelated purposes:

1. To maintain the common sense of unity between America and the West European states and to promote European institutional interdependence: otherwise Europe can easily revert to the unstable conditions that resulted in the two world wars and Europe's political suicide.

2. To encourage the eventual emergence of a looser community of the more developed nations of the world, including not only Japan but also most of the European communist states, so that the current conflicts among the developed nations can be gradually transformed into the beginnings of cooperation, particularly in regard to the third world. The willingness of the Soviet leaders to become involved in such cooperation will grow as they come to realise that western unity provides neither opportunities for communist expansion nor poses a hostile threat to the existing communist states, while the mounting chaos in the third world, abetted by the divisions within the developed world and exploited by the Chinese, may either force America and Russia into an unwanted direct conflict or give rise to new political systems that will support Peking in its anti-Moscow campaign.

3. To establish such international conditions that revolutionary changes taking place in many societies are directed to constructive ventures, and that the process of modernisation and development is not forcibly taken over by communist elites, supported by the more actively militant communist states employing the strategy of 'national liberation wars'.

Unless all three objectives are pursued and eventually attained, it is more than likely that the world will rapidly succumb to international chaos, made all the more ominous by the spread of nuclear weapons. Such chaos will certainly not be averted if the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world adopts a posture of gradual disengagement, refraining from the use of its military might in areas where local power is insufficient to meet the challenge of communist force, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, often specifically designed to negate the positive advantages of western economic aid. It should never be forgotten that any success of the more revolutionary communist factions is bound to have a feedback on Soviet attitudes, and that a revival in Soviet revolutionary expectations would automatically reduce the chances for

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ending the Cold War among the essentially western and developed nations.

IT follows that in certain places and times the quest for world order may require the use of force and that the successful consummation of the policy of peaceful engagement towards some communist states does not preclude taking a more forcible stand against violence by others. In this connection, some critics have argued that such active resistance may contribute to the restoration of Sino-Soviet amity or to the disruption of the American-Soviet détente.[3] Yet what is obviously forgotten when such an argument is advanced is that from the western standpoint the Sino-Soviet dispute or the American-Soviet détente are not ends in themselves but primarily a means for achieving more fundamental goals.

In the case of the Sino-Soviet dispute, its positive value to the West derives from the fact that it hinders the forcible expansion of the communist world, reduces the communist capacity for mischief-making, and helps to erode the revolutionary mystique among the Soviet rulers, thereby making them more inclined to see an advantage to themselves in a stable world. In fact, that dispute developed in large measure because the Soviets came to feel that the time had come to moderate their previous militancy and they warned the Chinese that direct pressure would not only fail in achieving the expansion of communism but could bring about a dangerous military confrontation with the West.

It would, therefore, make no sense to yield to the more radical communist states what in the past we have denied the Soviets merely in order to keep the Sino-Soviet dispute alive. For the success of the communist radicals would infect the Soviets, and communist unity would be restored not because of our resistance but because of its absence.

Similarly, the American-Soviet détente is to be welcomed when it neither implies a subordination of the interests of our western allies—for otherwise it could have a divisive effect, eventually likely to be exploited by Moscow, thereby altogether negating the détente itself—nor when it requires that such a détente be purchased at the cost of yielding in the East to pressures which in the West have been successfully resisted. It should not be forgotten that it was this success that laid the basis for the détente, in spite of the apocalyptic predictions of prominent 'realist neo-isolationist' critics, who during each Berlin crisis had urged a policy of concessions.

The importance and the desirability of the détente is to be measured in direct proportion to what it contributes to international stability, i.e. to the acceptance of the principle that in the age of rapid social change and immensely destructive weapons no major power can attempt *to impose by force* qualitative political changes at the expense of another major power's interests. The United States tacitly accepted this

[3] This was the theme of the *New York Times* editorials in February-March 1965, bitterly condemning President Johnson's policy in Vietnam, and it was widely repeated by his teach-in critics.

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principle during the Hungarian revolution of 1956; the Soviet Union was taught the lesson during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; and the Sino-Soviet conflict was exacerbated precisely because the Soviet Union learned the lesson. That is why it is so important that the West, and particularly the United States, be unambiguous in the definition of its interests and then equally unambiguously assert them, even at the apparent risk of military confrontations.

We still live in the age of weapons, even though increasingly we do not wish to use them. But the fear of using them rests on the consequences of their use, and not on a one-sided abstinence from them. It is therefore a contribution not to peace but to war to urge concessions by the West in the face of military pressures from the East. The West should not be urged to do what we do not expect the other side to do: to make unilateral concessions for the alleged sake of peace—or of the American-Soviet détente—simply because the other side chooses to exploit militarily some of its political and social opportunities.

Furthermore, it should be noted that such opportunities for international mischief-making are not one-sided: the West could also attempt to stimulate unrest in East Europe, to organise acts of sabotage against the Berlin Wall, to foster a guerrilla movement in Cuba or a national liberation struggle in Tibet. It is doubtful whether the western critics who vigorously object to western responses to pressure in Berlin or Vietnam, pressure designed to change the political *status quo*, would with equal vigour urge Moscow to yield for the sake of the American-Soviet détente.

It will not be easy for the United States, increasingly supported, it is hoped, by a collective effort of the West European nations and by Japan, to create sufficiently stable conditions in the third world, so that the unleashed energies and rapidly mounting social expectations of the newly liberated and politically activated peoples are channelled in a constructive direction. For this, western and particularly American involvement must be purposive and selective; an automatic and indiscriminating response to any radical communist challenge would dissipate and disperse western resources. Even limited commitments must be made on the explicit understanding that with the passage of time they could lead to a major involvement—and hence the stakes must be judged in advance as sufficiently high.

The criteria for choice will obviously vary, but some criteria are more misleading than others. In general, the old concept of strategic importance is probably no longer helpful. Korea was certainly strategically important to Japanese security in 1950; Laos in 1960 to that of Thailand or South Vietnam; South Vietnam to all of southeast Asia; southeast Asia to India; Cuba to the Caribbean, etc. In other words, almost any area is strategically important in a political confrontation of global consequence. This simply means that the political decision to defend an area—hence to make it a matter of political contest—automatically makes any area strategically important. This in turn

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brings the argument back to the question, ' What ought to be the criteria of the political decision? '

Broadly speaking, a combination of several internal and external factors must be present to justify a sustained western effort to help develop a backward country and to defend it against the communist ' national-liberation ' struggle. Obviously, there must be at least some local determination both to modernise and to defend the country, as well as some natural resources to make possible an eventual economic take-off, such as attained in 1965 by Taiwan. Moreover, the external impact of a possible communist takeover must be weighed in advance and it could be argued that occasional expansion of communism to countries that have neither the will nor the means to promote their progress could even turn out to be in some respects a hidden blessing.

Contrary to widespread myths, communist methods of industrialisation have not proven themselves to be particularly efficient or rapid. In some countries where the resources for industrialisation and modernisation existed, communism has done reasonably well. But by and large, rates of growth in communist countries have not been markedly higher than those achieved by some non-communist societies or by some countries before the communist takeover. In some communist states, social and economic development has at times even stagnated. The occasional expansion of communism to a backward and impoverished society, incapable of moving forward, thereby reducing communism's overall dynamism and social appeal, may be preferable to an indiscriminate western, and particularly American, effort to fight communism on all fronts everywhere and at the same time.

However, it is essential always to bear in mind that power has a psychological dimension. Once a commitment has been made, its subsequent withdrawal under pressure is far worse than a communist takeover in the absence of a commitment. The future is indeterminate but there are those who see communism as riding the crest of the future. That notion can be refuted only if the societies that consciously reject a closed society and a communist pattern of development do in fact advance and are assured international and domestic security in pursuing their development, even in the face of a deliberate and sustained communist effort to disrupt it. The Korean war showed that direct invasion does not pay. The Berlin and Cuban confrontations demonstrated that nuclear pressure is inadmissible where the vital interests of other powers are concerned. The Vietnamese war shows that ' national liberation ' struggles do in fact escalate into local wars and (for the first time in the history of established communism) that the sponsor communist state cannot enjoy with impunity a privileged sanctuary. As the range of unpunished international violence is reduced, the range of international cooperation will increase. Eventually, it is to be hoped, the United Nations will become the arena in which even major issues are peacefully arbitrated, but at this stage it would be mere wishful thinking to expect in the foreseeable future a major improvement in American-Chinese

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relations. The most that can be hoped for is a stalemate which may slowly ripen into a bilateral exploration of views, interests, and avenues of accommodation.

SINCE our purpose is to create a stable world in which the contemporary social and technological revolution finds a constructive outlet, it follows that western policy should not have the character of an anti-communist crusade. Indeed, in Europe the opposite is called for. There, the effort to forge stable, enduring, and growing bonds among the western nations can be reinforced by the simultaneous endeavour to develop a broader community of the developed states, including the Soviet Union and the East European peoples. This latter effort should be pursued even if in Asia or elsewhere tensions mount, for it is essential that some of the communist states see clear-cut advantages to themselves in a peaceful relationship with the West.

The policy of peaceful engagement may require a partial departure from established modes of thought that have taken root and matured during the phase of acute European Cold War and of West Europe's intense sense of dependence on America. Today, more than twenty years after the end of the war, that insecurity no longer exists and the Cold War is no longer so acute. It is therefore important to infuse a new sense of purpose into the Atlantic alliance—but this can be done only in a setting of wider goals and broader horizons. The concept of ending peacefully the existing European partition by fostering multilateral links with the European communist states would be likely to encourage the United Kingdom and Scandinavia also to see a greater role for themselves in closer ties with the Continent, thereby further enhancing the kind of cooperative and increasingly integrated Europe which has been sought since 1945. Finally, the adoption of such a broader policy is made all the more urgent by the present trends in both western and eastern Europe, pointing to the danger of renewed European balkanisation and with it to a decline in the vitality of the American relationship to Europe.

The fissures that have appeared in the West reflect the feeling of many Europeans that a merely defensive alliance with America against possible Soviet aggression no longer reflects the primary needs of the times, that in fact it contributes to the perpetuation of the European partition. That partition, de Gaulle argues, can be tackled only by the Europeans themselves. American policy has inadvertently helped to reinforce this impression; its primary stress on the Atlantic community strongly implied only a marginal interest in the active pursuit of policies designed to end the division of Europe. This left the field to de Gaulle, and it reinforced the sense of frustration among the Germans concerning the purely declaratory western policy on reunification. Gaullism first attracted many Germans because they saw in it the beginnings of a forceful western policy toward the East. Subsequently, realising that French objectives were different from the ones they had assumed, the

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formerly pro-gaullist Germans by and large did not return to the Atlantic orientation but, infected by de Gaulle's nationalism, turned instead towards an independent German orientation, preaching German explorations with Moscow. All that cumulatively weakened Atlantic ties, even though it is far from certain that it contributed to the emergence of a 'European Europe'.

More important still, it is very doubtful that a 'European Europe' can contribute constructively to a reduction of international chaos. In fact, the opposite may well be true. A Europe divorced from America would not have the economic wherewithal with which to approach the East, it could not guarantee its own security, nor could it eventually provide a balance for a reunified Germany. Such a balkanised Europe could become either a neutralist neighbour to the Soviet Union, dependent on Moscow's goodwill, or even perhaps witness new Russian efforts to promote a Russo-German deal to seal the fate of Europe. It is difficult to see how that could be in the interest of France, or Yugoslavia, or Poland, or Germany itself.[4] In any case, it would not be a step towards international stability but would tip the scales of history heavily in favour of Moscow.

Moscow itself, and even more its east European associates, are becoming more susceptible to western policies designed to transform the European status quo step by step into the beginnings of cooperation, provided the status quo is not undermined by western disunity or lack of firmness. The creation of the Common Market and the growth of western unity have been of decisive importance in challenging established communist orthodoxies and upsetting Soviet calculations. Furthermore, Soviet control over east Europe has so decreased that Moscow would find it difficult to obstruct east European acceptance of advantageous western offers of economic cooperation. Rumania has certainly proved this. Eventually even the Kremlin may wish to participate, given its internal problems and perhaps mounting Chinese pressure.

Admittedly, such cooperation would require a major adaptation in the Soviet world outlook, but the shift has gradually been occurring in the face of domestic developments and external failures which challenge the ideology. The Soviet breakthrough policy, exemplified by the Berlin and Cuban adventures, has failed, and the Soviet leaders implicitly have admitted this. The doctrine of national-liberation struggle, proclaimed by Khrushchev in January 1961 and formulated in the context of the

[4] Precisely for that reason not all East Europeans welcome the Soviet-encouraged campaign of the East European governments on behalf of de Gaulle's 'European Europe'. Some have given open warning against its long-range consequences and have explicitly come out on behalf of broader American-Soviet cooperation *in Europe*. See the extremely interesting article by E. Osmanczyk, 'United Europe, United Germany, and What Else', *Polityka* (Warsaw), 5 June 1965. Osmanczyk explicitly attacks de Gaulle's notion, which Moscow favours, of a Europe free from American influence, and argues that the presence both of the USA and the USSR in Europe is an enduring and stabilising factor. 'Europe cannot be united in the manner proposed by General de Gaulle: by weakening the position of the USA in Western Europe and of the USSR in Eastern Europe.' Osmanczyk goes on to call for increased collaboration between the two sides on the basis of the existing dividing line.

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breakthrough policy, was for a while pursued even after the beginnings of the détente with America. It is evident, however, that Khrushchev soon realised that the two could not be pursued simultaneously, and the Chinese seem quite right in charging that he was prepared to sacrifice the national-liberation struggle in favour of the détente. His successors also seemed to think that the gap between the two could be straddled, but by the summer of 1965 it became clear that a choice had to be made.

THE choice could be made easier for Moscow—and its consequences could be more desirable from the standpoint of world peace—if the options were maximised: commitment to national-liberation struggles means escalation and local wars fought in all likelihood in areas where the political beneficiaries of any communist victory would be the Chinese; or détente, with beneficial trade relations with the West, perhaps ideologically rationalised by Moscow by continued but more restrained support for various anti-western activities in the new states, and by diplomatic exploitation of western differences. (With many prospectively unemployed doctrinaires available in Moscow, it should not be difficult to present all this as a truly revolutionary Leninist policy.)

The global effect, however, would be further mutual restraint on violence and the increasing transformation of East-West politics into a game in which the major partners play by the same rules while keeping their own scores. We would calculate that drawing the east European states and the Soviet Union into closer cooperation, while resisting the more overt communist initiatives elsewhere, was a forward move towards a pluralistic and increasingly stable globe. Moscow might calculate that the West was becoming absorbed in endless conflicts, while Moscow benefits from cooperation with it and improves its world posture. Antimony of calculations, however, is often the essence of international cooperation.

To bring this condition into being will require a variety of intermediate steps designed to draw east Europe and Russia into a closer relationship with the West, thereby eventually setting the stage for the resolution of the German problem. It will require various measures to reassure the East on the existing territorial and security issues, as well as a major effort to develop multilateral economic and social relationships. The day is over when purely bilateral economic ties with communist states constituted a net political gain for the West. Today even the most rigid communist states seek such contacts, and Moscow does not interpret them as a defection to the West. Only widespread economic multilateral cooperation is likely to create an enduring fabric of international stability, and that is why the time is approaching when a broadly-conceived proposal for an all-European economic cooperation plan should be addressed to the East. Its purpose would be to cut across existing frontiers and to begin the process of constructive cooperation among the more developed societies.

In this effort, America may again have to take the initiative, given

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the inescapably more parochial German perspectives, the British inclination to settle for the European status quo, and the French involvement with the 'European Europe' illusion. As *The Economist* put it (6 March 1965): 'America must be a leader in the Atlantic alliance or nothing—in which case the alliance in its present form will cease to exist. And, if it is to be a leader, then it must lead somewhere. Without such guidance Europeans will remain a prey to economic resentment, the uncertain instinct of nationalism and the emotions inherited from a past of vanished supremacy'.

That 'somewhere' in Europe means clearly two interdependent goals: the further promotion of Atlantic unity and the simultaneous articulation of a grand initiative designed to establish a new relationship with Russia, thereby ending the 'civil war' among the developed and largely European nations. In Asia and elsewhere, the challenge is to create international stability so that the revolutionary expectations of millions of underprivileged people can be peacefully satisfied through the constructive cooperation of the more developed nations, including even some of the communist ones. Neither goal will be achieved overnight, but it will never be attained unless deliberately sought. Simply put, for America the choice is global engagement or international chaos.

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Under the Editorial Sponsorship of the

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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CONTAINMENT AND AFTER

Desmond Donnelly

IT IS NOW GENERALLY CONSIDERED that the Cuba crisis was the watershed in relations between the communist world and the western Powers. In writing of this Senator Fulbright states:

> In the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the United States proved to the Soviet Union that a policy of aggression and adventure involved unacceptable risks. . . . It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the character of the cold war, for the present at least, has been profoundly altered: by the drawing back of the Soviet Union from extremely aggressive policies; by the implicit repudiation, by both sides, of 'total victory'; and by the establishment of an American strategic superiority which the Soviet Union appears to have tacitly accepted because it has been accompanied by assurances that it will be exercised by the United States with responsibility and restraint. . . . These are enormously important changes. . . . Their effect has been to commit us to a foreign policy which can accurately—though not perhaps prudently—be defined as one of 'peaceful coexistence'.[1]

A similar but more limited judgment is made by Professor Richard Lowenthal: 'It may be assumed that the Cuban defeat proved a turning point in Soviet strategy'.[2]

The conclusions that have been drawn, however, differ considerably. Senator Fulbright's view is that since Cuba the Soviet Union has shown a new willingness to enter into mutually advantageous arrangements with the West; and the West should 'deal with the Soviet Union, for certain purposes, as a normal state with normal and traditional interests'. He cites the test-ban treaty as his principal argument. Mr George Kennan, whose general assessment of the current position has certain parallels with those of Senator Fulbright, has given a sombre warning against attempting to draw too many inferences from the Cuba affair. Whilst castigating in particular the school of extremist thinking that believes the Soviet Union's policy is largely a bluff, and that Moscow can always be forced to yield when faced with the stark alternative of war, he goes on: 'Whatever else may be said of the Russian communists, history affords no substantiation for the suggestion that they are cowards'.[3]

Both Senator Fulbright and Mr Kennan, in varying degrees, have entered a plea for a new appraisal of the Soviet Union's basic objectives and, as a corollary, the adoption of new western attitudes. Senator Fulbright's is the more radical and less sophisticated demand. He makes the specific statement, 'It is not communism as a doctrine or communism as it is practised *within* the Soviet Union or *within* any

[1] J. W. Fulbright, *Old Myths and New Realities*, pp. 4–5.
[2] In Arnold Wolfers, Ed., *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West*, p. 64.
[3] George F. Kennan, *On Dealing with the Communist World*, p. 14.

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other country that threatens us. . . . It is not communist dogma as espoused within Russia but communist imperialism that threatens us and other peoples of the non-communist world'. He clearly believes that the Soviet Union is in the process of abandoning both its basic evangelical appeal to the newly developing countries and its original aims of a communist world. The view that all communist regimes were alike in their threat is granted 'a certain validity in Stalin's time' but no more. This is a significant use of words, as it shows Senator Fulbright's thinking. Mr Kennan is more cautious in believing that, whilst political change will come in the Soviet Union, it will come—as far as our time is concerned—'only on the foundation of and within the framework of the present political system'. Yet both agree in advocating a more flexible approach to the Soviet Union and to the East European countries. They challenge the concept of ultimate victory in the Cold War. 'The question is not: Why not victory? The question is: What does "victory" mean?' says Mr Kennan, and goes on, 'I am not preaching a spineless pacifism'.

What then is it that concerns them? In essence it is that the Western Powers, under the leadership of the United States, are not taking due note of the changes taking place within the communist countries—Mr Kennan calls it 'a massive failure of understanding'—and are not adjusting their policies accordingly. What specifically do they advocate? Here there is a difference. Whilst Mr Kennan is an outspoken opponent of American policy in Vietnam, Senator Fulbright agrees that the American position had first to be strengthened in order to create a pad from which effective negotiations could be launched at a later date. Yet again it comes down to the same thing: they both appear to accept that in the post-Cuba era, the West is either divided or frozen in attitudes of inverted Stalinism and is unable or unwilling to take advantage of the new situation. What then do these distinguished American foreign-policy thinkers propose in terms of action? Mr Kennan wants more East-West trade for a start, and the eventual re-inclusion into the community of Europe of the east European states—a variation of his disengagement proposals. Senator Fulbright is more nebulous. He seeks a broadened 'frontier of loyalties' and demands that we 'generate expectancies of peace as powerful and self-generating as the expectancy of war'.

These are laudable aims but they leave much to be desired in their practicality. It is always desirable to explore the areas of possible agreement that are mutually beneficial, but it is also essential to consider them as they are, and not how we would wish them to be.

True, Cuba was a watershed, primarily because the Soviet government realised that it had misjudged the fibre of American will to resist and also because it was forced to re-appraise its areas of vital interest and to differentiate them from the areas of speculative adventure. The critical hours of October 1962 taught the Soviet government that the government of the United States also had its areas of vital interest. These lessons are, I suspect, imprinted indelibly upon Soviet foreign-policy thinking. Yet at no point do they amount to an abandonment of basic Soviet aims, as Senator Fulbright appears to believe. He has to face it that the Soviet Union, whether under Mr Khrushchev or Mr

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Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin, has not forsaken its belief in fostering the world-wide advance of communism by a combination of means that are violent and peaceful, revolutionary and diplomatic. He may argue—indeed, obliquely he does argue—that no communist state can be expected to give up overtly its revolutionary ideology. This ideology may indeed be abandoned in the future, but in the meantime we have to draw our conclusions from Soviet policy as actually practised in Vietnam and the rest of South-East Asia.

Are there areas, other than in South-East Asia, where circumstances are changing in such a manner that East-West agreements become possible? Messrs Fulbright and Kennan believe so. Yet the central problem that gave rise to the Cold War—the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe and the division of Germany—remains as intractable today as it did when Stalin reigned in the Kremlin. Mr Kennan must face it: his proposals for trade, and even credits for Eastern Europe, may create limited agreements, but they will be very limited indeed. His proposals will neither affect the communist basis of the governments of Eastern Europe, nor will they alter the military position because these governments owe their very existence to Soviet force. They will not substantially alter the closed nature of these societies because there are limits of easement beyond which authoritarian governments cannot go without prejudicing their existence. And if Mr Kennan believes that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from central Europe in advance of a major settlement of East-West problems, he will be proved wrong. Or take the 'neutral' Afro-Asian areas. It is true that the Cuba crisis has warned the Soviet Union not to undertake military ventures within the American zones of vital interest, and also where they cannot be supported effectively without resort to nuclear weapons because of American conventional superiority. It is not true to suggest that Soviet policy is any less expansionist in aim.

THERE ARISES NEXT THE ISSUE of the impact upon Soviet policy of the conflict with China and the effect this has had upon the positions of the East European countries. The dispute has unquestionably forced Soviet policy towards other communist countries to adapt itself to the necessity of competing with China for their allegiance. It has given these countries a limited sense of power that was lacking previously, but, as far as relations with the West are concerned, it has never gone beyond the point of a marginally greater freedom of manoeuvre in trading and cultural relations. The real effect to date is in relations amongst the communist countries themselves, and I believe it would be wrong to assume as yet that these are likely to be reflected in global East-West relations for, perhaps, another generation, and maybe, not even in the twentieth century. The much more likely area of change is in South-East Asia, as witness the opposing Soviet and Chinese policies towards the current India-Pakistan conflict. Here there is a common interest for Soviet and Western policy. Yet it would be wrong to assume that China will be either strong enough in the foreseeable future, or regard it as politic, to get involved in an even more direct conflict with the Soviet Union over India.

Implicit in Senator Fulbright's thinking is his feeling that continued

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western 'intransigence' towards the communist countries will work to our detriment amongst the so-called neutral peoples. To some extent this is true, but I question whether it is an issue either for great concern or of major importance. The lessons of recent years have shown conclusively that the neutrals are not neutral at all. Their leaders are largely addicts of the double standard. Their actions in general show them to be concerned above all with parochial interests. And their military significance, even in total, is of virtually no importance in any basic confrontation of power between the Soviet Union and the United States—as witness the impotence of the Afro-Asian countries in the United Nations in October 1962. This is not to say that the neutrals do not have a form of public opinion that is, at root, anti-Western because the Western Powers are associated with the experience of colonialism. Indeed, this is something of which we must always take note. But in my view it is best dealt with by a politically flexible approach to aid schemes so that they are related more closely to the policies of the recipient governments. It is a mistake to assume that the philosophies of western liberalism and their magnanimities apply or are appreciated universally. Yet this is the logic of Senator Fulbright's well-intentioned but misguided concept of world politics.

I come to the last question: Can Western policy influence internal Soviet (and Chinese) policy? This is the crux because the foreign policies of communist states are always more closely related to internal circumstances than is the case with Western countries. Indeed, communist foreign policy is often the specific expression of internal policies. To the extent that the western Powers have halted and contained the Soviet drive for power, it is true to say that Western policy had a profound impact upon communist thinking. Equally, it is fair to state that the development of American nuclear strength before Cuba and its subsequent expansion has contributed to the Soviet Union's internal difficulties and, to a lesser extent, the Sino-Soviet dispute. These western influences are negative. But can it be suggested—for this is the projected logic of Mr Kennan's position—that the changes, such as they are, in Soviet policies in the post-Stalin era are due to the fact that the western Powers have been 'nice' to the communist countries? Was Khrushchev encouraged to address the twentieth congress as he did because of internal stresses in communist society or because he was aware of Western liberal sympathies for any measure of destalinisation? Did the Soviet leaders accept the Chinese challenge from 1958 onwards because of the prospects of western policies or because they had no alternative? Finally, has the manifestly cautious Soviet policy recently been due more to American action over Cuba in 1962 or to more conciliatory Western policies? The first set of conclusions are inescapable.

Yet there are secondary conclusions to be drawn and some acknowledgment should be made to Messrs Fulbright and Kennan. Destalinisation has gone forward, to some extent, because western resistance to Soviet expansionism did not turn into intolerable western pressure. The Hungarian revolution is the clear illustration, for if the western Powers had gone to the aid of Nagy and his supporters, as all the inclinations of western liberalism urged, they would probably have provoked such violent Soviet reactions that the gravest situation would

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have arisen. Again, had the American tanks stationed in West Berlin been ordered to demolish the totally illegal Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961—as many western thinkers consider they should have done—the Soviet reaction would have been impossible to forecast. After the Cuba confrontation, the significant western policy was to pursue the test ban negotiations. This was shown to be completely correct because the signing of the treaty in 1963 amounted to a Soviet declaration of independence of Chinese pressures and widened the chasm between the two. Firmness, coupled with prudent exploration of areas of agreement may, over years, offer possibilities of advance. But there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between this approach and Mr Kennan's curious sense of guilt at western success and Senator Fulbright's almost headlong handshake.

Where do the potential areas of agreement lie? The test-ban treaty has shown that one possibility of slow advancement is in very limited forms of disarmament, but the lessons of the disarmament negotiations show how slow the progress can be. In marginally increasing East-West trade, as Mr Kennan suggests, there is another limited hope. Once the United States has established its military supremacy and demonstrated to the North Vietnam leaders the cost and perils of continuing the conflict, a new possibility may unfold. This may even lead to a wider acknowledgment of the Asian *status quo* because the Soviet Union has certain limited but definite interests that are complementary to those of the western Powers. Yet the final conclusions of any objective survey of East-West relations undertaken at this point in the mid 1960s must be reserved and largely sombre. The room for initiative or indeed manoeuvre for the western Powers is very limited indeed. The actions of statesmen are inevitably restricted. Those who make history have very little power to influence events during the present period. It is to be hoped that their opportunity may come in due course.

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NEUTRALISM AND POLYCENTRISM

Peter Lyon

NEUTRALISM and polycentrism are now very familiar terms, serving both descriptive and polemical purposes. It is very likely that they will continue to do so for some considerable time to come. Both have, of course, spread widely beyond the specific contexts from which they first sprang. As terms they are, indeed, new. But instead of therefore accepting that neutralism and polycentrism are novel features in the contemporary international scene, it is more accurate to regard them as old familiars, admittedly often in new dress and in new settings, and by contrast to regard the short period between 1949 and 1955 as a rare and exceptional period of global bipolarity: a period of tight bipolarity, which then gave way to loose bipolarity and may be giving way to multipolarity or polycentrism.

Generally, talk of the balance-of-power is talk about the character and distribution of power and influence among the Great Powers. The notion, the Great Powers, asserts a standard which is, while itself a very rough form of calculus, compounded of reputation and of approximate assessments of military might, actual and potential. Small states are, of course, part of the diplomatic system; but, by definition almost, they cannot feature as principals, as major items in the power equations of the general or world balance; balance-of-power thinking about the character of the whole diplomatic system is a perspective limited to the Great Powers. The Great Powers are those states which individually are assumed to be capable of dominating, or at least severely disrupting, the whole states-system unless checked by the countervailing pressures of their co-equals. Each Great Power, then, is seen as being capable of exerting considerable power in its own right; it is thus a polar power. There has always been a certain element of ambiguity as to whether there can be effectively two or more Great Powers associated together in alliances; and recognition of the obvious fact that alliances may or may not be binding, that they may be deceptively weak or deceptively strong, opens out a vast field for speculation and uncertainty. Be that as it may, the Great Powers together compose a system of mutual checks and balances, the general balance-of-power, which may at any particular time be stable or unstable, simple or complex, bilateral or multilateral. During the past three hundred years or so a multipolar balance-of-power has been much more common than has bipolarity. In this light problems of foreign policy usually arise in a polycentric, or multipolar, world; bipolarity is a rarer condition, usually forged by large-scale war. Basic to the question about the character of the world or general balance-of-power are the underpinning themes of how many Great Powers there are, and how these Great Powers comport

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themselves in their dealings with each other; do they seek to make and maintain or to disrupt alliances, and with what measure of success? These are all relevant questions to notice here because polycentrism is primarily about alliance-making powers; neutralism is primarily about those powers that seek to avoid membership in the alliances of the Great Powers.

Neutralism, so called, first sprang into political prominence in France in the late nineteen-forties, and very soon gained international currency. The label was first used, in journalistic argument, to designate, in intended disparagement, the position and outlook of those who were opposed to their country's membership in NATO. Subsequently, the term became applied more widely to denote all those countries and people who were opposed to being identified with what had become known as the communist and the capitalist camps, or alternatively as the Cold War camps; or, to put it more precisely, the neutralists were all those who were opposed, whatever the reason (and they were many and various), to being associated with the military alliances of either the Soviet Union or the United States. Neutralism thus originally meant all forms of dissociation from the Cold War.

When writing of neutralism my own preference would be to preserve a broad distinction between neutralism as an ideology—the sentiments, aspirations and aversions that kindle and sustain belief, as well as the arguments that characterise it at its most articulate—and when referring to neutralism as a foreign policy to use the label non-alignment. But popular usage is now so muddled and variable that it is probably best not to try to distinguish what are gross and shifting categories anyway, and to recognise that neutralism and non-alignment are now generally accepted as rough synonyms.

Ideological neutralism is present in overt or covert forms in all countries. For the desire to be dissociated from the Cold War, to remain outside certain military alliances, can stem from so many motives, ambitions, or aversions. Some obvious ones are: dislike of the dominant influence of great powers in world politics, fears of nuclear war, the desire to act, or to prompt action by others, as conciliators, mediators, peacemakers. Neutralism can also stem from parochialism, isolationism, idealism, or cynicism. It can thus be seen that the emotional well-springs of ideological neutralism are grounded in generally familiar aspects of human nature; but beyond saying this, the impact of ideological neutralism depends so much on local conditions and possibilities, on *enracinement*, that these processes must be investigated individually—though not here.

In the late 1940s neutralism as a series of protest movements against military alliances had been politically ineffectual; but from the early 1950s a new and more powerful and lasting current began. This was the foreign-policy neutralism of the newly independent states of Asia (and later of Africa), principally pioneered by India. These changes were symbolised by the shifting emphasis given to the term non-alignment,

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now preferred in popular usage, especially by those who wished to assert their independence of the Cold War rivals. Neutralism had already acquired connotations of passivity, of indifference to moral and political issues, whereas non-alignment implied a simple statement of fact, no formal alliances, and then could be embellished with more positive content as its proponents chose. Nehru, who always repudiated the label neutralism for India's foreign policy, first began to talk of his country's 'non-alignment' in 1952, which was for him a new label to summarise ideas which he had been expounding and developing ever since 1947, and in part since the late 1920s.

It was mostly the influence and inspiration of Nehru's ideas that encouraged many self-styled non-aligned statesmen, and some scholars, from the mid-1950s onwards to talk of a theory or doctrine of non-alignment. As a doctrine in the mouths of its votaries, neutralism came to be expressed either in vague lofty generalities or in highly contingent and particularist forms; there seems to be no middle ground. The particularist pleadings must, of course, be appreciated individually. The generalities usually embrace some or all of the following propositions: (1) that neutralism can help to mitigate and perhaps to eradicate international conflicts; (2) that neutralism is morally justifiable; (3) that neutralism is genuinely independent, perhaps the only genuinely independent policy; (4) that neutralism entails opposition to all forms of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism; (5) that neutralism helps to promote general disarmament and international peace.

Such propositions by now have been seen by some as the ingredients of a general theory of non-alignment, a theory believed to be rich in insights and of universal value and validity.[1] I believe this to be a very potent and wildly misleading myth. My reasons for saying this have been outlined elsewhere [2] and need not be repeated here. But it may be added that the basic assumption from which most theorising about non-alignment starts is just as ill-founded in the facts of international history as was Dulles's notorious counter-thesis that 'neutrality' (by which it was clear from the context that he meant non-alignment or neutralism) is, save in exceptional circumstances, short-sighted and immoral. There is little warrant from the past for regarding either alignment or non-alignment as the norm of international politics; both have been simultaneously present throughout the history of the modern states-system. There are, however, several tendencies usually present in alignment and non-alignment which do seem well grounded in fact. Great Powers do tend to be alliance-making powers; though it is less clearly true that small powers are invariably alliance-avoiding, some are alliance-shy at all times, some are not. Circumstances, especially geographical and military considerations, determine and alter choices. In the post-1945 world

[1] The ne plus ultra of this line of reasoning is approached in a recent book by John Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory* (1965), especially Part 5.

[2] See the author's *Neutralism* (1963) especially Chap. 3.

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there has been a close correlation between being a new state and professing non-alignment in some shape or form.

THE Bandung Conference, held in April 1955, gave a tremendous fillip to the swelling sense of Asian and African renaissance. It also had the consequence of increasing the self-confidence and widening the horizons of a number of leaders of non-aligned states. The practice began to grow up of certain non-aligned leaders consulting and acting together whenever this seemed mutually desirable. The Brioni meetings between Nehru, Nasser, and Tito were early evidence of this; and their meetings were the precedent for the later, much larger neutralist conferrings—notably those held in Belgrade in September 1961 and in Cairo in October 1964. Whereas in the early 1950s a neutralist foreign policy had been recognisable mainly in terms of the negative criterion of not being a member of the military alliances of the great powers, by the early 1960s the more widely recognised identifying feature of a neutralist foreign policy was rather shown by the attendance lists at the large neutralist conferences. At Belgrade twenty-five neutralist or non-aligned countries were fully represented, with a few other, mostly Latin-American, countries being represented by observers, a kind of quasi-neutralist status. At Cairo forty-nine countries were fully represented and ten countries sent observers. As early as 1955–56 Nasser at least had learned and then taught the lesson that even if neutralism is immoral, as Mr Dulles asserted, for 'active and positive' neutralism the wages of sin might be high.

It was about this time, too, that the notion of *le tiers monde* was first launched,[3] though it was more than four years later, after about twenty new states emerged in Africa in 1960, that its English equivalent, the third world, became a standard catchphrase. Even so, the third world was and is a somewhat ambiguous notion. To some it suggests a broad measure of agreement, with the non-aligned all pulling together in concerted harmony. This is still so remote from actuality, and likely to remain so, as to be entirely mythological. The solidarity of the non-aligned is usually greatly exaggerated. But this is not to say that the notion of the third world is entirely empty.[4] It is a convenient shorthand for a sizeable segment of the world and for processes no less, though surely no more, complex than those at work within the so-called western world. The third world, just like the other two worlds, has its amities and animosities, its feuds and friendships. In general, dire domestic disorders are more frequently encountered in the third world than elsewhere, and there will be no swift end to this.

Also launched in that climactic year, 1956, was the term polycentrism. The inventor was, as is now well known, the late Italian communist

[3] By the French sociologist Georges Balandier. See *Le tiers monde*, ed. G. Balandier (Paris, 1956).

[4] For a challenging view that it is far from empty, see Peter Worsley, *The Third World* (London, 1964).

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leader, Togliatti. In an interview with a writer for the Italian periodical *Nuovi Argomenti* of 16 June 1956, Togliatti said that different communist parties must pursue different paths: 'The whole system becomes polycentric, and even in the communist movement itself we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of a progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different.' This viewpoint, which henceforth was to be heard very often from many different sources in many different guises, was not, of course, entirely new. Basically, it was the line which Tito had articulated in the events leading up to Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, when he denied Stalin's claim that the world communist movement must have a single leading centre, and also defied Stalin's proud boast that he could waggle his little finger and bring Tito to heel. That Tito's successful defiance of Stalin did not also stimulate further communist non-alignment—which was in effect what Tito was claiming—was due immediately to Stalin's determination to stamp out Titoism in eastern Europe whatever the personal fate of Tito. It is to be remembered that Togliatti in thus endorsing 'Titoism' under the new mantle of polycentrism was speaking after Khrushchev's notorious 'secret' speech at the twentieth Soviet party congress had burst like a thunderclap around the communist world. Destalinisation was now the official vogue in the country which had long claimed to be the centre of world communism and the process of reconciliation with Yugoslavia was well under way. The trip of penitence to Belgrade had been made and the wooing of selected Asian non-aligned states was now actively being pursued. It is worth drawing attention to the fact that Togliatti was saying that the whole world system as well as the communist movement was becoming polycentric. This last point is being increasingly appreciated by the non-aligned states of the third world as well as within the communist world. For as the Sino/Soviet quarrel has developed and intensified many Asian and African non-aligned states have experienced its usually baleful, but sometimes—for them—beneficial side-effects.

The very fact that the split has caused China and the Soviet Union to be open rivals for their friendship serves to put the non-aligned on their guard in their dealings with the big communist powers. The warnings that each gratuitously gives about the other's iniquities and ambitions cannot have helped to improve the image of either of them in the eyes of those who are mostly coming to know them for the first time. The clumsy and bullying diplomacy of China's envoys as the Algiers Afro-Asian Conference collapsed, in June 1965, despite their strenuous attempts to avert this, was a striking reminder that easy diplomatic successes are no more the sure prerogative of China than of Russia, or of any other big power. The defeat of Chinese diplomacy (and the collapse of the Bandung spirit) was sealed when China withdrew from the Algiers conference, which was adjourned *sine diem*.

And if the leaders of the non-aligned are sufficiently interested to read the relevant Soviet and Chinese literature about non-alignment, they can discover that their official doctrinal outlooks are not, and probably

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never have been, strikingly dissimilar. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese leaders are disposed to regard non-alignment as particularly meritorious or permanent. Two examples must suffice: in an article entitled 'The Non-Aligned Countries and World Politics' in the *World Marxist Review* (April 1963), the author warned the non-aligned countries of what he called 'non-bloc fetishism' and continued:

> Non-alignment is the alternative to a pro-imperialist foreign policy, and is a gain *only compared with the latter*. A new type of international relations is being moulded by the socialist system, relations based on the principles of peace, equality, self-determination, respect for the independence of all countries, and on a fundamentally new type of diplomacy. Failure to understand this can but lead away from the general path of contemporary international relations. It would be tantamount to disregarding the fact that the world is divided into two opposed social systems—the socialist and the capitalist; it would be tantamount to ignoring that in our age the socialist world system is a cardinal factor ensuring peace, and the socialist countries will steadily increase in number, while the capitalist world will continue to shrink. To be sure, the number of non-aligned countries has grown of late, and will continue to grow. This increase is primarily due to the appearance of new sovereign states.

And in close agreement the *New Terminological Dictionary* printed and published in Peking defines 'Neutralist line' as:

> This is day-dream and can never be realised. Even its theory is not correct. As the world situation stands today there are only two roads—either to support capitalism or to support socialism—and there is no third road. Any vain hope to take on a third road is doomed to failure.

But to draw attention to these continuing doctrinal affinities is not of course to deny that recent years have provided mounting, unmistakable evidence of the depth of the now fundamentally unbridgeable differences between the Chinese and Soviet leaders. It is in this situation of a new great-power Cold War, Moscow v. Peking, that non-alignment in relation to this squabble has seeded and in at least one notable case, Rumania, has probably already taken deep root.

TODAY, while communist neutralism or non-alignment now features in the vocabulary of a number of western commentators, so far as I know there is no strong evidence of communist enthusiasm for applying these labels to themselves or even to their communist confrères. Probably there is a deep resistance in the minds of all who see themselves as sincere communists to believing that neutralism or non-alignment can apply to themselves at all.

Non-alignment within the communist world is not the same as in the third world. However, neither species does of itself *promote* polycentrism, though each non-aligned state may seek independent profit

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from polycentrism. This is because a new situation is discovered either in the process of unfolding or already in being. Talk—such as is now increasing with some students of world affairs—of the polycentric *policies* of small or non-aligned states is somewhat reminiscent of the fable of the grasshopper perched on the wheels of a travelling coach who believed that the world was revolving around him.

Non-alignment can now most profitably be seen in relation to changing balances of power, both the general or world balance and the relevant local balances. All the non-aligned states are unaligned in relation to the great powers' alliances which, as they took shape in the late 1940s and early 1950s, crystallised a certain distribution of power for a time. The nature of each state's non-alignment is nowadays strongly influenced not so much by the operation of the central balance as by the functioning of its local or regional power balance. Only world powers, that is, powers with general interests and capabilities, can substantially affect the general balance, though, of course, the advent of nuclear weapons has meant that all states have more than a token interest in the state of that general balance. But each and every state, aligned or non-aligned, is deeply involved in its local power balance, be it India vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, Somalia vis-à-vis Kenya and Ethiopia, Israel vis-à-vis the Arab states, or Cambodia vis-à-vis its neighbours. In fact, non-alignment is not, and never has been, an all-purpose foreign policy posture. Popular speech and writing may have almost sanctified the notion that there is an easily recognisable policy and attitude to world affairs properly known as non-alignment or neutralism. In fact, this is seriously misleading. There is not, and never has been, a single standardised non-alignment. And just as non-alignment must be regarded as a rough and variable category so too must alignment.

THE world is now passing through a phase where military alliances everywhere are in disarray. The complete disbanding of SEATO would not occasion great surprise and there is continuous evidence of dissensions within NATO, CENTO, and the Warsaw Pact. But it is wrong to regard the days of all alliances as approaching an end, or even to assume that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are inevitably doomed to dissolution. The society of sovereign states may at times seem to be well-nigh completely atomistic, but this state is never unrelieved, and alliances have always played a part in ensuring that this is so.

Though China and France are now obviously discontented with their alliances, so far neither of them has repudiated all their alliance connections. Many of their individual powers of leverage still stem from their felt right to criticise and to make claims on their super-power allies. France's influence in the world would probably diminish, as China's revolutionary influence would not, if she repudiated all alliance ties and thus lost the right of access and mutual consultation which alliances specify or imply. Yet recent French actions, and China's even more, have recalled attention to what has always been true, but was in the

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early 1950s apparently forgotten: that alliance obligations cannot be assumed to work automatically, nor can they for long freeze the ever shifting world distribution of power and influence.

The early 1950s were the years of crescendo in the Soviet-American Cold War. We are now in the days of diminuendo of that particular Cold War, and it already appears to many—usually too glibly—as less important and less dangerous than either the Sino-Soviet or the Sino-American Cold War. It is now a commonplace to say that there is a US-USSR *détente*, with the 'hot line' and the partial test-ban treaty invariably cited as illustrative examples. But it is important to remember that these particular Cold War hostilities are not yet over, nor is the multiple system yet fully in being. The US-USSR rivalry is an encounter of different interests, ideas and ambitions as well as a military confrontation of unprecedented might.

There are still, then, only two world powers, two powers whose technological and military ascendancy over all the rest is clear and likely to last for the rest of the century. Technological ascendancy does not, however, solve one's political problems; it may often add to them and complicate them. It may be tiresome, but it is always necessary to ask, when talking of polycentrism, 'centres' in what sense? While France and China have shown their ability and determination to resist leadership from Washington or from Moscow, support of a regular, reliable kind that they can themselves enjoy is still very small. And in their own spheres of operation much the same may be said of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Indonesia, or the UAR. On balance, the two greatest Powers now want to stabilise the world territorial status quo; in this sense, at least, they are stabilising centres. But there are many more than two political epicentres in the world, especially in the third world, and the greatest potential political epicentre of all is China.

Neutralism and polycentrism are now part of the ever-present and ever-changing complexity of the contemporary world, and there is no sure or simple way of knowing their significance short of studying many different forms. What is certain is that in a polycentric world, neutralism must be polymorphic.

For all statesman (and, incidentally, for all students of world politics), each year for the next thirty-four years is likely to provide ample confirmation of another of Trotsky's sayings: 'He who wishes for a quiet life has not done well to be born in the twentieth century.'

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RUSSIA, THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM, AND THE THIRD WORLD

Richard Lowenthal

SINCE the summer of 1963 there has been a notable revision in the official Soviet view of the part which non-communist one-party regimes in underdeveloped countries, particularly those in Africa and the Arab world, can play in following a so-called non-capitalist road of development; the revision has been in their favour, and has had a significant practical effect on Soviet policy and on the attitude of Soviet-oriented communists in these countries. Previously, although ready to give economic aid and diplomatic (and indirectly also military) support to such regimes against 'the imperialists', the Soviets were highly critical of their political and ideological positions. In the past two years this criticism has been muted for many of them; what has been tried instead is nothing less than the deliberate renunciation of independent communist parties, publicly acting as such, in a number of countries. This is something new in Soviet policy and in the international communist movement.

The problem of Soviet relations with non-communist one-party regimes has, of course, a long history. Almost as soon as the institutions of the Bolshevik one-party state, the first in history, had been consolidated, it began to be regarded as a possible model for other countries and parties—including nationalist parties in underdeveloped countries whose leaders in no way shared the ideological goals of the communists, but were impressed by the potentialities of this form of government as an engine of modernisation. With its monopoly of organisation and information, the one-party regime permits both the mobilisation of backward peoples for their own re-education and the maintenance of national unity during a period of enforced sacrifice. The use of the model for such purposes was first attempted in the twenties by nationalist leaders who looked to the Soviets as an ally against Western imperialism —by Kemal Ataturk in setting up the regime of his Republican People's Party, and by Dr Sun Yat-sen and his successors in reorganising the Kuomintang with Soviet aid and advice.

In both cases, the wish of these nationalist leaders to ensure the monopoly of political activity for their own parties naturally created an obstacle for the work of communist parties which their Soviet allies wished to promote at the same time. In the Turkish case, the Soviets soon resigned themselves to the suppression of the Turkish communists by Kemal, registering some verbal protests but maintaining an unchanged friendship with Ankara. In China, they compromised by the expedient

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of the 'bloc within', under which the communists individually entered the KMT while the Communist Party retained the right to conduct independent propaganda outside it. This first form of licensed infiltration proved a sham solution: it was to lead to severe disappointments for both sides, from Chiang Kai-shek's suppression of the communists in 1927 to his final overthrow by them after two decades of civil war.

After this catastrophic experience, a long time elapsed before any new attempt was made to establish a one-party non-communist state. Only in the later 1950s did decolonisation in Africa lead to the rise of a number of such regimes, the first being the Convention People's Party in Ghana, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, and the Union Soudanaise in Mali. These parties were not communist, but were markedly pro-Soviet. In particular, the two in former French West Africa had grown up before decolonisation under the influence of the French Communist Party and the communist-dominated French trade unions; their leaders had gained a good grounding in Marxism before they freed themselves from that influence—largely because of the French CP habit of sacrificing a consistent anti-colonial policy to the passing tactical needs of Soviet foreign policy or French domestic politics.[1] The official ideology of these parties was therefore much closer to communist doctrine than was the case with the national-revolutionary parties of the twenties; it showed a mixture of revolutionary Marxism with nationalist and pan-African elements, to which observers gave the telling name of Afro-Marxism.[2] Yet in the very nature of the case, this ideology was bound to be different from the orthodox Marxism-Leninism of the USSR, since the social structure of these countries offered no possibility of applying the idea of class struggle to their internal problems; nor did the need to concentrate all national energies on safeguarding independence and tackling the tasks of development make a class struggle within the country appear in any way desirable. Because of this immense difference in the real problems facing them (reflected in the eclecticism of the official ideology), these new ruling parties, while feeling a close ideological kinship with the Soviets and other communist parties, were not in the least inclined to accept Moscow's ideological authority, much less its organisational discipline. They found this steadfast adherence to their own mixture of national communism and classless African socialism the more easy to maintain as Moscow's ideological authority was visibly shaken even within the communist movement after 1956, and as the Yugoslav communists, after their second excommunication in 1958, deliberately encouraged the tendency of national-revolutionary regimes to assert their ideological independence and to keep clear of blocs in foreign policy, offering them for this purpose not only Marxist arguments but tactical advice and technical assistance.

[1] See F. Ansprenger, *Politik im schwarzen Afrika* (1961).
[2] Cf. W. Laqueur, 'Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, July 1961.

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For the Soviet Union, the rise of non-communist, or even semi-communist one-party regimes in Africa presented serious diplomatic and tactical difficulties, the more so as it largely coincided with a change in Soviet policy in the direction of greater communist party activity in the non-aligned countries. Between 1954 and 1958 Soviet policy towards these countries consisted primarily in support from outside—giving economic and diplomatic aid to the existing non-communist regimes, and supplying arms when they were engaged in disputes with 'imperialism'. The communist parties within these countries were also instructed to give 'critical support' to the policy of the 'national bourgeoisie', whether their rule was democratic or dictatorial. But in 1959, influenced on the one hand by the revolutions in Cuba and Iraq, and on the other by the anti-communist measures taken by Nasser in Syria and Nehru in Kerala, Moscow came to the conclusion that external aid was not enough to influence developments among the non-aligned, and that greater internal communist pressure had to be exercised to reinforce external aid from the Soviet bloc in order to push these countries on to the 'non-capitalist road of development'.[3]

THE new line took explicit shape in 1960–61 in the formula of the 'national democratic front' and the 'national democratic state', used for the first time in the declaration of the conference of communist parties held in Moscow at the end of 1960, and repeated in the CPSU programme adopted the following year. It meant that communists in ex-colonial and semi-colonial countries were to fight to complete the revolution against imperialism and feudalism in alliance with the national-revolutionary forces, to accept initially the leadership of 'bourgeois' nationalists, but at the same time to advocate their own immediate programme of radical land reform and of industrialisation by the state and to go ahead in building up mass organisations; they were thus to direct the national-democratic front towards the non-capitalist road, and to prepare themselves to take over the role of leader. As applied to the new states of tropical Africa, this policy required an intensive effort to create communist parties, which did not exist in the majority of the countries in question. *The African Communist*, a periodical which began publication in the autumn of 1959, was designed primarily to serve this purpose.

In practice, however, the policy proved difficult to carry out, particularly in the growing number of non-communist one-party states. The first Soviet list of countries which were said to be on the national-democratic road consisted of Indonesia, Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Of these only Indonesia had a national-democratic front in the

[3] Cf. R. Lowenthal, 'Die Strategie der nachkolonialen Revolution', in E. Boettcher, ed., *Ostblock, EWG, und Entwicklungsländer* (1963); 'On "National Democracy"', *Survey*, April 1963.

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Soviet sense, that is, a coalition of nationalists and communists led by the nationalists but with increasing communist influence. Under Castro, Cuba jumped the national-democratic stage more quickly than the Soviets expected (or perhaps desired) and proclaimed itself a 'socialist state ruled by a Marxist-Leninist party'. The three West African one-party states, though willing to maintain the friendliest relations with Moscow and to send fraternal delegates to the twenty-second CPSU congress, were not prepared to tolerate the creation of competitive communist parties in their countries, not to speak of bringing them into a coalition. In Guinea, suspicion of Soviet participation in establishing communist cells in the teachers and youth organisations of the ruling party led at the end of 1961 to a diplomatic crisis and to the recall of the Soviet ambassador at Sekou Touré's request. Similar difficulties soon arose with the development of one-party states in North Africa—in the first place with the consolidation of the Algerian revolutionary regime.

The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) had been supported politically and materially by the Soviets and the entire eastern bloc once it had shown itself to be a serious factor in the situation; Soviet support was not so wholehearted and consistent as Peking's, since Moscow had to consider French susceptibilities, but it made a substantial contribution to the success of the revolt which the FLN recognised. The Algerian Communist Party, on the other hand, which took no part in the early stages of the revolt, tried later to gain recognition as an ally of the FLN, but in vain: the FLN advised communists to join its organisations as individuals, but rejected a pact between the two organisations. When the war for independence ended in 1962 and a sovereign Algerian state established, the FLN promptly proclaimed itself the sole party and, after some hesitation, explicitly banned the communist party. This blow to Soviet hopes was the heavier as it was not a case of preventing the foundation of a communist party, as it was in West Africa, but of suppressing a party which had been in existence for many years. The CPSU central committee took the unusual step of expressing its 'deep regret and alarm' in a statement published in *Pravda* (4 December 1962). By early 1963, the communist parties throughout Arab North Africa, from Morocco to Egypt, had been banned, while in tropical Africa the formation of new parties encountered as many difficulties as it had under the old colonial regimes.

THE failure of Soviet strategy in the growing number of new one-party states might have been accepted with resignation as a temporary triumph of reaction had the suppression of communists been accompanied by concessions to capital, domestic and foreign, as communist theory would suggest. What compelled Moscow to reconsider its theory and practice was the fact that some of the regimes which banned independent communist activity put through unexpectedly radical measures of expropriation of both domestic and foreign capital and

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were ready to rely on the support of the Soviet bloc in any ensuing conflict with the Western powers.

This was true even of the UAR, not exactly a one-party regime but rather a national-revolutionary military dictatorship that was trying *après coup* to transform itself into a one-party state. Nasser's Arab Union, and the later Arab Socialist Union, had been created more than once on paper, but remained stillborn. But this regime, which put its communists in prison, extended the state sector of the economy far beyond the scope of large-scale industry by the nationalisation decrees of summer 1961, which covered medium and parts of small-scale industry as well—a victory for nationalist anti-capitalist ideology over economic rationality which stood in sharp contradiction to the expectations of Nasser's Soviet critics. And while Nasser thus followed the path of non-capitalist development, Syria, whose separation from the UAR had been enthusiastically welcomed by Arab communists, took up a much less unambiguous anti-Western attitude, but soon proceeded no less severely against the communists.[4]

In Algeria, the FLN had on the eve of independence in its Tripoli programme proclaimed its goal of achieving socialism under the leadership of peasants and workers and had warned the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements that their role in the new state would depend on their loyal cooperation on this road. In the spring of 1963, this socialist outlook found expression in Ben Bella's land seizure decrees under which the estates of the former French colonists were nationalised and their collective management entrusted to elected committees of the labourers—a measure of distinctly revolutionary character, as the Soviet and communist press recognised a few months later.

If the Soviet leaders and theoreticians still hesitated to admit the contradiction between the 'reactionary' anti-communist and the 'progressive' anti-capitalist measures of one and the same regime, there was no lack of good friends to bring it to their attention. In 1962 friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were again resumed, not the least important reason on the Russian side being the desire to use Belgrade's influence in a number of non-aligned countries. The Yugoslav concept of 'different roads to socialism' had always implied that in ex-colonial countries the road to socialism could be taken without seizure of power by the communists or even the existence of a communist party; the lead could be taken by forces which managed to combine the nationalist tradition with socialist goals. Moreover, the Italian communists had throughout maintained relations with the Yugoslav CP, and many of their leaders had come to adopt the same point of view; this was the more significant as the Italian party had long been in charge of liaison with the communists of Arab North Africa. Thus the Yugoslav and Italian revisionists could throw the weight of their practical experience into the scale on the side of a

[4] A comparison of the two regimes, in Nasser's favour, is made in G. Mirsky, 'The Changing Arab East', *New Times*, 1964, no. 2.

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reconsideration of policy. Finally, the impression created by the unexpected events in Africa and the Middle East was reinforced by the case most obviously in conflict with the theory, that of Cuba, which had become a 'socialist' state under the leadership of a man who had never belonged to the communist party before the capture of power and did not owe his power to that party. Recently he has renamed the Fidelista party, in which the old-guard communists hold little power, the Communist Party of Cuba.

THE discussion which preceded the change in Soviet policy towards non-communist one-party regimes in the underdeveloped countries turned on four inter-related questions:

The first, raised by a few Soviet experts in 1962, concerned the class character of these regimes. Was it still possible to describe Nasser, who had taken radical expropriation measures against the big bourgeoisie and substantial sections of the middle bourgeoisie, as representative of the 'national bourgeoisie'? Had not the undifferentiated application of this label to the nationalist leaders of the non-aligned countries, irrespective of their actual policy, become a serious obstacle to communist activity? Should it not be admitted that the mass basis of many of the ruling national-revolutionary parties was essentially peasant, and in part proletarian, and that in many cases their leaders also were not bourgeois in the classical sense, but intellectuals and officers of petty-bourgeois or peasant origin? In the West the peculiar characteristics of the typical leaders of national-revolutionary movements—their origin in the intelligentsia, or the 'intelligentsia in uniform', their transformation into a 'state bourgeoisie', that is, a bureaucracy wielding political power—had long been a subject for analysis. Now the Russians began to turn their minds in this direction.

The second question concerned the possible role of these leaders and their regimes in the decision whether their countries would pursue a capitalist or non-capitalist road of development. If they represented the 'national bourgeoisie', they were bound to promote capitalist development and so become an obstacle to the further advance of the revolution once national sovereignty was achieved. Intellectuals and officers of petty-bourgeois or peasant origin, on the other hand, were in principle free to choose between the two roads according to the domestic and international situation, but also to their own personal history and ideological convictions. Was this not the explanation of the radical measures taken by some of these regimes? According to the national-democracy theory, the choice of the non-capitalist road depended on growing communist influence in a coalition with the national-revolutionaries, but had not the actual course of events shown that some of the national-revolutionary regimes could take this road in the absence or after deliberate suppression of a communist party, though admittedly with the help of 'the socialist world system', that is, the Soviet bloc? In the words of a protagonist of revision: 'Where

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the conditions for the leading role of the proletariat have not yet matured, the historical task of breaking with capitalism can be accomplished by elements close to the working class. Nature abhors a vacuum.'[5] These 'elements' were the same nationalist-socialist leaders that had only yesterday been described as representing the national bourgeoisie, and the vacuum they filled existed partly because of the natural weakness of the communists in their countries, and partly because of their own anti-communist measures.

From this analysis a third question arose—what to make of the various eclectic ideologies going by the name of 'African socialism', 'Arab socialism', etc. In their mixture of nationalist and socialist elements they resembled the ideas of the Russian *narodniks*, and they had been combated in Soviet and communist propaganda as an attempt by the national bourgeoisie to mislead the masses with sham socialist slogans; the communists alone stood for *scientific* socialism, and all those who preached 'socialism of the national type' were so many frauds.[6] This dogmatic attitude was in keeping with the idea that only the communists could show their allies the non-capitalist road; but if a few of these national-revolutionary regimes had actually taken that road without communist guidance, should not their professions in favour of 'socialism of the national type' be recognised as expressing their choice of this road, and be encouraged accordingly? Soviet theoreticians now began to take the actual policy of the leaders and movements in these countries as the basis for distinguishing between the misuse of socialist slogans by reactionary regimes and the honest if still confused efforts of genuine national-revolutionary forces to provide an independent rationale for their anti-capitalist decision.

It was only when these three questions were cleared up that the Soviets could raise anew the strategically decisive question of the appropriate attitude to be adopted towards the claim of non-communist revolutionary one-party regimes in the ex-colonial countries to a monopoly of political power. The question presented itself in the following form: Was it really necessary to challenge this claim by promoting communist parties in competition with national-revolutionary parties which had chosen the non-capitalist road and were honestly anxious to pursue socialist goals? What was the point of the slogan of an alliance of equals, a 'national-democratic coalition' of communists and nationalists, in countries whose national-revolutionary leaders were prepared in large measure to carry out the policy desired by the communists, but considered the very existence of independent communist parties a threat to national unity? Was the pressure of competing communist parties really necessary in order to eliminate the ideological confusion of these leaders, to lead them on from 'petty-

[5] G. Mirsky, 'The Proletariat and National Liberation', *New Times*, 1964, no. 18.

[6] See the attacks by the Soviet Africanist Potekhin on 'African socialism' in *World Marxist Review*, November 1961, *Narody Azii i Afriki*, January 1962, and Khrushchev's speech in Sofia reported in *Pravda*, 20 May 1962.

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bourgeois' African or Arab socialism to a 'scientifically-based proletarian socialism' that is, to Marxism-Leninism? Or could this not be achieved more effectively by the cooperation of communist cadres within the framework of the ruling parties?

The question was the more timely as a number of new one-party regimes were showing signs of deficiency in political stability and ideological unity. Imitation of the external features of the bolshevik model was no guarantee that in all these regimes, some of them hastily improvised, the leaders would in fact have the authority to control effectively the mass organisations grouped round the one and only party, or that the latter, as spokesman of separate interests and groups, would not rather exert pressure on the party leaders. Even where the leader's authority was uncontested, as in Egypt, his performance in the realm of ideology was often too poor to imbue the state party he had created with a convincing and concrete conception of its tasks. In one case the pluralism flourishing behind a totalitarian façade, in another the ideological weakness, could open wide opportunities to communist influence inside these parties.

Apart from a few isolated instances, the systematic discussion of these questions became public only in the spring of 1964, that is, at a time when the decision in favour of revision had already been made [7]; that had happened in mid 1963.

THE first outward sign of a change in Soviet policy towards non-communist one-party regimes was an article by Mikhail Kremnyov in the August 1963 issue of *World Marxist Review*, in which the conclusion was for the first time reached that 'one can envisage the possibility of the influence of the growing working class increasing in these parties and turning them into mass parties of the Marxist-Leninist type'. This implied the recognition that these parties were by no means monolithic, but offered opportunities for influence to the 'working class', that is, to communist-trained leaders of affiliated trade unions, students' associations, etc. Many of these countries had government-controlled trade unions which had for some years been affiliated to the communist World Federation of Trade Unions and whose leaders had been trained in communist-run schools even earlier. A similar state of affairs prevailed in the mass organisations for students, teachers, journalists, women, etc., so that even in countries where there was no communist party a considerable number of communist-trained cadres held important positions. The idea of concentrating communist activity in these countries on the use of these opportunities was not proclaimed by Kremnyov as a new general line, but rather mentioned in passing, but the very publication of the article in that particular journal

[7] See the report of the conference in *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, 1964, nos. 4 and 6.

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showed that it was no mere contribution to a debate, but a directive.

The immediate occasion for the underlying decision was the situation in Algeria, and the application of the directive to the FLN regime was made manifest in the subsequent comments of the Soviet press and in the reports it published of statements by Algerian communist leaders when the new Algerian constitution was introduced in September 1963. These showed that an understanding was being reached, if not already in operation, between Algerian communist leaders and the FLN on recognition of the one-party regime and communist collaboration within it. In *Pravda*, on 9 September, Bachir Hadj Ali stated that the revolutionary-socialist orientation of the FLN programme had laid the basis for a 'fruitful dialogue' between the two, and shortly thereafter an authoritative article in *Kommunist* (16, 1963) declared that Algerian communists were 'not oppressed' and were free to propagate their views. The authors admitted that in 1962 the communists had opposed the one-party system, for which the country was not then ripe. Since then, however, the FLN, by its revolutionary land decree of March 1963, had set the country firmly on the non-capitalist road and proclaimed its goal of a socialist society; this justified the one-party regime and communist collaboration within its framework.

Final confirmation that the turn of the Algerian communists to a new form of 'licensed infiltration,' approved both by the FLN and the Soviets, had been completed, came early in 1964. In January Luigi Longo gave a report on the visit of an Italian CP delegation to Algeria; not only was the general policy of the FLN socialist and increasingly based on class struggle, but communist representatives of affiliated mass organisations were exercising considerable influence on that policy and particularly on the drafting of the new FLN programme.[8] In contrast to the Tripoli programme, which made a conditional offer to the bourgeoisie to collaborate in the leadership, the new programme, adopted in April, asserted that the bourgeoisie had shown itself unwilling to work with the regime towards socialism, and that it was therefore necessary to base the state exclusively on the cooperation of the toiling classes—workers, peasants, and revolutionary intelligentsia. The same congress which adopted the programme imposed a new structure on the FLN, designed to make it both 'vanguard' and 'mass party'—a small core of selected cadres and a large outer ring of members. These changes were explicitly welcomed in the Soviet and international communist press.[9] Immediately after the congress *Alger Républicain* (19–20 April 1964), the communist paper which had continued publication even after the suppression of the communist party, announced that it would in future appear as an organ of the FLN, with no change in the editorial board.

[8] *Rinascita*, 25 January 1964.
[9] e.g. G. Mirsky in *New Times*, 1964, no. 17; Ahmadi in *World Marxist Review*, 1964, no. 3.

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Clearly, a far-reaching understanding of this kind on the 'bloc within' was bound to bear fruit in closer and more friendly relations not only between the two governments, but also between the ruling parties in the Soviet Union and Algeria. When, immediately after the congress, an Algerian government and party delegation visited the USSR, 'Comrade Ben Bella' was given the title 'Hero of the Soviet Union' (*Pravda*, 2 May 1964), and the final communiqué on the visit emphasised the satisfaction of both sides with the development of party relations between the two, the commitment of the FLN to the 'socialist road of development', and its recognition by the CPSU as 'the unifying centre of all the contemporary patriotic and democratic forces of the Algerian nation in the fight for the socialist reconstruction of their state' (*Pravda*, 7 May 1964). Without abandoning non-alignment or proclaiming allegiance to the Moscow version of Marxism-Leninism (which would have given the Soviets the right to intervene ideologically in their affairs), the Algerian leaders nevertheless avowed their faith in 'socialist construction' in the Soviet sense of the term, no doubt in exchange for the recognition by the CPSU of their party monopoly. Henceforth this solution was to serve as a model for Soviet policy towards other non-communist one-party states in the ex-colonial world.

THAT the policy would be so extended was indicated by Khrushchev at the end of 1963 when, in an interview with editors from Algeria, Ghana, and Burma, he said that the road of 'national democracy', that is, a nationalist-communist coalition, was not the only possible road for the further progress towards socialism of national revolutions in the underdeveloped countries. While again condemning the use of socialist phrases by certain 'objectively' reactionary regimes, he now also welcomed the declarations of 'revolutionary democratic statesmen who sincerely strive to solve their national problems by non-capitalist methods and proclaim their determination to build socialism'; such regimes, he pledged, would get the support of the USSR (*Pravda*, 22 December 1963).

The interview was immediately greeted throughout the Soviet press as 'a document of creative Marxism', and interpreted as the signal of a general turn. Potekhin, the leading Soviet Africanist and prominent critic of the ideology of 'African socialism', now wrote (*Kommunist*, 1, 1964) that the term was ambiguous and was misused by reactionaries, which was why the 'scientific socialism' avowed by the ruling parties of Guinea and Mali was preferable; what must be decisive for judging other parties, however, was not the confusion of their ideology, but their action in choosing the non-capitalist road. The discussion which had until then scarcely reached the ear of the public, was now brought to a conclusion in a debate arranged by the Institute for World Economics and International Relations, in which the triumphant revisionists warmly welcomed the evolution of a number of leaders in

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the ex-colonial countries 'from the ideology of nationalism to the ideology of socialism of a national type', and expressed the hope that soon 'petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois leaders of the national liberation movements would come over to the working-class position'.[10] This hope implied nothing less than that the new strategy of renouncing competitive communist parties would facilitate the evolution of a number of non-communist one-party regimes into 'socialist' regimes—an evolution to be accomplished under the same leaders, whose legitimacy derived from their nationalism, more or less on the model of Castro's Cuba.

The countries encompassed by this hope were, in addition to Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali once again; moreover Burma, where General Ne Win had just begun to set up a new state party, and the United Arab Republic. Nasser's Egypt, because of its international weight, was indeed the main target of the new line, but it also presented the greatest obstacles because of the strength of Nasser's personal dictatorship, the low degree of political vitality in the official Arab Socialist Union, and the intensity with which communists had been persecuted.

The first Soviet-Egyptian feelers about turning the Egyptian communists into 'loyal collaborators' in the country's internal affairs, were probably put out in the autumn of 1963, about the time when Nasser released a number of political prisoners, including many communists. On 26 November *Pravda* advanced the view, until then held only by a few Soviet experts, that Nasser's 'state-capitalist reforms from above' had dealt a severe blow to the Egyptian bourgeoisie, thus beginning to create the conditions for entering the non-capitalist road. To make these achievements secure, political life would have to become more 'democratic'; in particular, communists would have to be brought into it. And in his December interview Khrushchev emphasised once more that a country could not both build socialism and persecute its communists.

When, in May 1964, shortly after receiving Ben Bella in Moscow, Khrushchev made a state visit to Egypt, the communists there were no longer in prison, but they were still forbidden to form a party. During the visit Nasser seems to have allowed them to work as individuals in the Arab Socialist Union and in the press, provided they renounced independent party activity. In any case, at the end of the visit, *Pravda* (24 May 1964) said it was 'logical to raise the question of enabling all those to collaborate who were interested in the victory of a socialist UAR'. The official commentary in *Kommunist* (8, 1964) bore the title: 'Unity of the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement.' Yet the aftermath of the visit revealed differences among the Soviet leaders as to the degree to which an optimistic appraisal of the possibilities of the development of the Nasser regime in a socialist direction was justified. While Khrushchev himself took an affirmative

[10] See footnote 7.

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view in the many speeches he made during the visit, and not only designated Nasser, like Ben Bella, a Hero of the Soviet Union, but also addressed him on that occasion as 'Comrade', the official statement of the Supreme Soviet bestowing the order avoided the term. The final communiqué on the visit, in the introductory paragraph, said the UAR had 'taken the road of socialist development', but in a later section attributed this formula to the Egyptian side, and quoted the Soviet side only as praising Nasser's policy of 'fundamental economic and social reforms' (*Pravda*, 15 and 24 May 1964).[11]

IN the following months it became apparent that the Soviet leaders had decided on the more cautious appraisal of Egyptian developments but approved the rapprochement effected by Khrushchev in practice. A leading article in *New Times* in June (23, 1964) referred to continuing ideological differences with the UAR, but suggested that closer relations with the Soviet Union would help its people to tread the non-capitalist, and eventually the socialist road. In July Kremnyov wrote with greater precision in the *World Marxist Review*: in the economic sphere, the big and even the medium bourgeoisie had been practically eliminated in Egypt, but the old bureaucratic state apparatus was still in existence; ideological development was lagging behind economic and social progress, and official propaganda was often reactionary in tone; the cure lay in drawing the masses into political activity; if the communists were really free, they could help in this.

This semi-official warning against Khrushchev's optimism did not imply either a retreat from the new line or from its application to Egypt, but only a more sceptical appraisal of what was already achieved there, in contrast to the rapid progress of Soviet and communist influence in the Algerian FLN. Opposition to the application of the new line to the UAR came from a number of Arab communists, above all from one figure of international standing, the Syrian communist party leader Khalid Bagdash. The Syrian Communist Party had always been the strongest of the Arab communist parties, and had suffered severely under Nasser during the time when the two countries were amalgamated. In a series of contributions in *World Marxist Review* (7, 8, 11, 1964) Bagdash contested the idea that Nasser's anti-communism could be overcome by a change in communist tactics and the renunciation of open criticism of his policy; nationalist intellectuals and officers, he argued, could in the absence of a strong proletarian party successfully lead the struggle for national independence and make real progress along the road to socialism by economic and social reforms, but they could never build socialism itself; for that the 'leading role of the working class', that is, a communist party acting independently, remained indispensable.

[11] For a detailed analysis of the changes in the Soviet formulations at this time see Uri Ra'anan, 'Moscow and the Third World', *Problems of Communism*, Jan.–Feb. 1965.

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This criticism could hardly be ignored by the Soviets, the more so as the Syrian CP was one of the 26 parties then invited to Moscow for the preparatory conference that was to discuss the Sino-Soviet conflict. In December, however, after Khrushchev's fall and the postponement of the conference to the following March, *Pravda's* publication of the communiqué put out by a conference of 'representatives of communists of Arab countries', showed that, despite the objections of Nasser's opponents, the new line was definitely to be applied to Egypt as well. The communiqué spoke consistently of 'Arab communists', not of communist parties; it did not once mention the Syrian CP, and throughout it concentrated on the parallel, if differentiated, developments in Algeria and Egypt. It was acknowledged that the FLN 'unites all revolutionary and socialist forces, including the communists', and that Algeria had taken the socialist road. In more cautious tones the communiqué welcomed the great economic and social transformations in the UAR, which had 'entered the non-capitalist road of development'; these would enable that country to make its way to socialism if democracy were extended and the Arab Socialist Union transformed into an organisation fully representative of the interests and ideology of the working people (*Pravda*, 11 December 1964).

Despite its obvious external similarity to the 'bloc within' practised in the twenties by the Chinese CP on Soviet urging, the new policy of licensed infiltration differs from it in three respects: in the stage of political development at which it is introduced, in the limits it imposes on communist party activity, and in the aims which it pursues.

First, the 'bloc within' was negotiated at an early stage of the national revolution, before the Kuomintang had become the government, whereas the policy of licensed infiltration is directed at ruling parties which have achieved national independence and is designed to move them on from the national to the socialist phase of the revolution.

Second, during the 'bloc within' period the communists insisted on their freedom to conduct their independent party propaganda outside the KMT, which they regarded—following Lenin and the theses of the Second Comintern Congress—as an indispensable condition for taking the lead in the second phase of the revolution. Today the communist cadres in the countries concerned are advised by Moscow to renounce such independent propaganda and to present themselves as advisers and assistants of the nationalist leaders, but on no account to appear as their potential rivals.

The difference in tactics is explained by the difference in aim. The aim of the communists in the 'bloc within' in China, as in the 'bloc without' normally used in united-front tactics, was to increase their own strength at the expense of their allies in order eventually to eliminate them, take over their power, and destroy their organisation. The object of present-day licensed infiltration is to win the national-revolutionary leaders step by step for a 'socialist' policy, in the Soviet

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sense of the word, to occupy positions of power under them, and to transform their ruling parties into parties of a communist type. As a model for the new strategy, Castro's Cuba is more relevant than the China of the twenties.

THIS is something new in the history of communism and appears at first glance as an extremely bold concept. It is true that the first non-Russian communist parties arose by the deliberate 'bolshevisation' of parties or groups of the democratic-socialist left, but these were not parties in power, and the ideological authority of the Soviet Union among all revolutionary socialists was then unchallenged. Castro's 'conversion' to Marxism-Leninism, on the other hand, was not the result of conscious Soviet strategy, but came as a surprise to Moscow; and the fusion of the Cuban communists with Castro's own 26 July Movement was not the cause but the consequence of that conversion. It may indeed be argued that Cuba's development into a 'socialist state' was the result of the coincidence of three weaknesses—the ideological and organisational weakness of Castro's own movement, which was totally unprepared for the seizure of power; the weak political standing of the Cuban communists, who had no prospects of competing with the prestige of the victorious revolutionary leader; and the weakness of Moscow's international authority, which could no longer enforce the subordination of a revolutionary regime that was geographically remote and independent in origin, even though that regime depended economically and militarily on its help, and professed allegiance to 'Marxism-Leninism'.

It is precisely in this combination of weaknesses that the Cuban model is relevant for non-communist one-party regimes in the ex-colonial countries. Many of the monopoly parties in these countries are better organised than was Castro's, but ideologically most of them are just as confused, and all of them suffer from a far more marked shortage of trained personnel than comparatively developed Cuba, where Castro's movement was recruited largely from intellectuals. For all these parties, therefore, there is a strong temptation to accept the offer of loyal cooperation of even a small number of communist-trained functionaries who have clear, if often rigid economic and political ideas, are relatively well-disciplined in their thought and action, and devoted to the cause.

Except in Vietnam, the communists did not lead the fight for national independence in any of the former colonies, and are therefore in no position to compete with the leaders of the victorious nationalist movements. Their chances of coming to power as rivals of the ruling party are minimal for at least another generation; on the other hand, their opportunities of gaining influence in these parties as functionaries and experts are considerable, and the attractions of licensed infiltration are consequently as great for them as for the nationalist leaders.

Finally, the weakening of Moscow's ideological authority not only

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diminishes the reluctance of the non-communist one-party regimes to cooperate with their local communists, but is also a consideration affecting Soviet policy itself. So long as the rule of a communist party guaranteed the subordination of the interests of the state concerned to Soviet interests, or at least seemed to promise the coordination of its policy with that of Moscow, any extension of communist rule meant the extension of the Soviet sphere of power. Today it means at best a weakening of the West and a chance to increase Soviet influence, at worst a Soviet obligation to give aid and protection without corresponding control, and the danger of ideological attack if Soviet aid does not come up to expectations. On the other hand a non-aligned national revolutionary regime with an anti-imperialist bent and friendly to Russia offers Moscow no fewer possibilities of exerting influence and far fewer burdens and dangers: in 1964, it seemed by no means certain that relations with 'communist' Cuba were more advantageous or freer of complexities for the Soviet Union than its relations with non-communist Algeria. Thus Moscow's loss of doctrinal authority and the progressive dissolution of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy might be converted into a means to extend its political influence in the world on a more flexible basis.

This last consideration, however, reveals the inherent limits of the new strategy. Its advantages for the Soviets depend on its negative features—on the renunciation of independent activity by the communist parties in national-revolutionary one-party states, and the consequent reduction of the grounds for possible diplomatic friction with them. But the long-term effect of licensed infiltration on the development of these countries depends on the cohesion and effectiveness of that same doctrine whose dissolution is bound to continue owing to the pluralistic decay of the world communist movement but also to the new revisionist strategy in these countries. How long will the communist cadres, having accepted Moscow's advice to work loyally within the national-revolutionary state party, retain their belief in an internationalist doctrine which each communist state interprets differently, or recognise an overriding loyalty to a Soviet Union which has obviously ceased to be the recognised centre of world communism?

The second inherent limitation lies in the national interests of the new states themselves. Some 'non-capitalist' measures against landlords and privileged foreign firms or in favour of the planned promotion of industry by the state may be in accordance with the genuine development needs of these countries; others may have a harmful effect on economic growth. But their actual foreign policy will in most cases be determined less by anti-imperialist resentment or ideology than by the attitude of the rival power groups to their interests—the size and form of development aid, intervention in regional conflicts, and so on. Communists who try to induce their government to foreign-political actions which its leaders consider incompatible with the national interest would soon find themselves isolated. The strategy of licensed infiltration may overcome

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the specifically organisational barriers which the non-communist one-party system opposes to communist influence. But no organisational strategem can overcome the basic political barrier of nationalism—least of all in the age of the disintegration of the world communist movement into its national elements.

POSTSCRIPT

Since the above was written, the Algerian coup d'etat of 19 June 1965 and the reaction to it of pro-Soviet communists inside and outside Algeria has shed new light on the policy of 'licensed infiltration'. First of all, the instability of the FLN regime confirms our thesis that many of the new one-party regimes in developing countries are only sham-totalitarian, because the leaders do not effectively dominate their organisations and continue to be exposed to the pressure of various affiliated groups. In this balancing game, Ben Bella seems to have increasingly leaned on the support of communist-led trade unions and student organisations against the army; the propaganda conducted in these circles even before the coup against the alleged 'Nasserist', 'militarist', and 'state-capitalist' tendencies of Boumedienne suggests that the communists were among the elements pushing Ben Bella to get rid of Boumedienne and his supporters. What is certain is that Ben Bella's overthrow has led to an immediate elimination of communist influence at the top, that the Algerian communists reacted to it by organising street demonstrations, and the Italian and French communists by bitter press attacks on Boumedienne, and that the Soviet government hesitated considerably to recognise the new leader; Boumedienne in turn has in his first public declaration rejected all attempts by 'foreign adventurers' to prescribe the course of 'Algerian socialism'. Before the coup, the merger of the communist *Alger Republicain* with the official central organ of the FLN, *Le Peuple*, was impending; now both papers have indeed disappeared, but the editors of *Alger Republicain* have not been taken over into the new *El Moudjahid*. In short, the new leadership has withdrawn the licence for communist infiltration—at least for the time being.

The new policy here described thus seems to have suffered a severe setback in its model country—a setback due to the very extent of its initial success which has mobilised nationalist resistance from within the ranks of the regime. Comparisons with the Chinese catastrophe of 1927, or even more closely with the events accompanying the downfall of Kassem in Iraq, are difficult to avoid, though the Algerian setback has not been as sanguinary. It remains to be seen whether this experience will compel yet another revision of Soviet policy towards the non-communist one-party regimes of the developing countries.

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CHINA AND THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

G. F. Hudson

FOR nearly three decades after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd in November 1917 Russia was the only country in the world in which a communist party held the power of the state. Elsewhere communist parties, whether enjoying rights of political activity or operating underground, lacked the authority of government for the fulfilment of their aims, but were at the same time free from the responsibilities and problems of administering a sovereign state. As members of an organised international movement, themselves without state power and concentrated on the endeavour to attain it, as their Russian comrades had already done, the non-Russian parties were willing to accept direction from Moscow as regards both the interpretation of Marxist (or, as it now became, Marxist-Leninist) doctrine and the main lines of political strategy to be pursued for their common purpose. Moscow was their Mecca and their Rome; the Russian revolution was their inspiration and their model, a utopia no longer confined to the realm of the ideal but already realised on earth. To preserve the Soviet Union against the machinations of capitalist powers was their first consideration, and they hoped to receive assistance from it when their turn came to make revolutions. In the circumstances of the twenties and thirties their subordination to the higher authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was one of voluntary submission; the Kremlin had no means of compelling the obedience of men who were beyond the reach of its political police, but the sentiments of loyalty were strong enough for the enforcement of a world-wide discipline, so that critics of its policies were silenced or expelled from their parties, and Trotsky thundered in vain in his endeavour to build a 'Fourth International' against Stalin, 'the betrayer of the revolution'. Heresy and schism were overcome; the company of the faithful remained undivided and the seamless mantle of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Stalin was cast over all the communists of the world. When Hitler killed himself in his bunker with the victorious Red Army in the streets of Berlin, it seemed that all dissent was refuted and that the international communist cause under Russian leadership was on the eve of a triumph even vaster in scope than the original revolution of 1917.

Vast it certainly was, for within five years after the end of the war communist state power was established not only in the countries of East Central Europe as far as the Adriatic and the Elbe, but also in the immense territory of China over the most numerous of the nations of mankind. Yet from this very victory came disintegration. Parties holding governmental control of sovereign countries were no longer

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as amenable to central international direction as they had been when they were wandering in the political wilderness. They began to 'get ideas' instead of simply doing and believing what they were told; even where, as in Poland and Hungary, they owed their power entirely to Russian military occupation, they soon began to find Russian tutelage irksome, and they were much more restive where, as in Yugoslavia, they had won power mainly by their own efforts. Yugoslavia was the first to break away from Stalin's well-ordered family. The dispute was not at the outset ideological; it arose from heavy-handed Russian interference in Yugoslav affairs. But when the breach had become irrevocable and the whole propaganda apparatus of the Soviet Union was turned on to the denunciation of Tito, Yugoslav criticism was extended from Russian behaviour to Russian doctrine, and 'Titoism' became an ideology. For several reasons, however, although it was originally a left deviation, it was not a move to outbid Russia in revolutionary militancy. Yugoslavia was, after all, a small country and could hardly aspire to become an independent base for a world revolutionary movement. Moreover, Yugoslavia had never been a main centre of European political thought, but had been very much within the orbit of West European intellectual influences, so that when the Russian spell was broken there was inevitably a pull back towards the West. Yugoslavia remained a communist party-state, but there was internally a certain relaxation of the regime and internationally it became one of the 'non-aligned' countries and found scope for its diplomacy in association with such bourgeois, but left-inclined and anti-colonialist, states as India and Egypt. Titoism was not regarded in the West as a menace; on the contrary, it was hailed as a most auspicious development leading away from the rigours of Stalinism and the asperities of the Cold War towards a more normal conduct of international intercourse.

The example of Tito's Yugoslavia, however, had a misleading effect on many Western political commentators because it led them to assume that, if communist China were likewise to break loose from Russian tutelage, the deviation would be in a similar direction and with similar happy results for the peace of the world. These observers were right in thinking that, if the national pride of little Yugoslavia could not tolerate domination by Russia, a communist regime in the most populous country of the world would be even less likely to remain submissive to it. But they were wrong in expecting a communist China emancipated from Russian leadership to move towards reconciliation with the West, a relaxation of the Cold War, and a softening of revolutionary ideology. What happened was just the opposite; China seized from Russia the banner of militant, world-revolutionary Marxism-Leninism just as Khrushchev was about to furl it in the name of peaceful coexistence. To the claim of Moscow that decisions of congresses of the CPSU were valid for the whole world communist movement, Peking opposed a claim to be the sole heir of pure and undefiled Marxism-Leninism and reviled

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the post-Stalin leaders of the CPSU together with Tito as degenerate revisionists. China's break with Russia implied no compromise with the West but an assertion of the communist faith in its most militant and uncompromising form in opposition to both the West and Russia—indeed to a bracketing of the West and Russia, not merely on account of the alleged collusion of Khrushchevite Russia with American imperialism, but also on the ground that Russia is essentially a European power and thus geopolitically and historically aligned with the West in contrast to the Afro-Asian world which China aspires to lead.

THE process by which Marxism in China came to be assimilated to an ethnocentric nationalism repeated a similar process which had occurred in Russia itself. Russia, like China, had been subjected to 'westernisation' and Marxism had been part of the stock of ideas imported from Western Europe. The westernisation, starting with the reforms of Peter the Great, had provided Russia with a modern technology and made her one of the great powers of Europe, yet at each stage of historical development Russia continued to lag behind, so that at the beginning of the twentieth century it was still reckoned the most 'backward' of the principal European nations. The prolonged cultural borrowing and the habit of looking to the West as the source of all enlightenment created in Russia by way of reaction a sense of humiliation and resentment against the West; this state of mind was exploited during the nineteenth century by the Slavophiles who held that Western civilisation was spiritually rotten and that Russia's way of salvation should lie in a revival of the religious values of the old Orthodox Christian Russia as it had existed before the Petrine reforms.

But such romantic archaism could not prevail in an age of rapid economic and social change, and in the opening years of the twentieth century westernisation was intensified. The Marxists were among the most radical of the Westerners; they were internationalists, seeking their inspiration in Western Europe, where so many of them lived in exile, and assuming what was then orthodox Marxist belief, that the socialist revolution must occur first in the most developed industrial countries. What happened, however, was just the opposite; the Bolsheviks captured and retained power in Russia, while the citadels of capitalism remained intact in Britain, France, and Germany. The event refuted the Marxist prognosis but it fulfilled the vision of Bakunin who had seen the flames of insurrection in Moscow as a beacon for the enslaved peoples of the world. Now at last the tables were turned; since socialism was the predetermined higher stage of human evolution, the Russians by making a socialist revolution had leapt ahead from being a backward nation to being the vanguard of mankind. They were now to be not pupils, but teachers; the world must learn from them as the pioneers of the new civilisation. From this sense of current superiority it was only a step to the glorification of Russia's national past, which was carried to such extreme lengths under Stalin; the

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Russians, it was held, had been the first to advance to socialism because they always had been a uniquely gifted and creative people. During the Stalinist period, whatever the Russian people suffered, they could always find satisfaction in the contemplation of their own greatness, and their international isolation—except in so far as it might involve strategic dangers—was a matter for self-congratulation rather than regret; it was natural for the capitalist world to be against them, but that was a tribute to their achievement; progressive people everywhere loved and admired them, as was proved to them by the endless succession of pilgrims to Moscow who added their due words of praise to the Soviet regime's panegyric of itself.

Now it has all happened again, but in another continent, and this time at the expense of Russia as well as of the West. In China, as in Russia, Marxism was an import from the West, with the difference that it came to China from the West *via* Russia, for there was hardly any knowledge of Marx in China before 1919. In China, as in Russia, Marxism entered intellectual life as part of a process of westernisation. But in China this process was not only much more recent and abrupt; it was far more alien to ethnic tradition and much more humiliating for the Chinese than it had ever been for the Russians. Russia might have lagged behind the historical development of Europe from the Renaissance onwards, but it shared in a common inheritance of medieval European civilisation; China, on the other hand, had evolved a civilisation of its own over three millennia, with only slight contacts with other centres of comparable cultural attainment, and the Confucian *literati*, who governed the Chinese empire only a century ago, were convinced that they were the only really civilised people in the world. With the disasters which befell China towards the end of the nineteenth century the traditional culture was discredited, and the younger generation turned desperately to 'Western learning', but it was a bitter traumatic experience thus to descend from the heights of ethnic self-esteem and become the pupils of 'barbarian' teachers.

The victory of the communists in the civil war did not immediately alter this situation. The new China defiantly repudiated the dominant political and cultural influence of America and gained military victory over the army of the United Nations in North Korea. But for a full decade after the founding of the People's Republic the Chinese communists remained within the political and cultural orbit of the Soviet Union, never a mere satellite, but a member of a bloc of states within which Soviet leadership was acknowledged. China depended on Russia for economic aid and military protection; there was a great and genuine admiration for Russia as the homeland of Marxism-Leninism and a will to learn from 'the Soviet experience'. It was only with the quarrel between Peking and Moscow from 1959 onwards that China freed itself spiritually from Russian, as well as from American, entanglements, and became once more herself alone, the Central Land, no longer a borrower of ideas, but in her own estimation the main source of truth and

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enlightenment for all mankind. A high price had to be paid for this independence; China's isolation was economically oppressive and strategically dangerous. But by way of compensation the Chinese since 1960 have had the enormous satisfaction of being in their own eyes, together with their adherents, the only genuine Marxist-Leninists. The next best thing to being the founder of the true religion is to be its principal legitimate representative, and this is what China claims to be after the lapse of Russia (according to the Chinese view) into revisionist heresy.

This is not to say that China picked a quarrel with Russia in order to assert itself ideologically as a rival for communist leadership. The facts of the record in so far as they are known, and particularly China's support for the idea of formal Soviet leadership of the communist bloc at the Moscow conference of communist parties in November 1957, indicate that China did not seek the quarrel; it was forced on her by what the Chinese communists not unreasonably regarded as the ruthless disregard of their interests shown by Khrushchev in his foreign policy. But once the conflicts of policy had been translated into an ideological dispute and the Chinese had been thoroughly roused in opposition to Russian direction of the world communist movement, Peking passed from defence to attack and emerged as a rival for international communist leadership. Chinese pretensions have grown enormously since 1960.

WE have by now become so accustomed to the fact of the rift between China and Russia that it is somewhat disconcerting to recall that in 1957 China was trying to persuade Poland to concede an explicit recognition of Soviet leadership of the communist bloc in the reformulation of communist principles undertaken to mark the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Yugoslavia firmly refused to subscribe to any formula which endorsed Soviet leadership and Poland accepted the principle only with the greatest reluctance. The Poles were surprised at the Chinese insistence on the clause because they had regarded the Chinese as their allies in the cause of polycentrism within the international communist movement, and the Chinese had in fact interceded for them in Moscow at the time of the 'Polish October'. But Mao Tse-tung's attitude in 1957 was quite a consistent one. He regarded the bloc of communist states primarily as a military alliance and it should therefore have a leader to exercise the supreme command in time of war and co-ordinate diplomatic and strategic policies in time of (temporary) peace; the preponderant economic and military strength of the Soviet Union made her the natural leader of the bloc for these purposes. On the other hand, Mao affirmed the right of each member of the bloc to manage its own internal affairs without interference from Moscow; he fully endorsed the idea of 'different roads to socialism'. In this conception of the bloc as a power coalition it was assumed that the Soviet Union was in a situation of permanent

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enmity with the North Atlantic coalition headed by the United States, and it was further assumed that for any negotiations with the enemy camp there would be consultations within the communist bloc so that the several interests of its members would be taken into account. Mao looked forward to great successes in world affairs through the combined efforts of the bloc, and it was at this time that he coined the slogan about the east wind prevailing over the west wind; he appears to have been deeply impressed by the first Russian Sputnik and to have believed that Russia had thereby really obtained a decisive military superiority over the West.

The actual course of Soviet policy after 1957 was, however, first disappointing, and then infuriating, for China. Khrushchev made a threatening gesture over Berlin in the autumn of 1958, but he took no action when the West stood firm, and embarked instead on the conciliatory approach to America which culminated in his tour of the United States and his meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David. He undoubtedly hoped to get his way over Berlin by a soft sell, but since this task was difficult enough by itself, he was not going to add to his difficulty by including Chinese demands on his agenda, and it soon became clear to the Chinese government that he was ready, if he could, to reach a settlement with America which would leave China in the lurch. Then in the autumn of 1959 came the Chinese military clash with India in Ladakh and the Soviet declaration of a neutral position with regard to the dispute. This was in Chinese eyes an unpardonable betrayal. China did not expect or need any material assistance from Russia in her conflict with India, but the principle of communist international solidarity demanded that one communist state should always support another politically in a dispute with a bourgeois state. The Chinese press was later on to date the Sino-Soviet rift from the stand taken by Moscow on this occasion.

It was the failure of the Soviet Union, as the Chinese saw it, to represent the collective interest of communist states, as distinct from the special interest of the Soviet Union itself, that stirred Chinese resentment at Soviet unwillingness to help China to become a nuclear power. Given a genuine fraternal solidarity of the communist states, it was obviously a rational division of labour within the bloc for Russia to go on providing the nuclear armoury while China devoted her relatively meagre industrial resources to conventional weapons. But after the events of 1959–60 the Chinese communists could no longer have any confidence in Russia as the guardian of their interests, and the pursuit of an independent policy as a great power appeared to them to require nuclear weapons of their own. Hence the concentration of effort on their production in spite of the great strain it imposed on the Chinese economy. The magnitude of the effort required to produce atomic bombs without Soviet assistance greatly embittered the Sino-Soviet quarrel, and it was further aggravated when the Soviet Union joined with Britain and the United States in signing the Test Ban Treaty, which was seen

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in Peking as an attempt to confine nuclear power permanently in the hands of those states which already possessed it and as confirmation of the alleged collusive understanding between Moscow and Washington for control of the world.

IN the ideological polemics which raise these conflicts of policy to the plane of doctrinal theory the Chinese case is that the Russian communists since the days of Lenin and Stalin have failed to live up to their heritage, have grown soft and faint-hearted in the cause of international communism, and have yielded to the illusion that victory can be obtained without armed struggle and bloodshed. The Russians are reproached for asserting at their twentieth congress that a communist party can take power in a state without violence and for talking about 'peaceful coexistence' as if it were a spell to eliminate the realities of class struggle and imperialist aggression. To the Russian charge that they are war-mongers the Chinese reply that it is the imperialists who will decide whether there is to be war or not, and that they are less likely to make it, or to wage it successfully, if they are confronted with militant revolutionary forces. Imperialists are 'paper tigers', not as formidable as they appear, and the important thing is not to be afraid of them; the Russians, however, in their excessive fear of war submit to American 'nuclear blackmail' and connive at the suppression of wars of national liberation, whereas China holds high the banner of an undaunted Marxism-Leninism and supports all peoples struggling against imperialism.

From all these polemics emerges a picture of a gentle and peaceful Russia never doing anything to create tension in the world, in contrast to a rabid, warlike China making mischief wherever it is possible to make it, and in so far as this picture is taken seriously in the West it is greatly to the advantage of Russia, for the very tendencies which are denounced by the Chinese communists as derelictions of Marxist-Leninist duty are regarded as signs of grace by Western liberalism. But if one compares the recent actions of Russia and China instead of their debating positions, there is a most remarkable lack of the contrast which might be expected. The nearest the world has been to general war since 1945 was during the Cuban crisis of 1962, but then Russia and not China was the protagonist on the communist side. Formosa is a more irksome 'bone in the throat' for China than West Berlin is for Russia, but China has not made the slightest effort even to capture the notorious 'offshore islands' since 1958. Even in relation to wars of 'national liberation' it is difficult to maintain that Chinese interventions over the past five or six years have been more vigorous or more provocative than the Russian. It was Russia and not China that materially sustained Castro's Cuba against American wrath; Chinese support took the form mainly of mass meetings in Peking. In the story of foreign interference in the Congo since 1960 Russia has been quite as prominent as China; it is Russia, not China, that set up a 'Lumumba University'

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and encouraged Egypt to supply arms to Congolese rebels by promising to replace any arms that were thus subtracted from Egypt's own stocks. In Laos, on China's own frontier, where conditions seemed specially favourable for Chinese intervention, there has been hardly any intervention at all; China left pro-communist military interference to North Vietnam and the airlift to the Pathet Lao in 1961 was carried out by Russian, not Chinese, aircraft. Finally, in the Vietnam war, although China's own strategic interests are so much more closely involved than Russia's, her assistance to North Vietnam has not been substantially greater than Russia's; both Russia and China have helped the Vietnamese communist regime, but neither has been willing to carry its aid to the point of direct combat with American forces.

It seems therefore that in practice, on the actual record of the last few years, Russia's revolutionary activity has been more, and China's less, than one would be led to expect by their verbal controversies. The roaring of the Chinese lion has indeed a blood-curdling sound, but the animal is couchant and not rampant. The roaring does, however, have an effect on Russia, for although the Russians are now quite as indignant against the Chinese as the Chinese are against them, Russia cannot but be sensitive to aspersions cast on her revolutionary integrity in front of the world's communist parties and the anti-imperialist zealots of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is difficult to estimate how far the fear of Chinese denunciations and the desire to outbid China in appeal to 'progressive elements' have deflected the Kremlin from policies it would otherwise have pursued. In some cases Russia might have acted as she did even if there had been no China to gibe and goad. But in the recent phase of the Vietnam war Russia would probably have been ready for an international conference but for the fear of being accused by China of betraying the Vietnamese people in their struggle against American imperialism.

The greatest effect of the Chinese polemics, however, is undoubtedly on the Chinese themselves. For home consumption they vindicate the regime, show Chairman Mao in a yet more glorious role, and enable the Chinese people to feel it is once more at the centre of the world. The Russian industrial advisers may have disappeared, taking their blueprints with them; the 'advanced military technology' which Russian soldiers were to have provided may still be lacking; but the Chinese can rejoice in their own virtue and be happy in thinking how right they are. Theirs is now the fountain-head of true doctrine, and that is more important than any material progress. Nevertheless there is a substantial material progress, even though it is so much slower than was hoped. There are also the great explosions in the desert of Lop to reassure China that she is indeed a Great Power with a future of increasing strength.

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POLYCENTRISM AND PROLIFERATION

Erasmus

A COMMON attitude among Western liberals at the present time is to hold that the trend towards polycentrism in international politics is a welcome development, whilst the trend towards nuclear proliferation is an unwelcome one. The emergence within the two opposing alliance systems of new centres of power is seen to be causally connected with the Soviet-American détente and applauded on that account; but at the same time the nuclear force with which they are equipping themselves is regarded with alarm and despondency.

There is no intellectual inconsistency in holding both of these views simultaneously, and there is every reason to believe that both are correct. It is not always recognised, however, that polycentrism and proliferation are different facets of a single process; and that in practice it may not be possible to encourage the one whilst frustrating the other. If this is so the question needs to be asked which of the following two sets of considerations should be given the most weight: the classical argument drawn from pre-nuclear international experience, that the replacement of a polarised by a polycentric international system will lead to increased stability; or the novel argument of nuclear-age strategic analysis, that an increase in the nuclear powers is bound to throw stability into decline?

Polycentrism and Stability

The classical argument has been that an international system in which power is polarised, as it was between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, contains two sources of danger. First, the balance of power is likely to be unstable since the two preponderant states cannot vitally affect it by procuring allies or depriving the opponent of them, but can only resort to augmenting their own intrinsic strength, especially their armaments. Second, the attention of the two dominant states is concentrated upon their struggle with one another, to the exclusion of other issues; a single conflict so dominates the international system and so absorbs political energies within it as to threaten an explosion that will produce its collapse.

It is too soon to say that the system of polarisation of power has broken down, or even that the trend away from it is an irreversible one. But the revival of other centres of power in Western Europe and China and to a lesser extent elsewhere has qualified the operation of the system and relieved much of the tension associated with it. In purely military terms it is still the case that the Soviet-American balance cannot be vitally affected by changes in alliances. But the aspirations of the major countries of Western Europe and of China to nuclear self-

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sufficiency are well-grounded enough at least to make it doubtful whether the polarisation of military power will last, and to make belief in its eventual demise a powerful present reality. Moreover, in political and economic terms the weights that third countries can throw into the scales are already big enough to have a noticeable effect in conflicts where the ultimate military sanction is not engaged.

The revival of other centres of power has also served to distract some of the attention of the United States and the Soviet Union away from the conflict with one another. While the Soviet-American antagonism still provides what Burke (describing the relationship of pre-revolutionary France and the Empire) called ' the great middle balance ' of international politics, it now shares the stage with other major conflicts within the two alliance systems and cutting across them. It no longer provides the sole outlet for their aggressive feelings, nor absorbs the whole of their military and propaganda efforts. The United States and the Soviet Union are even able to perceive the possibility of co-operating against some of the intruders upon the scene, if only for limited purposes. All of the major powers now have a wide range of choice of allies and antagonists, where in the 1950s they had virtually none; flexibility and mobility have been restored to the diplomatic system, which is better able to contain the rift between its two leading members.

Proliferation and Stability

There is therefore every reason to regard the rising diplomatic authority of France, Western Germany, China and others in recent years as having vindicated the classical arguments for preferring a polycentric to a polarised distribution of power. At the same time, there is good reason to believe that nuclear proliferation makes for a decline in stability.

General Gallois and others have argued that far from making the world more dangerous, the spread of nuclear weapons can be expected to usher in a period of unprecedented security; just as the presence of nuclear weapons in the Soviet-American conflict has made for moderation and caution, so they will have a tranquillising effect upon other pairs of antagonistic states.

In the first place, this argument exaggerates the tranquillising or stabilising effect that nuclear weapons have had upon the Soviet-American relationship. The Soviet-American strategic nuclear stalemate has existed only for the last ten years; for a decade before this the United States had either a monopoly of nuclear weapons or an effective superiority in them, and was in a position to contemplate preventive nuclear war. When the strategic stalemate did eventually become established, it did not remove the possibilities of war by accident or miscalculation; nor is there any assurance that the stalemate will not itself be eventually upset and a deliberate resort to war made a rational act of policy once again. Moreover, the most we can say for the beneficial effect of nuclear weapons upon the Soviet-American relationship is that

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it has made war between them less likely at the cost of enormously magnifying the risks of catastrophe if war nevertheless does break out. If we had the choice (which, of course, we do not have) between the pre-nuclear world in which wars were more likely to occur but less likely to be catastrophic if they did so, and the world that we have, it would still be rational to choose the former.

In the second place it is erroneous to assume that the spread of these weapons to other international conflicts will result simply in the duplication of the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation. Pairs of rival states, like India and Pakistan or Israel and the UAR, are unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons simultaneously; nor, after they have both acquired them, are they bound both to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces able to inflict enough destruction to deter any attack. What is far more likely is that nuclear weapons will be introduced into these conflicts in such a way as to confer a temporary monopoly or effective preponderance upon one side.

It is also the case that some of the potential newcomers to the nuclear club are inherently more likely to use nuclear weapons than the existing members: because, being dissatisfied powers with less to lose than the United States or the Soviet Union, they are more willing to take risks; because, being less rich and less technically sophisticated, they are not able to duplicate the elaborate safety measures that the major powers have applied to their command and control systems; and because, since they are less politically stable than the United States and the Soviet Union, their nuclear forces are more likely to fall into the hands of factions in a civil conflict.

Finally, the increase in the total number of centres of decision of nuclear war or peace (and the increase alongside it in the total number of operational nuclear weapons) is bound to magnify the dangers of accident and miscalculation that are already present. It is true that we should not think of proliferation as increasing insecurity in mathematical proportion; some newcomers to the club will be more dangerous members of it than others; and it is even possible that security will in some cases be served by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear power —while in the Middle East, for example, it is best that neither of the principal antagonists possesses nuclear weapons, it may be better that they both should do so than that only one of them should. But in a world of many nuclear powers the risks of accident and miscalculation are bound to be much greater, even though they are not so in proportion.

The Contribution of Proliferation to Polycentrism

If, however, there are reasons for believing that polycentrism contributes to the stability of the international system whilst proliferation detracts from it, the question arises whether in the nuclear age the latter is not essential to the former. Nuclear weapons are the decisive instruments of war in our time, and the threat of their use the most terrible sanction which one state can bring to bear upon another. The fact that these

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instruments are unlikely in the normal course of events to be used, and that there are many purposes in war and foreign policy for which they are quite unusable, does not detract from this fact. Moreover, while many of us in our minds try to distinguish between the trend towards polycentrism and the trend to nuclear proliferation, it is clear that in the minds of those who conduct the foreign policies of the principal states concerned in these trends the two things are closely connected. France and China, the countries most clearly dedicated to the overthrow of the system of polarisation of power, clearly see the construction of their own nuclear armouries as one of the bases of their policies. Nor is there any doubt that the resistance offered by the United States and the Soviet Union to the spread of nuclear weapons is founded upon the perception of the challenge this contains to their diplomatic position. The doctrine that the spread of nuclear weapons is dangerous to international society as a whole is held with sincerity in the United States and the Soviet Union, and enjoys a very wide (and, as has been argued above, deserved) credence elsewhere; but it is no accident that it is in the two preponderant states that the doctrine is held most strongly.

It is true that there are other important sources of diplomatic authority besides nuclear weapons, and that total impotence is not the only alternative to possession of them. Countries like Western Germany, India, and Japan have achieved for themselves a stature in world affairs that is very different from that of small powers; and Britain, France, and China would enjoy this kind of stature even without their nuclear weapons.

It is also true that a policy of acquiring its own nuclear weapons does not necessarily represent the best use that a potential nuclear power can make of its resources. There are a number of countries which, like Canada or Belgium, have neither a demonstrable military need for nuclear protection other than that afforded by their allies, nor the aspiration to great-power status to which nuclear weapons are a necessary accoutrement. There are other countries like Pakistan for whom, at least in the present state of technology, the attempt to acquire nuclear weapons would imply a drain on their economic and technical resources which on balance would leave them diplomatically weaker than they are.

American and Soviet 'High Posture'

It is true, furthermore, that the attempt of new nuclear powers to acquire invulnerable delivery systems in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to set in train counter-measures by these countries designed to frustrate them. In the United States it has become increasingly fashionable to argue that the two preponderant powers can preserve the system of polarisation of power against the threat of proliferation by deliberately maintaining a ' high posture ' of military force. It is said, for example, that if the two powers were in the near future to begin deployment of anti-missile missiles on a large scale, this would provide

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a means to this end. Anti-missile missile systems deployed by the United States, while they would not provide sufficient protection against a full-scale attack by the Soviet Union, might reduce the risk of attack by a lesser nuclear power to manageable proportions. If the United States and the Soviet Union together, so the argument goes, could make their cities more or less invulnerable to attack from the quantitatively and qualitatively inferior missile forces that other nuclear powers are likely to have over the next decade, they might discourage potential newcomers from wishing to enter the nuclear club, and at the same time provide a means of preserving their preponderant position if proliferation nevertheless continues.

Many potential nuclear powers, however, have in mind antagonists other than the United States and the Soviet Union, and would not be much deterred by American or Soviet 'high posture' policies. For those powers which, like France and China, do aspire to nuclear independence in relation to the major powers, 'high posture' policies would undoubtedly imply a challenge, but not one of which the outcome is a foregone conclusion. If, as many authorities believe, strategic nuclear technology has now reached a plateau on which it is likely to remain for a decade or so, the aspirant great powers may well take up the challenge with a fair prospect of ultimate success.

It is often pointed out that the equation of great-power status with possession of nuclear weapons is a dangerous doctrine. It is not desirable from the point of view of Soviet or American policy that potential nuclear powers should come to believe that prestige or authority or the self-respect due to a great nation can be achieved only in this way; nor, it may be argued, is the acceptance of such an attitude desirable from the point of view of international order as a whole.

But while it may be bad policy to allow the doctrine to gain credence it is not for this reason false. Nuclear weapons are not a sufficient condition of great-power status, as is clear enough from the recent history of Britain; but they are a necessary condition of that status, if by it one means the sort of relative independence in foreign policy that is enjoyed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The attempt of France and China to replace the system of polarisation of power is therefore essentially bound up with the prospects of their nuclear programmes. They may or may not succeed in fashioning out of their present nuclear capabilities sufficient invulnerable retaliatory forces in relation to the major powers; and even if they do it will not follow that they are comparable to the two giants over the whole range of the instruments of national power. But it is clear that if they do not succeed in doing so the present system of a qualified polarisation of power will continue to hold the field.

Although, therefore, it is possible to distinguish intellectually between the trends to proliferation and to polycentrism, the prospects of the two are bound up together; and if there is a choice to be made it is between

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two systems each of which has evident advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the stability of the international system.

There is, however, a more distant sense in which proliferation may be regarded as a danger even by the advocates of a polycentric system. In the spread of nuclear weapons one clear qualitative line of division has already been crossed; that between the two continental super-powers and the rest. But a second qualitative line of division, that between the secondary or medium powers and the small powers, has not yet been reached. If the circle of nuclear powers were to widen to include not merely a few more medium powers but a plethora of small states, this would be as much a threat to the system of several nuclear powers that might emerge from the nuclear proliferation of the next few years as it would be to the system of Soviet-American nuclear hegemony. The need to prevent such a world of many nuclear powers from developing, or, if it cannot be prevented, to mitigate its consequences, is likely to be recognised by the major nuclear powers, whether they are two or several.

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NUCLEAR PROSPECTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Curt Gasteyger

TWO events have fundamentally changed the character of the international system since 1945: the emergence of a social-revolutionary ideology as a vehicle of foreign policy, adding, to the traditional conflicts *among* states, that of permanent class struggle *within* states; and the successful development of nuclear weapons, creating an almost insurmountable gulf between the few who possess them and the many who do not. Both communist ideology and nuclear weapons have introduced not only additional elements of friction but also a new dimension of power which has had integrating as well as divisive effects on the international community.

Adherence to common principles as authoritatively dictated by Moscow was meant to strengthen (and justify) the unity of the 'socialist world' and to exclude all those who questioned its truth: its cohesive effect was strong so long as the unity of doctrine could be maintained and Soviet interests were considered to be identical with those of world communism. Nuclear weapons in turn remained for years in the hands of two or three powers who thought it highly unlikely that others would acquire them, and who formed an exclusive club whose main interest was to stay as small as possible. This ideological self-sufficiency as well as the nuclear exclusiveness almost inevitably antagonised all those who were either challenged by the former or excluded by the latter. It established a sort of dichotomy in international politics which in the long run could satisfy only those two powers whose position it improved—the United States and the Soviet Union. Whether they called it the 'division of the world in two camps' or a 'bipolar system' did not matter so long as it expressed the basic fact that they were the leading powers of the two alliance systems covering nearly two-thirds of the globe. For them this bipolarity not only came as close to a general stabilisation of the status quo as could be expected in conditions of cold-war rivalry; it also created between them a community of interest, the main objective being to prevent a general nuclear war. Hence the bilateral approach of both the United States and the Soviet Union to measures for controlling the arms race during all post-war negotiations.

It is difficult to say to what extent the Soviet-American bipolar concept was ever a reality and, if so, at what point its political (though still not military) basis started to crumble under the impact of polycentrism and nuclear proliferation. This bipolar world probably never existed to the degree many people on both sides were inclined to think: it was not so stable and durable nor were the alliances as cohesive and firm as they were thought to be. The process of their diversification had

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begun long before the effects appeared on the surface; it was in fact undermining the bipolar system before it had come properly into existence. Today we may well be at a decisive juncture of international politics, at which Soviet-American attempts to retain as much as possible of their bipolar superiority counteract the trends towards greater diversification and the emergence of more independent or semi-independent centres of power. Though one cannot predict the precise direction these two currents will eventually take in the next decade or so, one may venture to forecast some developments which are already faintly discernible today:

the military superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union will remain unequalled, though not necessarily unchallenged; in terms of military strength, therefore, the Soviet-American bipolarity will continue;

the process of further diversification within the alliances is likely to continue; it is at least difficult to see how it can be stopped or even reversed. The general loosening of the alliance systems, as well as the disintegration of the Afro-Asian group, may lead to new political constellations and forms of (particularly economic) collaboration;

the main driving force behind this prospective development will be new and old forms of nationalism often replacing former ideological bonds;

a further spread of nuclear weapons is likely, though not as quickly as was thought some years ago. Proliferation, however, need not necessarily run parallel to political diversification, not only because it has nothing or little to do with ideological affiliation but also because it is likely to take place first outside the military alliances;

a gradual change in the present military alliances will be speeded up not only by growing diversification and nuclear proliferation but also by the emergence of China as the great rival power of the Soviet Union and the United States. This may well lead to a far-reaching reversal of alliances.

WILL polycentrism spread further, dissolve existing alliances, and lead to the creation of new centres of power? Will a further spread of nuclear weapons play a decisive part in this? The answer to these questions depends largely on how one defines polycentrism and what nuclear proliferation actually means.

Polycentrism may be looked at from two different angles: to some it can occur only in an international system which makes doctrinal unity an essential condition of internal cohesion and in which unquestioned obedience to the leading power is expected at least as much of the ruling parties as of their respective governments. In this narrow sense polycentrism certainly remains a unique phenomenon of the communist bloc, with the possible exception of Nasser's Arab League in its early stages. If, however, polycentrism is defined as a trend towards growing independence among the members of an international alliance, leading to the

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establishment of new political centres challenging the leadership of the hegemonial power, the conclusion is that this broad concept of polycentrism may apply equally to what has been happening recently in the western world. Any comparison between China's challenge to Russia and President de Gaulle's challenge to the United States is obviously partial, but there are some striking similarities between the two attempts to re-establish a greater degree of independence, to the detriment of both the cohesion of their alliances and the position of their leading powers.

The very nature of polycentrism demands two specific criteria which clearly show its limitations as a trend in world politics. The first is the willingness and capacity of a country to set up a new centre of influence or possibly hegemonial leadership over a group of countries or ruling parties. China is seeking both, by exploiting its enormous political and human potential and effectively using its version of communist ideology. As the attraction of ideology depends largely on the success of its preacher, the impact of Maoism will certainly become stronger with the growth of China's political, economic, and military power. It may be doubted whether Peking will ever attain the indisputed and unchallenged leadership, political *and* ideological, that was Moscow's for nearly forty years. What is important is that China is probably the only country in the world which is not only determined to challenge the two great rival powers but also disposes of the necessary resources to do so successfully in the future. This is where any comparison with France or any other actual or potential polycentrist country ends. Within NATO (not to speak of other western alliances) there is no claimant for an equal status with the United States. In contrast to China, France is already touching the limits of its economic resources and political power. Neither France nor Germany nor Japan will ever be in a position to challenge the pre-eminence of the United States; China, on the other hand, may some day be a greater power than the Soviet Union. Though it is always possible for a smaller country, like Egypt, for instance, to establish itself as a regional centre of power, this will be of less significance for world politics as a whole (the acquisition of nuclear weapons could, however, as will be shown, alter the situation to some extent).

The second limitation on the spread of polycentrism is the capacity of a country to act as a lever on an alliance in order either to break it up or to loosen its cohesion so as to give its members more freedom of manoeuvre. No doubt China's defiance of Moscow's hegemony has split the unity of the communist world and allowed the former satellites to gain greater ideological and political autonomy. President de Gaulle's insistence on greater equality and more independence has affected the Atlantic Community, too. But already France's attempt to replace the alleged American hegemony over western Europe by its own is doomed to failure. France or, for that matter, any other western country, can do tremendous harm to the existing alliance systems or supranational

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bodies (such as the Common Market). But apart from the United States is there one which is strong enough to build up a new political centre?

There remains the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The question of war and peace is one which every country wants to decide for itself, and the fact that it has become the almost exclusive concern of these two powers is probably the most important incentive to polycentrism. It is true that because of the nuclear stalemate the middle powers have regained a greater degree of independence. But on all issues concerning peace and war their influence remains smaller than the members of an alliance enjoyed in the pre-nuclear age. In a way this is a comfortable situation. It permits the secondary members of either alliance system—and even the non-aligned countries—to pursue their particular goals in the confidence that there will be no world war so long as the great powers themselves have an interest in preventing it. It seems, however, not comfortable enough to satisfy the ambitions and security requirements of some of these countries.

Granted that Peking would not have pushed the quarrel with Moscow so far, nor de Gaulle have challenged the American position in Europe, if war had been feared. It is equally true that it is precisely this feeling of ultimate dependence and the ensuing frustration that stimulates polycentrism, reinforces the desire to challenge super-power hegemony. The challenge may be directed either to one of these powers or, as was the case with French and Chinese opposition to the test ban treaty, to the actual or assumed accommodation between them. The objective in both cases is the same: to reduce (or weaken) the influence of these powers, prevent any stabilisation (or increase) of their hegemonial status, and improve one's own position. The acquisition of nuclear weapons is considered to be the most important means to achieve these objectives. They are supposed not only to enhance national status and prestige, but also to become a decisive lever to force the great powers' hands in their decision-making about peace and war.

HOW would the further spread of nuclear weapons affect the present bipolar balance of power and promote polycentrism?

It took twenty-five years for the five countries which now possess these weapons to pass the nuclear threshold. This is a rather slow rate of proliferation, especially if one bears in mind the military importance nuclear weapons have and the political influence they bestow. Although one should not draw from past experience any conclusions for the future, the prospect of facing a world of ten or twenty nuclear powers in the forthcoming decade may well prove erroneous. Of course, nobody can know how long it will take for the present number of nuclear powers to be doubled. Almost certainly less than another twenty-five years, and perhaps less than ten years in the absence of an effective non-proliferation agreement. All we know today is that most countries have not yet taken any decision and that only two countries, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, have publicly committed themselves

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not to produce nuclear weapons. Furthermore, experience has shown that until now all nuclear powers have been extremely reluctant to share these weapons or indeed the technological know-how with even their closest allies. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in massive programmes of military assistance to a series of countries, allies or non-aligned. But, with two notable exceptions (USA and Great Britain on the one side, and the Soviet Union and China at a very early stage of the Chinese nuclear programme on the other), they have been unwilling to give foreign assistance in the nuclear field.[1] It is difficult to see why either side should abandon this cautious policy, but it would be over-optimistic to take it for granted that no change will ever happen. A nuclear power like China may have a number of reasons to depart from this line of self-restraint if it thinks some kind of nuclear assistance to another country serves its own interests better. Nevertheless, this is highly unlikely, at least for the foreseeable future. At a press conference on 29 September 1965 the Chinese VicePremier Chen Yi made it clearly understood that his country considered the question of Chinese help 'in the manufacture of atom bombs' to other countries as 'not realistic'.

There are other obstacles on the way to nuclear proliferation (high costs, lack of technological skill, the fear that it may upset the present stability and increase the danger of nuclear blackmail and accidental wars, etc.). But there are even more reasons for governments to acquire a nuclear capability: prestige and national security, the economic 'fall-out' resulting from such a tremendous industrial effort, and the recognition that the spread is inevitable. Nuclear proliferation in fact is contagious. And it is obviously more contagious in those areas where no alliance systems exist or where the stabilising effect of direct East-West confrontation does not impose additional restraint on the countries concerned. Paradoxically, nuclear proliferation is therefore most likely to take place in the non-aligned world, which is, in terms of industrial development, least qualified for it.

China only confirms the rule: one of the reasons prompting Peking to acquire nuclear weapons was precisely its growing distrust in the credibility of Soviet nuclear protection. But proliferation is, of course, not limited to any special area. A continuing spread in the non-aligned world may well induce the more reluctant industrialised countries to go nuclear as well. A further process of disintegration of the alliance systems, weakening the existing nuclear guarantees and in turn increasing the trend to greater self-reliance, can accelerate this development. Finally, some forms of nuclear sharing may materialise and neutral countries like Sweden or Switzerland may wish to strengthen their national defence by acquiring or manufacturing tactical nuclear weapons. Though it is hard to say *at what rate* proliferation will continue, there are many reasons to believe that it *will* continue.

[1] Cf. Morton H. Halperin, 'A Ban on Proliferation', in E. Luard, ed., *First Steps to Disarmament* (London, 1965), p. 133.

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It is quite another question what proliferation in these circumstances will mean. Its military effects may be quite different from its political and psychological implications. A nuclear explosion does not make a non-nuclear country a nuclear one. Militarily speaking, the only truly nuclear power is one with a militarily effective force including both nuclear weapons and a capacity to get them to their target. Politically—as the example of China shows—much less than this is needed in order to be treated (and respected) as a nuclear power. The decisive criterion in this respect is probably the determination of a country to go nuclear. In addition, minor forms of proliferation, such as the possession of a capacity to produce fissile material (like India) or of effective delivery means (like Germany), can provide governments with important possibilities for political action. It can therefore be argued that the actual acquisition of a nuclear force is no longer necessarily the only essential criterion for nuclear proliferation. There are various elements connected with the process of nuclear armament which will influence the policy of a country and the reaction of its environment: 'the potentiality itself can play a major part in international life, forcing rivals to respond and increasing the bargaining power of its possessors.' [2] Nuclear proliferation in a wider sense may therefore become a more diversified and complex phenomenon than it has been hitherto: it is not only the rise in the number of nuclear powers *stricto sensu* which can affect the present pattern of international relations, but also the various potentialities of political action that flow in one way or another from the bargaining power of nuclear weapons.

AT this point the question arises to what extent nuclear proliferation will stimulate polycentrism and threaten the existing balance of power. To assume that the spread is likely to go on does not mean that one should not try to prevent an indiscriminate arms race but only to suggest that, as Hedley Bull said once, it is quite possible to attempt to stop or inhibit proliferation while at the same time insuring against the possibility that it will take place. To what extent this will happen nobody knows. But it seems already highly unlikely that proliferation will stop only when every single country in the world has got its nuclear weapons. For a number of reasons (economic and technical barriers, political arrangements and security guarantees), there is probably a point of nuclear saturation beyond which the spread will not go. It is therefore one thing to assume that some further proliferation is inevitable, and a different one to believe in the inevitability of a world of some 120 nuclear states.

Whatever the precise number, would it make the world less safe and less stable? The answer to this calls for a number of qualifications. First: the acquisition of nuclear weapons will have different effects according to the nature of the countries acquiring them. If countries

[2] Cf. Leonard Beaton, *Must the Bomb Spread?* (London, 1966).

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like Sweden or Ireland go nuclear it would certainly affect the balance of power and threaten international security less than if Germany or Indonesia did. Furthermore, the question implies that there is in fact today something like a global balance of power providing both stability and security. If this were true it would be foolish for any country to upset it by acquiring nuclear weapons of its own. In other words, there would hardly be an impulse towards proliferation. Obviously, some countries like France and China do not share this view. They may possibly admit that there is something like a bipolar stalemate, but they are less and less willing to accept it as a guarantee of their own national security or indeed of that of other countries. In their view the attempt to prevent further proliferation represents a modern form of hegemony perpetuating the division of the world into two categories, the nuclear and the non-nuclear powers. Thus it is believed that any potential nuclear country which considers prestige and status an essential element in its policy, domestic or foreign, will sooner or later resent such nuclear hegemony and claim that it cannot be a true substitute for nuclear armaments of its own.

Objection to the nuclear hegemony does not, however, necessarily engender or promote polycentrism. A multi-nuclear world is not a multi-polar world. The French, for instance, maintain that acquiring national nuclear capabilities within an alliance should not lead to its disintegration or diversification but could, on the contrary, allow for new and better forms of collaboration. While leaving untouched (and unquestioned) the overall superiority of the leading power, such a nuclear pluralism within an alliance would add substantially to the security of its members and satisfy national or nationalist aspirations. Seen in this light, proliferation can be taken as a new means in the armoury of traditional power politics. By itself it has no ideological connotation.

But to what extent does the acquisition of nuclear weapons strengthen a country's position within an alliance? And does it, whether intended or not, promote polycentrist policies? Looking back at the recent evolution within the communist bloc and the Atlantic alliance, one feels inclined to say that in some form or other a strong trend towards emancipation from great-power leadership would have developed anyhow. The exclusive possession of nuclear weapons by the great powers did indeed sharpen and accelerate the almost unavoidable conflict of status and influence, but it may be doubted whether that was its central, let alone its only, cause. One may even go further and say that it was the very possession of nuclear weapons that restrained the great powers from trying to prevent polycentrism—not because they did not have the necessary power to do so but because its exercise was limited by the existence of these weapons.

It now looks as if a further spread of nuclear weapons will first take place not within the alliances, which still provide for a number of security guarantees, but outside them. If this is correct it serves as

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another indication that proliferation has only limited effects on polycentrism and that the chances of polycentrism itself spreading remain limited. The world in ten or twenty years from now may therefore well be a multi-nuclear one, but only in a very limited sense a multi-polar one. In other words, the growing number of powers possessing some access to nuclear weapons will only be a secondary cause of the gradual dissolution of the present politically bipolar system.

NEVERTHELESS, the emergence of more and more nuclear powers will affect and possibly even reduce the privilege (and burden) of the great powers to decide almost alone on peace and war on a global scale. From their point of view a multi-nuclear world may become less manageable. But there is no evidence that this world will become necessarily more dangerous and less stable. There is a general tendency to assume that great powers behave more responsibly than smaller ones. As holders of nuclear weapons the former may be technically safer, since they have developed a highly sophisticated control system which nuclear newcomers will not have for a long time or will not even be able to afford. It is therefore true that new dangers may arise in a world of more nuclear powers and greater political diversification. These dangers may be different from but not necessarily greater than those of today. The risks of accidental war may increase. Equally, the possession of nuclear weapons may become an instrument of political pressure on the non-nuclear environment or may serve to draw the great powers into a large-scale war (either by the triggering off a major power's nuclear forces by an allied or guaranteed state, or by a deliberate attempt to provoke war between the major powers—' catalytic war '). The possibility of such additional dangers cannot be dismissed easily. There is always the risk that nuclear weapons may be used either politically or in actual fighting; but that risk has been present since the first nuclear explosion took place and there is no foolproof guarantee against it as long as these weapons are with us.

On the other hand the acquisition of nuclear weapons brings with it caution about their use. This is so because the increase in the military potential makes a country at the same time more vulnerable to outside attack. China may be the test case. Though politically militant in almost every respect, it has become highly vulnerable since it decided to do without Soviet nuclear protection and establish itself as a nuclear power in its own right. The price of such a policy of national independence is therefore a greater degree of vulnerability and caution. It is a price not every country is prepared to pay.

Nuclear proliferation may also lead to a different and better assessment of the real political and military value of these weapons. As long as the number of nuclear powers remains limited, their possession is almost inevitably linked with a special power status in international affairs. As they spread, their value will probably be assessed more realistically and less emotionally. Their usefulness as a powerful

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instrument of political bargaining may decline, particularly in areas where a regional nuclear stalemate is likely to emerge. This is not meant to suggest that nuclear proliferation is fairly harmless and that nothing should be done to prevent it. But it is more realistic to base a policy of non-proliferation on the assumption that a further though only slow and numerically limited spread is likely, and at the same time try to minimise its dangers after it has occurred. It should therefore include both the attempt to slow down (if not bring under control) the rate of the spread by measures of arms control, combined or separate (such as a cut-off in the production of fissile material, an extension of the test-ban treaty to underground explosions, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, and the set-up of defence guarantees), as well as the promotion of adequate command and control arrangements once a country has acquired nuclear weapons, and the formulation of standard rules of 'nuclear behaviour' in order to minimise the danger of accidental wars and avoid the over-estimation of the newly-acquired nuclear potential.

Thus nuclear proliferation may lead rather to new forms of international collaboration and behaviour than to political 'polarizations' fundamentally different from those which are not already inherent in the present global constellation. These new forms may be less imposing and antagonising than the nuclear exclusiveness and political hegemony of the two great powers; equally they may be less binding and formal than the integrationist concept both alliance systems started with fifteen years ago. Although the two great powers will continue to bear a greater responsibility for the maintenance of the international order than anybody else, they may find it wiser to reduce their world-wide commitments as the spread goes on, or help to establish regional military 'stalemates' by which politically fluid or explosive situations can be stabilised. They will probably have to live not only with a more diversified and less manageable world, but also with the fact that conflicts at a lower level or of smaller size may flare up more frequently without calling for their direct intervention. Once they recognise that peace is not necessarily indivisible but may well become divisible again in a multi-nuclear world, proliferation may look less nightmarish and the danger of catalytic war less threatening.

Finally, this means not only accepting proliferation if it cannot be avoided, but also developing ways and means of coping with its new risks. There is no reason why the great powers should feel they alone are called upon to do so. In fact, it may be better if they did not. In this respect growing political diversification may have a salutary effect in promoting the decentralisation of political power and a more balanced sharing of political or nuclear responsibility. Neither is in itself a threat to international stability if they are taken by the great powers less as an attack on their leadership and more as a demand to share the burdens of power. The new nuclear powers, on the other hand, have to realise that they cannot ask for more influence without accepting more responsibility for common survival.

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STRATEGY OF SURVIVAL

Morton A. Kaplan

International Conflict and Behavioral Science * is a collection of papers delivered at a conference of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation and the New Hope Foundation. It uses behavioral science to explore the 'ways in which our knowledge of human behavior may improve the chance of human survival'. I have always been a firm proponent of the contribution that behavioral science may make to questions of international politics. This volume shook me in that belief.

I also admit that I am not sympathetic to the viewpoints expressed by the authors, not because I am opposed to human survival but because I do not believe that the prospects of human survival are enhanced by the naïvetés underlying the authors' propositions. There are academically respectable essays in this volume, for instance the articles by Boulding and Etzioni, even though their relevance to practical political issues may be doubted. Yet, as I continued reading, I began to suspect that a hoax had been perpetrated and I am not sure whether to treat the book seriously or as a spoof.

Arthur Waskow's article on 'Nonlethal Equivalents of War' is one of the most curious in the book. I was completely unable to discover the point of his remarks. Is he asserting that man has basic aggressive instincts which, if they don't eventuate in war, must be diverted by some substitute activity? If so, he has an extremely naïve view of man and the social process. Is he asserting that there are advocates of war and that the advocates of peace must find a different kind of competition that attracts those who might otherwise support the advocates of war? Or is he trying to answer the argument that certain national objectives can be obtained only by war by pointing out that non-military means may work? If this last is his intention, it strikes me not merely that he has chosen an extremely obscure way of making it known, but that he is tilting at windmills. Who does not agree that there are preferable alternatives to conflict under at least some circumstances? Waskow seems to feel that the 'thermonuclear strategists' do not, and he finds a curious objection to their reputed point of view. They cannot carry out tests designed to confirm their predictions whereas tests can be made for Waskow's predictions. I was not aware that the difficulty of predicting what might happen in a thermonuclear war eliminated the need to design a suitable weapons system or to think about a suitable strategy. Nor am I sure that Waskow's nonlethal equivalents of war, presumably for settling other problems, can really be tested. Many important problems are either non-recurrent or recur in new contexts. Although we may know what followed certain decisions, we often do not know what produced them or what alternative decisions might have produced. Yet we are left

* *International Conflict and Behavioral Science; the Craigville Papers.* Ed. Roger Fisher, New York, 290 pp., $6.50.

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with an inescapable responsibility to act on reasoning as plausible as we are capable of.

This is, however, not good enough for Waskow. He advocates 'the careful observation of a full-scale national campaign of nonlethal offensives, with preparations to change tactics if certain techniques did not work. The ability to research nonlethal equivalents of war is no mean advantage over thermonuclear strategy. The hallucinating subject of the sensory-deprivation experiment and the astrologer who never tries to check his predictions are men dangerously adrift in the world. Merely imagining the future is no way to build realistic images; it is those men who shape the future and watch it change beneath their hands who understand it' (p. 140). Should President Johnson's anti-poverty programme include funds for nuclear strategists who suffer from sensory deprivation? Poor souls, they cannot 'shape the future and watch it change beneath their hands'.

Anatole Rapoport's essay, entitled 'Perceiving the Cold War', seemingly attempts to create sympathy for the nuclear strategists under the guise of attacking them. Rapoport starts with a picture of the professional strategic analyst that could only appear demented to the members of this professional community. He cites no evidence to sustain his view. He merely asserts it. The professional strategist is a person, according to Rapoport, whose professional experience involves games in which winners take all. Rapoport himself is a gifted student of game theory, and he is well aware that game theory includes cooperative games. He says, however, that the strategist must believe that both sides must be 'entirely and irrevocably committed to The System (which must be pictured as utterly evil) and The Game. The essential image is reduced to this; The Game is being played exclusively according to strategic considerations, like chess, where it is certain, not merely probable, that whatever can be done to gain an advantage or to harm the opponent will be done by the rational player. The penalty for losing The Game is submission to The System' (p. 16). Since the strategist dare not look at the consequences of the nuclear game, he must fix his attention on the consequences of losing the game and these must be viewed as utterly evil or he would not be able to play the game. In my years of participating in the 'game' of professional strategy, I have not met or read the work of any professional strategist of repute for whom this description would be anything but the most ludicrous kind of caricature.

Rapoport's second article in this volume, 'Critique of Strategic Thinking', states that the strategic thinker assumes his opponent to be ruthless, cunning, and completely rational, and that he believes his models to give rise to correct prescriptions for political behavior. The strategist, he argues, cannot cope with or even adequately consider irrational behavior. If we could find such an ignoramus, not only would Rapoport's strictures apply, but we could find even more devastating objections to his methods than Rapoport instructs us in.

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE to give briefly an accurate description of what it is that defence analysts do. But they certainly do not fail to distinguish between zero sum and non-zero sum situations. Indeed, most of their analyses cannot be carried on in terms of game theory at all, since game

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theory does not present appropriate models. There are two basic kinds of activities that may be said to be carried on by the defence analyst. One is the design of weapons systems. Here the question of rationality which concerns Rapoport so much does not enter into the problem in the way in which he thinks it does. Although the putative enemy may not use his weapons system in order to inflict maximum damage, a system which optimises against optimum use of the enemy's system is good enough for all practical purposes. (There are technical and theoretical problems here, but none of Rapoport's arguments touches on them.) If the enemy wants to get less than optimum damage from the use of his equipment, or not use it at all, so much the better.

There is a second mode of analysis to which the defence analyst applies himself and that is general strategic theory. That is, should the United States adopt a massive retaliation strategy, a pause strategy, etc.? I am not aware of any serious efforts on the part of the defence strategists to solve problems of this kind through the use of game theory. Nor do they confuse this limited problem with the general problem of political strategy. (Rapoport accuses them of asking the wrong questions.) To my knowledge, no defence analyst assumes that the Soviet Union will behave rationally, as Rapoport charges, even if he thought that this much belabored term had a precise meaning in all contexts. It is believed that the constraints on Soviet leaders are likely to be sufficiently great to deter them from acting with complete irrationality. This is a quite different proposition from the one that Rapoport thinks is formulated. Even so, no one asserts this will necessarily be the case. On the other hand, there is no strategy that can be devised that will preclude the possibility that the Soviet Union will behave irrationally. (For instance, a failure to act in Cuba in 1962 might have produced a crisis in Berlin that escalated into nuclear war.) Certainly nothing that Rapoport has proposed will preclude this. Nor will our failing to think about it preclude it or even necessarily reduce its probability.

Rapoport is further disturbed by the possibility that strategic thinking on our part may impel the Soviet Union into the kind of competitive, war-producing game that he abhors. If he is talking about the strategy of conflict in general, his remarks are an obvious spoof. Russian Marxist dialectics are—and always have been—based on the concept of conflict (they call it 'contradiction'). No effort to come to agreement with them is likely to succeed unless this element in their thinking is at least taken into account. If he is talking about nuclear strategy in particular, then the Russians indeed may learn something from our own defence strategists. They may learn about war avoidance and limitation; many of the American defence specialists are trying to 'educate' the Russians towards this end.

Until the strategic thinkers influenced the Pentagon debate, the American nuclear strategy was that of massive retaliation. The change-over from that homicidal strategy was the work of strategic thinkers such as Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter. (This writer played a minor role in the debate of which he is not ashamed.) Surely Rapoport can hardly argue that this was a waste of effort, even if there are a large number of political problems that this strategic debate did not solve. Indeed, the claim could be made (though it cannot be pursued here), that

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the strategic debate made these larger political problems more tractable both by producing military systems less sensitive to preemption and by widening the range of political options. Had there been a similar debate over the pre-1914 mobilisation system, then at least one of the important causes of the first world war might have been mitigated.

Rapoport has presented a view of a strategic analyst which, if true, would make him out to be a man who did not understand even the technical aspects of the models with which he was supposed to be working, or the relations between these models and the real world, whose influence on public policy could only be pernicious, and whose views were inhuman. Having portrayed the strategic analyst as stupid and depraved, Rapoport depicts the world that would result from the rejection of the nuclear strategists and their position:

> Freed from self-perpetuating, crippling fears of each other, Americanism and Communism could not only coexist but could each be enriched by incorporating the best of each other's features, properly adapted to its own needs and ideals. The world as a whole would benefit by the insight that there is more than one way to enhance the dignity of man (p. 25).

Despite the assertion earlier in his essay that the same sort of statement could not be made concerning Nazism or racism, there are idealistic aspects in both of them which can also be singled out. Indeed, neither can be understood apart from the idealistic elements in them.

Is Rapoport's distinction between communism as inherently good and fascism as inherently evil convincing? Was Stalinism merely an aberration? Is the system of 'comrades courts' in Russia really consistent with human dignity? What is essential and what is transient in the Soviet system? Where is the reasoned analysis of the value system of the Soviet Union, let alone of the relationship between value system and social structure, in Rapoport's article? Even Togliatti asserted that Stalinism could not be blamed merely on a personality aberration. Not only is Rapoport's position essentially unreasoned, it is unnecessary. Were Hitler ruling a Nazi Germany today and in possession of an effective nuclear system, most strategic analysts would be extremely loth to contemplate even a modest nuclear confrontation, except under the compulsion of the most cruel circumstances, just as today they seek to avoid a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union and to mitigate its consequences should one occur. Why, then, does Rapoport, who is an intelligent man, make an unreasoned, inaccurate, and unnecessary defence of communism? Could it be that he wants to discredit his own position as a pro-communist position?

IN HIS ARTICLE 'Allowing for Soviet Perceptions', Urie Bronfenbrenner, after constructing a complicated model for Soviet psycho-political behavior, concludes:

> if the pressures from without coincide with internal crises, such as agricultural failures, or economic shortages, we risk the possibility that the Soviet Union will return to an era of regimentation and paranoid nationalism (p. 175).

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Bronfenbrenner thus states that hostility on our part towards the Soviet Union would be likely to trigger tendencies that would make the Soviet Union act extremely aggressively, as it did under Stalin. But in fact, as Professor Bronfenbrenner surely knows, external pressure did not produce that kind of behavior in the Soviet Union under Stalin. On the contrary, external pressure usually led Stalin to retreat. Indeed, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, at least some Soviet analysts would have preferred the cautious Stalin to the impetuous Khrushchev. This is not to assert that Stalin's behaviour in the 1930s or the response of the Soviet system at that time is a sufficiently good guide for formulating United States foreign policy towards the Soviet Union today. Almost surely it is not. But then Professor Bronfenbrenner is no doubt as aware of all these points as the next man. No doubt he was attempting subtly to discredit the 'mirror image' hypothesis.

'The Crisis of the Nation-State' is an article contributed by an anthropologist, Kathleen Gough, which goes further than anything I have previously read to establish that anthropology is the study of the primitive. It contains such gems as 'it seems unlikely that a centralised monopoly of force could long endure in a world society, for such a monopoly in the states of the past seems to have been inextricably bound up with external competition' (p. 58). No doubt this explains the juntas in Latin American states, the tight control over the means of coercion in the smaller communist states, and so forth.

The article by William A. Gamson, a social psychologist, entitled 'Evaluating Beliefs about International Conflict', is superficially plausible. The author recommends that we categorise sets of belief systems as to the degree of Russian expansionism and as to whether the Russians would respond better to conciliatory or refractory initiatives on our part. He then sets up matrices which, in effect, constitute box scores for crisis situations.

The Russian responses then validate one set of hypotheses as against rival hypotheses. This procedure seems eminently reasonable and many journalists would do well to become aware of the general problem.

Where then is the joker? It lies in the fact that the matrix approach would require a large number of crises in which environmental differences cancelled out, and extreme simplicity in the decision-making processes of the Soviet Union, as well as indifference with respect to the genesis of the crises. It is possible that the author does not intend his matrices seriously. I, for one, would hope so, for the basic intellectual problem to which he turns is a serious one.

IN DEALING WITH THE scientific inadequacies of the volume under review, the chief difficulty lies in the conception of scientific models and their use. It is, or at least should be, well known that highly complicated models have largely heuristic value, and that even heuristic use of such models must be limited to the proper kinds of applications. For instance, the psychologist can discuss the mechanisms of projection, introjection, etc.; he can show how they work and the general conditions under which they are elicited. But it is very difficult to predict which mechanism will be used in an actual case.

The more complicated the model is, the greater the number of

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restrictions placed on its application. When we move from the point of view of the individual in his immediate social group to individuals in highly articulated social and political roles, we have added a large number of poorly understood complications to our model. One may even doubt the heuristic quality of such complicated models. Most of the models employed in this volume suffer from the jejune use of excessively simple models for extremely complex situations. The psychologists tend to extrapolate from the simple models concerning individual behavior—models which really aren't very good for predicting individual behavior—to extremely complex social and political circumstances, where their central variables are peripheral and their contextual information almost non-existent. Thus not only are these efforts bad science but they also fail to carry any conviction even as informed intuition. This is not to say that the conclusions that the authors come to are necessarily wrong. But their views are not presented in a genuinely reasoned manner. It really does not help us very much to tell us about self-fulfilling prophecies, about projection, about experiments in which group pressures made individuals at least report false perceptions. We know all these things. And they are equally consistent with contradictory explanations and prescriptions. For instance, either Churchill or Hitler can be projecting. Even if both are projecting, their projective beliefs may be incorrigible. If they are incorrigible, their nations may attack, in which case only a military response would work. But, equally, if they are incorrigible, their nations may retreat in fear, and so forth. The analysis gets us exactly nowhere, for the system within which the mechanisms operate and the environments of the system are the central core both for explanation and prediction, insofar as either is possible. In fact, these elements so far dominate the situation that even where the mechanisms operate, it may be possible to ignore them without any loss of explanatory or predictive power. For instance, our analysis of Hitler's aggressiveness, apart from psychological explanations, but based either on more relevant social and political theories or on empirical extrapolations, may dominate our psychological knowledge to such an extent that our willingness to believe that a particular psychological mechanism operated may rest on its coherence with our alternative explanation. The surprising thing is the poverty of psychological models and generalisations in predicting or even in explaining complicated political events. This is true even where psychological evaluations play more than a marginal role in interpreting an event. It is true also of the application of macroscopic sociological models. These models have heuristic value only when relatively simple *and* when they deal with the variables that are the chief constraining factors in the situation. I used to give an examination question in which the students were asked to assay the relevance of my loose bipolar model (a model that is relevant for macroscopic events of international politics) for the US decision to cross the 38th parallel in Korea (a microscopic event). Those students who had really grasped the relevance of systems theory were able to understand that its relevance for this kind of microscopic problem was at best extremely limited.

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The procedure employed by Lester Grinspoon in 'Inter-personal Constraints and the Decision-Maker' is quite different and it is legitimate. He is not trying either to explain or to predict. He is instead examining the strains that the institutional structure places on the decision maker, and inquiring whether these strains can be mitigated. But to carry this subject further would go beyond the bounds of this review. In any event, if we are to take *International Conflict and Behavioral Science* as a serious effort, we can see that most of the authors grossly misuse scientific procedure. It is deeply disappointing that instead of seizing the opportunity, so far as present techniques permit, to display dispassionately the contributions behavioural science might make to the important problems of the day, so many of the contributors succumbed to passion, prejudice, and unreasoned assertion. It does not suffice to praise Boulding, Etzioni, Gamson, Grinspoon, and Fisher for at least making serious intellectual efforts. We expect this of scholars. It is the *hubris* of the majority of the authors that is so grievously disappointing.

PREUVES

publie dans son numéro de NOVEMBRE

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Le N° de 96 pp. ill. — France: 3 F.60 — Etranger: 4 Frs
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THE EUROPEAN REVIVAL

K. A. Jelenski

THE idea of the reunification of Europe has in the last few years implicitly dominated all Western political debates. However remote as a prospect, this re-emergence of Europe as an autonomous political concept is at least a striking illustration of a reversal in the history of ideas.

It may be useful to confront this rapidly spreading psychological sense of European unity and recovery with the sense of decay and doom which pervaded some of the best European minds even before Europe lost its central position in the world. Theories concerning the decline of Europe as expressed between the end of the eighteenth century and our own day fall roughly into four categories. The first three can be easily labelled: organic, parricidal, and masochistic. The fourth is more complex, since it rests on the identification of 'European' and 'aristocratic' values. If Europe is condemned to share the fate of any industrial society—so runs the argument—how can it retain a 'European' identity?

The organic theory, inspired by Goethe, Hegel, and Nietzsche, is formulated in Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*: 'A culture dies when its soul has realised the entire sum of its potentialities in the form of nations, languages, religious doctrines, arts, states, sciences, and thus returns to its original psychic state.'

The thesis which I would call 'parricidal' is based on the notion that the two giants which issued from Europe—America and Russia—will kill it and take over its heritage. Its most famous exponent is Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote in 1856: 'There are two great nations in the world to-day which, starting from different points, seem to advance to the same aim: the Russians and the Americans . . . each of them seems called by a secret design of providence to hold one day in its hands the fate of half the world.' But as early as 1790 Baron Melchior Grimm, the Parisian litterateur, wrote to Catherine the Great: 'Two Empires will divide . . . all the advantages of civilisation, power, genius, letters, arts, arms, and industry: Russia in the East and America . . . in the West; and we, the people of the centre, shall be too degraded, we shall have sunk too low, to know, except through vague and incoherent tradition, what we have been.'

The 'masochistic' theory implies that the decline of Europe is a well-deserved punishment for past aggressions against other civilisations. Its most scholarly expression is to be found in Arnold Toynbee, and echoes of it in such different minds as Jean-Paul Sartre and Professor Barraclough.

Our classification is of course an abstract one, since elements of all these theories of 'Decline and Fall' were often combined. Thus the first

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exponent of the fourth theory—Europe's identity is connected with aristocratic values and will lose its specific qualities once its aristocratic structure is destroyed—was again Tocqueville, who wrote: 'When I consider the state to which several European nations have already arrived, and that towards which others drift, I tend to believe that soon there will be among them no place for anything but democratic freedom or the tyranny of the Caesars.' We know that 'democratic freedom' was for Tocqueville the equivalent of 'Americanisation', while 'tyranny of the Caesars' stood for the Russian example. Tocqueville's implicit preference for the American solution is beyond doubt, but he felt that once the 'passion for equality' which he considered the distinctive feature of American life had taken possession of Europe, the latter's aristocratic forms would disappear, and with them would go its specific civilisation. Characteristically, in our own days this theory is favoured by American historians and sociologists more than by their European colleagues—probably a left-over from the American nineteenth-century identification of 'Europe' with 'aristocracy'.

It is perhaps worth noting that each category of these prophecies of Europe's 'downfall' gained actuality in certain moments of the past. Begun in 1912 and completed in 1917, Spengler's *Decline of the West* was the great prophetic work of the first European disaster. It inspired Paul Valéry's famous 1919 phrase: 'We, civilisations, know now that we are mortal.' What had been, a hundred years before, a prophetic vision of the rise of America and Russia to the status of world powers, became a favourite platitude in the years immediately following the second world war, reinforced as it was by the American atomic monopoly on the one hand, and the identification of Russia with communism on the other. Finally, the process of decolonisation in Asia and Africa naturally favoured the theories of 'well-deserved punishment'. The last category of theories, the one which identifies European with aristocratic values, is probably the most persistent, since it is not challenged by the present economic and political recovery of Europe. Indeed, it is often assumed that the very means of this recovery undermine the specific qualities of European culture.

IT is only in the last decade that—with this last exception—the vogue of these theories has declined and has indeed sometimes been superseded by a new cliché—that of the 'European miracle'. Events have refuted opinions emphasising the 'decline' and 'decadence' of Europe only gradually. The extraordinary vitality of European literature and arts between the two wars obviously undermined Spengler's theory. The 'two giants' theory was invalidated by two series of events: the end of the American nuclear monopoly and of the bilateral balance of power on the one hand, the end of stalinism and the emergence of polycentrism on the other. But we find in Tocqueville's own writings a premonition of the reasons why the 'two giants' theory itself was not equivalent with Europe's downfall. Indeed, Tocqueville was the first to

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perceive that the differences between the Old World and the New would soon diminish, since Europe would become increasingly like America. And Europe surely owes to its 'Americanisation' its survival (we leave aside for the moment the complementary problem of the preservation of its identity). Moreover (what Tocqueville could not foresee), it seems that America is becoming—independently of its European origins—gradually 'Europeanised', while incipient signs of the same process can be observed in Russia. The 'Western Giant' is thus being exorcised, while the image of the 'Eastern Giant' is shifting from Russia to China. As for the third theme of European 'defeatists'—their argument rested on the assumption that Europe's wealth was due to colonial exploitation, whereas the process of decolonisation between 1945 and 1962 coincided with unprecedented economic development throughout our continent.

There remains the last argument, which seems the most serious one, since it does not in any way challenge European vitality but only Europe's chances of preserving its own identity. In an essay entitled 'A New Europe', summing up an issue of *Daedalus* (Winter 1964) devoted to this very theme, Mr Graubard, the editor, rightly emphasises the fact that Europe's present problem is not one of domination—in any case impossible in conditions of a multilateral balance of power—but of the preservation of its identity. 'The difficulty of achieving this identity in any meaningful way arises from the fact that so little in Europe's recent past is immediately relevant to the present. The control of vast territories overseas, by economic or political means, is excluded. The destruction of class differences, even where it is more apparent than real, precludes the possibility of maintaining the values of a more aristocratic society. In the realm of ideas, it is difficult to conceive how Europe can achieve again the sort of primacy that she once enjoyed.'

It is difficult to see how the first objection can be relevant, since Graubard himself states that no society can have a dominant position in the contemporary world. As for the last, if Europe ever had a 'primacy in the realm of ideas', it was only in ideas of European origin. We shall not develop here the theme of some contemporary ethnologists of the impossibility of any judgment of value relative to patterns of culture, but would only remark that the loss of European primacy in the realm of ideas can be relevant only if we assume that European ideas become universal, which is a curious form of 'defeat'.

There remains the identification of Europe with aristocratic values. Comment on this must imply a judgment of value: if the identity of Europe really depends on the preservation of class differences, then let 'Europe' perish. But the alternative is not so simple. Tocqueville himself said that while Europe could do nothing to prevent itself becoming more and more like America (which was equivalent to anticipating the sociological consequences of economic development), it might prepare for this by knowing more about American life. It is probably fortunate that Europe reached that stage of development at a time when

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American society itself had outgrown the crudest forms of mass society. In fact American neo-marxist criticism often uses the term 'alienation' to disguise its own elitist values. Even so imaginative a marxist as Herbert Marcuse can almost sound like Joseph de Maistre: 'With its code of forms and manners, with the style and vocabulary of its literature and philosophy, this past culture expressed the rhythm and content of a universe in which valleys and forests, villages and inns, nobles and villeins, salons and courts were part of an experienced reality' (*One Dimensional Man*, Boston, 1964). Europe, at any rate, is warned.

More seriously, however, the greatest drawback of the European idea in recent times was that many of its exponents themselves clung to 'aristocratic' values. The 'right' and 'left' ingredients among partisans of a united Europe are a complex matter and vary from country to country. Although the extreme right wing (by definition nationalistic) is excluded, militant Europeans are often associated with a conservative outlook. This is particularly the case in England, where the European idea is often linked with Catholicism and insistence on 'Mediterranean' values. But elsewhere, too, the conservative-liberal trend of Ortega-Keyserling-Ernst Jünger was at least as strong as the democratic-socialist one of Arturo Spinelli-Carlo Schmid-André Philip. At any rate, as far as public opinion is concerned, the European idea was until quite recently of an intellectual and aristocratic character. Indeed, as Goethe said in his *Gespräche*, 'Europe has been one of the most extraordinary republics that ever existed, and its ruin was due to the fact that one of its parts wanted to become what the whole has been, namely France, who wanted to become a Republic'. But, just as the idea of nationality became a common possession in the nineteenth century, so in the last two decades has the idea of Europe. In the early twenties, Carl J. Burckhardt wrote to Hugo von Hofmannstahl: 'These weeks in Italy modified many perspectives for me. In Bologna, someone told me: "You are a European". While my car climbed the Saint-Gothard, I reflected on what it means to be a European.' Burckhardt, Hofmannstahl, Valéry, Larbaud, the true European until the last war is the aristocratic intellectual, familiar of the Orient-Express and the Harmonika Zug, who knows all the libraries and museums, but reaches them, strolling leisurely across avenues, Strasse and viale, from the Ritz, the Adlon, the Danieli. At the lowest intellectual level it is the Europe of maîtres d'hôtel and croupiers. There is a certain ironic justice in the fact that Ortega's famous *Revolt of the Masses* ascribes Europe's 'decadence' to the breakdown of its 'elites', while it is precisely the formation of a European mass-society which made the diffusion of the European idea possible.

Strikingly, each of these theories of European decline corresponds to a set of problems facing Europe to-day, and the mere fact that these problems concern the future gives a positive turn to interpretations which were negative inasmuch as they were inspired solely by reference to a prestigious past. The 'organic decline' theory is bound up with the

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question: can Europe retain—or regain—its importance? Already belied by the mere fact that Europe is to-day economically at least potentially as strong as each of the two superpowers, it corresponds to problems of the economic, institutional, political integration of Western Europe. Theories stressing the end of Europe's centrality and the loss of its identity are connected with Europe's universal role—and in particular with Europe's relationship with the third world. Finally, the 'two giants' theory poses the most acute problems: can Europe end its partition? Should it remain eternally divided between its two powerful protectors? While all these problems are inter-connected, it is this last question—European reunification—which is in fact the basic one. The re-emergence of Europe dates in fact from the recent change in Europe's attitude towards its partition.

AFTER the end of the war, 'Europe' virtually disappeared as a universal ideological-political concept. It was replaced by 'the West'. Several American historians (and even some European ones) suggested in those years that, just as a Mediterranean age was succeeded by a European age, so the European is being succeeded by an Atlantic age. From the Atlantic Charter to the Atlantic Alliance, Europe's natural vocation was on the Western side, but in the role of a junior partner.

While Europe was being reconstructed with American help, there was a strong polarisation of European opinion in the direction of the two neighbouring giants. The Marshall Plan laid the groundwork for European integration, but in the exclusive framework of the Atlantic Alliance. True, the two key political problems of the cold war years—the integration of Western Europe into NATO and of Western Germany into Western Europe—were discussed in the light of their bearing on the eventual future reunification both of Western Europe and of Western Germany with their Eastern halves. Partisans of these two integrations claimed that they were necessary prerequisites for reunification, while adversaries argued that they were obstacles to it. In fact, however, both partisans and adversaries knew that these were neither prerequisites nor obstacles, but substitutes for reunification. The concept of 'Europe' had in those days no independent appeal of its own, and was reduced to provincial proportions. When used by European federalists it applied *de facto* to Western Europe only, integrated into the Atlantic Alliance. When used by neutralists (as in *Le Monde* in the late forties and early fifties), it was in the illusion of sparing *Western* Europe the threat of another war. Characteristically, partisans of an eventual transformation of Western Europe into a United States of Europe closely tied to America accused European neutralists of 'objectively' serving stalinist Russia, while neutralists accused European federalists of being mere American agents. In fact, so long as America retained the monopoly of the atom bomb, and so long as Russia was the uncontested centre of world communism, Europe had little chance of playing a universal

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role, and in particular little prospect of ever ending its partition on the Elbe line. With regard to its Eastern part, European federalism was singularly passive. American policy used the doctrine of liberation as a tactical weapon, partly to stimulate hope on the other side of the iron curtain, partly because of the pressure of American voters of European origin. The doctrine of 'containment' was a more honest way of facing a situation which was in fact sealed by the passivity of the West during the East German uprising of 1953 and the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

On the other hand, European neutralists never dreamed of extending their project of neutral status to the other side of the Elbe.

It is only in the present decade that, as a consequence of the new situation created by polycentrism, the concept of Europe has begun to dominate Western debates. The two approaches to European reunification dominant today can be clearly related to the positions held during the cold war, but they no longer show the same polarisation towards America or Russia. The prospects of reunification do not seem any closer, since it encounters the same two stumbling blocks: the Russian need for security combined with its military power, and the German problem. In fact, East European polycentrism, which made hopes of reunification rise, is tolerated by Russia only because its security is guaranteed by its hold on Eastern Germany—and unless Russia withdraws from Germany European reunification is impossible. But while the actual prospects remain the same, the change of general mood, of historical perspective, is significant. European 'progressives' generally assumed that in 1945 History endowed her eldest daughter, Russia, with Eastern Europe as a permanent gift. Post-stalinist détente and East European polycentrism now point to the historical defeat of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe.

As seen from the West, the theoretical choice of policies seems much the same as it was during the cold war. There are always two basic options between what might be called the 'magnet and wedge' theory and the 'mimesis' theory. The first is based on the same premises as the classical 'Atlantic' position: the more closely united and the stronger the West, the more divided and weaker the other side will be. The West should, through unity and economic success, act as a magnet, while driving a wedge into the communist camp, in the hope of fostering its disunity by discontent. The second theory corresponds to an extension of the neutralist position: let the United States withdraw from Europe and Russia will do the same. This implies a belief in good example and in encouragement, or, in less moral terms, in some form of political mimesis of the two camps. However, the change in the historical perspective has on the one hand blunted the opposition between the two positions, and, on the other, produced important modifications in their political and ideological connotations. The European partisans of the 'magnet and wedge' theory no longer rely exclusively on a bipolar vision of the world balance of power, while the partisans of the 'mimesis'

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theory include, this time, Russian 'disengagement' in their plans. The first are less fascinated by America, the second less fascinated by Russia. Curiously enough, while during the cold war the 'Right' tended to hold a classically 'Atlantic' position, and neutralists could be assimilated roughly to the 'Left', this is no longer the case. The retreat from Europe of both America and Russia is today advocated by gaullists in France and elsewhere—that is to say by partisans of the right-wing position of restoring and perpetuating the principle of the independence of states. On the other hand, there are today sectors of opinion which, fearing the renaissance of German militarism and East European chauvinisms (that is, starting from 'left-wing' foreign policy positions), maintain that both the Atlantic alliance and Western European integration are indispensable conditions for any negotiation with Russia, any solution of the German problem, and viable peaceful equilibrium in Europe. Starting from this position, the most imaginative suggestions have been made by, among others, Professor Brzezinski in his *Alternative to Partition*, and, from a more European perspective, André Fontaine. This position has the merit of setting the reunification of Europe as a 'Grand Design' of our times, and of accepting, for its sake, the desirability of a looser Atlantic alliance. It has even been suggested that, in our polycentrist world, we should take advantage of the new potentialities of multilateral relations. Thus Pierre Hassner writes in an essay entitled 'Polycentrism, West and East':

> The three levels, national, European, Atlantic, would each have its specific role to play in a broadly conceived Western view. Naturally some kind of distribution of roles already exists implicitly on a geographical basis: West Germany has a preponderant voice on relations with East Germany; Western Europe seems to be able to take advantage of traditional links and sympathies as well as of geographic proximity in relations with Eastern Europe; the United States has by necessity a permanent dialogue with the Soviet Union. And it is just as well that these concentric zones do in fact overlap. For beyond the geographical repartition all three levels have a fundamental role: the *Atlantic* framework by providing the military conditions of security and the economic conditions of peaceful engagement today, and one day those of a negotiated settlement; the *European* community by offering a solid basis of stability, a centre of attraction and the long-range prospect of transforming the political problem by devaluing the nation-state; the various *nations* by constructing through their daily contacts the ties which should prepare the collective initiatives and long-range transformations.

If nationalism is 'anti-European' in the West, it is, at least in the short range, 'pro-European' in the East.

WE tend to forget that, long before the Russian-Chinese break, the organisation of the Eastern bloc after the war had already assumed the division of the communist world into two. Neither the Warsaw military pact nor Comecon includes China, North Korea, or Vietnam, for the

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simple reason that the Eastern bloc constituted itself as a European bloc before communism won in China.

As long as Moscow's hold over its satellites was virtually total, there were no possibilities of any independent contacts between Eastern and Western Europe. During the first thaw of the 1950s, Polish and Hungarian revisionists manifested a return to such essential European values as creative freedom in literature and the arts, and the desire for democracy. Indeed, this first period of the thaw, which was of a political, philosophic, and literary character, allowed the expression of a European conscience. One of the first regressive steps of Gomulka's government after the 1956 upheaval was the prohibition of a weekly literary paper which was to be called *Europa* and which remained still-born. The nostalgia for Europe manifested in Poland and Hungary during the first thaw was probably more internationalist, more in keeping with the present ideals of Western Europe, than the new actuality assumed by the continental approach which came to light in the 1960s. But these early attempts were doomed to failure because their manifestation was premature. It was the second thaw, which began in 1960 and more clearly in 1962, and which was due to the overt Russian-Chinese break and to the new polycentrist situation, which gave a new actuality to the European theme. This second thaw is more economic and nationalist in inspiration, and it centres more in the communist party functionaries than in the revisionist opposition.

The background of this second thaw consists in the new freedom of movement each communist party now possesses, combined with growing popular scepticism about communism and the ultimate aims of society. Polycentrism, and the loss of faith of Soviet leaders in revolutionary dynamics, brought the East European communist leaders to recognise that the international communist movement is no longer the true framework of power. Neither is the Soviet Union—since it is no longer in total control of the international communist movement. As a result, the true framework of power is now constituted in Eastern Europe by the individual states, whose alliance with Russia is maintained for two chief reasons: on the one hand communist parties are resolved to remain in power (and alliance with Russia is their only guarantee in this respect), while, on the other, in a complementary fashion, the USSR cannot at present afford their defection from its camp. The third reason, used mainly as a rationalisation, but which has a real appeal for public opinion, is the fear of German aggression.

The first result of this new situation is the rise of nationalist feelings. Nationalism in Eastern Europe is endemic and in the past its manifestations have been disastrous. Professor Brzezinski is perfectly right when he writes, in *Alternative to Partition*: 'It is doubtful that a healthy society can be built by promoting anti-soviet nationalist dictatorships. They could bring in their wake all the traditional territorial and ethnic conflicts, providing temptations for the USSR and the USA again to become involved. It would be short-sighted for the West to ride the

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tiger of nationalism in the hope that it will threaten only the Soviet-dominated world; the tiger could endanger all of Europe.'

Meanwhile, however, this tiger shows its claws eastward. If we think that as recently as March 1959 Khrushchev declared, in his effort to revive Comecon, that in the future communist society 'only ethnic borders will survive for a time and even these will probably exist only as a convention', the present policy of his successors, limited to a negative, defensive hold-what-we-have policy, stressing only economic ties, seems like an acknowledgment of defeat. No wonder *Izvestia* wrote in 1964 that 'nationalism is the greatest danger for socialist society'.

This revenge of a preserved past over a defeated future was well summed up by Kadar, who declared in a speech to the Hungarian Parliament: 'Class struggle has not altered geography'. The road of East European countries to the concept of a unified Europe leads through nationalism at least in the sense of getting rid of the Russian imperialism which in Stalin's days was inseparable from ideology. The first step of those East European countries when the Soviet hold relaxes is to eliminate compulsory Russian instruction from their schools and to reduce the number of Soviet cultural institutes.

Even more interesting is the reappearance, in East European public debates, of the very concept of Europe. This concept can probably be best assessed today in terms of cultural-political dialectics. The paradox lies in the fact that the immediate political prospects of achieving a reunification of Europe are nil, while this very problem has been revived in political debates, overtly in the West and implicitly in the East. Thus, if this problem has any political meaning, it is on the assumption that a culture can in the long run exert a political influence. It is by no means a new thesis and all the 'Greece-Rome', 'Europe-America' clichés derive from it. Marx always insisted on a law (which he borrowed from bourgeois historians) that conquerors who are at a lower cultural level than the conquered end by being 'conquered from inside' by their more sophisticated victims. Lenin referred to this 'law' in his last article 'Better less, but better'. Could it be that, of all Marx's and Lenin's predictions and laws, this one may be relevant to the future of Russia, influenced by a resuscitated Western Europe (and awakening Eastern Europe), an influence that becomes a 'magnet' when combined with the Chinese shadow? Is the reunification of Europe a political problem in terms of the immediate present, or in terms of *Kulturgeschichte*?

AT the root of all theories which persist even today in perpetuating the 'decline of Europe' tradition there lies a confusion between the problem of Europe's centrality and that of its specificity. Contemporary exponents of these theories assume that the specific role of Europe was merely a consequence of its dominant position in the world. The secret is, of course, that they dislike Europe and hope that it will either

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dissolve in a new technological civilisation or be subdued by the peoples of Asia and Africa. The first trend is represented by Professor Barraclough, who resembles a 'progressive' scoutmaster with no use for European 'refinements'. The second is represented by Jean-Paul Sartre and is, needless to say, infinitely more imaginative. While Barraclough clearly has little understanding of European culture and art, Sartre's identification with Europe is so deep that he brings to it the same implacable hatred he directed against his own European bourgeois childhood in *Les Mots*.

For Sartre, while Europe is 'dying in convulsions', ex-colonial peoples in revolt who 'kill Europeans at sight' are 'makers of human history'.

Professor Barraclough suggests in his *Introduction to Contemporary History* that the opening of a new period in world history—which is to him contemporary history in the strict sense of the term—'can be placed with some degree of assurance at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961'. 'One of the most obvious characteristics' of this new period is for him 'a decline in European predominance and a shift of emphasis away from Europe'. Indeed, 'it is a period of readjustment on a continental scale, when, in the relative chart of world events, Europe counts for less than at any time in the last hundred years'. True, he registers the Rome treaties of 1957 as one characteristic event of this new period, but he does so merely because it illustrates 'a tendency to the formation of new regional groupings . . . seen at work not only in Europe, but also in Latin America, in the Arab world, and in Africa'.

Professor Barraclough's concluding sentence is worth quoting: 'The European age—the age which extended from 1492 to 1947—is over, and with it the predominance of the old European scale of values. Literature, like politics, has broken through its European bonds, and the civilisation of the future, whose genesis I have tried in the preceding pages to trace, is taking shape as a world civilisation in which all the continents will play their part.'

Professor Barraclough's notions about contemporary literature are so confused that we need not take him too seriously, as a few examples picked at random will show. Thus, the work of James Joyce is for him 'the ultimate refinement—some would say *reductio ad absurdum*' and, with that of Gertrude Stein and E. E. Cummings, 'surrealist'. He also thinks that 'dadaism and surrealism reached their peak between 1919 and 1921'—that is, three to five years before the surrealist movement was founded. When he writes: 'If the dominant intellectual personality of the decade after 1945 was Camus, whose message was the negative one of revolt, the typical figure in the following decade was Brecht . . .', he either has his chronology completely mixed up, or else he means that English intellectuals took up Brecht only in the fifties, which is a curiously provincial point of view. The strangest misunderstanding occurs when—probably misled by catch-words like

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'objective literature'—Professor Barraclough hails in Alain Robbe-Grillet a herald of his 'new era' of technological social-realism. Robbe-Grillet—the most sophisticated exponent of 'pure' literature, who wrote: 'The artist does not put anything above his work, and he soon learns that he can create only *for nothing*'—is in fact the only name quoted to illustrate a shift 'to the problems arising out of social relationships within the new, technical, industrial mass-societies into which the changes of the last sixty or seventy years had plunged the world'. No wonder that Professor Barraclough's verdict on a 'process [going] from Van Gogh, Cézanne and Gauguin to Kandinsky, Picasso and Jackson Pollock, from Debussy to Schönberg, Bartok and Webern, from Mallarmé and Rimbaud to Eluard and Pound' is gloomy: 'For the most part the experimentation which was characteristic of the first half of the twentieth century failed to arrive at positive results . . . much of their work has retained only historical interest.' In contrast to these disappointing names, he considers an anthology of African poetry by Senghor 'epoch-making'.

Sartre and Barraclough have one thing in common: they have to deny the force of European culture in order to claim that the loss of Europe's dominant position necessarily signifies its decline. In fact, this fear could be reasonably felt if another 'centre' of civilisation could conceivably have achieved such a dominant position, and (to use a cliché) wrenched from Europe 'the torch of civilisation'. For over a century—and with particular force in the nineteen-forties and fifties—many Europeans thought either America or Russia could become this one single power achieving a dominant position in the world. But in the age of polycentrism such a position is beyond the capacity of any society. Indeed, this new polycentrist situation does away with that sense of doom which many Europeans felt in the last fifty years, while the Americans and Soviets experience in turn—at least in terms of thwarted potential hopes—what Europe has already lived through.

We owe to Denis de Rougemont what is probably the best definition of Europe: 'An adventure of decisive significance for the fate of mankind.' In his excellent book *The Meaning of Europe*, he suggests that Europe exhibits certain original and distinctive features; Europe discovered the whole of the earth, and nobody ever came and discovered Europe; Europe has held sway on all the continents in succession and up till now has never been ruled by any extra-European power; Europe has produced a civilisation which is being imitated over the whole world, while the converse has never happened. Now, while the first and third of these characteristics are irreversible, the second one is not: it is therefore important to realise that it is only the advent of a polycentrist age that will guarantee—for the foreseeable future—the integrity of Europe.

In his *Decline and Rise of Europe* John Lukacs writes: 'The *historical* development of the idea of Europe *is* the idea of Europe'. Europe—from Vico to Hegel and Marx, and from Gibbon to David

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Hume and Tocqueville—is the continent of historical thinking. To be European is inseparable from an historical consciousness. 'By the middle of the twentieth century the Modern Age is over, the European Age is over, the European political system develops into a world political system, and the scientific method is no longer the singular achievement of the European mind. But historical consciousness still seems to be something singularly European. . . .'

The future of the world seems to be one of a universal civilisation, based on European techniques, European patterns, European ideas. Indeed, 'the West' is only a term for a stage in the expansion of European ideas, since America was made by Europe, Russia is part of Europe, marxism of European origin. After all, it is Europe which produced a civilisation which is being imitated by the whole world.

ACTA HISTORICA ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICAE

A periodical of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

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ACTA HISTORICA is published twice a year making up a volume of some 400 to 500 pages. Size: 17 x 24 cm.

Subscription rate per volume: $8.50; DM 35; £3

Distributors: KULTURA, Budapest 62, P.O. Box 149

Editorial Office: Budapest I. Uri utca 51-53

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EEC AND COMECON

John Pinder

THE most important development in the political economy of the West since the war may well have been the creation of effective multilateral organisations that transcend the nation-state. Gatt, OECD, and Efta have all helped to secure freer trade and better economic cooperation, and to prevent the destructive international competition that characterised the inter-war years. But, as far at least as relations between its members are concerned, EEC, the European Economic Community, has induced more progress towards these ends than any other organisation. Its members have created a single market as populous as that of the United States; they have developed a system for the formation of common economic policies; and they have transformed a secular hostility between their members into a relationship that places war between them beyond the bounds of possibility. The implications of these facts for the countries of eastern Europe are clearly of great interest; and, even if the new methods of collaboration have now been called in question by General de Gaulle, they have already shown such remarkable results that it is pertinent to ask whether they contain any lessons that could be relevant to the future evolution of eastern Europe.

Problems of Integration in Comecon

While the nations of the West, and particularly those of the Community, have been in the process of moving beyond national sovereignty, those of eastern Europe have been either standing pat on that concept or moving in the reverse direction. The name Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and still more its abbreviation Comecon, somewhat resembles that of the Common Market, and this leads some people to believe that the two organisations are therefore similar. But this is a superficial judgment. For entirely understandable historical reasons, their nature is fundamentally different.

The difference is clearly expressed in the treaties that established the two bodies. The members of EEC were 'determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples',[1] while CMEA 'is established on the basis of the principle of the sovereign equality of all the member countries of the Council'.[2] EEC has a strong and independent Commission as its executive and the treaty lays down that the members can take certain important decisions by majority vote; CMEA has a relatively weak Secretariat and all recommendations

[1] Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.

[2] The Comecon Charter, 1960, Article 1. This and the three following quotations are taken from Michael Kaser's *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (London, 1965).

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or decisions must be adopted by the unanimous vote of those members interested in the question under consideration.

The intractable nationalism of the economic arrangements in communist countries stems from the experience of Russia under Stalin, who created a highly centralised system of national planning that concentrated on independence from outside economies (i.e. on basic industries) and rigidly controlled all foreign trade transactions: a system of extreme economic autarky.

When the greater part of eastern Europe fell into Stalin's hands at the end of the war, this system became the stereotype for the countries concerned. Each of them established a highly centralised system of national planning, concentrating on independence from outside economies and insulated from them by means of the control of foreign trade. Stalin's power and prestige were so great that he could doubtless have imposed a unified economic policy on eastern Europe over a long period, even though the systems he had created were so inherently autarkic and recalcitrant to outside pressures. But after his death the logic of the system began to tell. The political expression of this trend is polycentrism (which seems to be a new word for national sovereignty, as far as countries ruled by communist parties are concerned). The economic implications have been trenchantly expressed by the Rumanians. Thus a Rumanian editorialist, rejecting the concept of an interstate development of the lower Danube region, insisted that Rumania was 'an independent and sovereign state. On this territory nobody has anything to study, neither in detail nor in lesser detail, without authorisation from the Rumanian government, for both the efficient use of resources and the location of objectives, as well as any other problems, big or small, are of the exclusive competence of the Rumanian government and people'. General de Gaulle might speak in similar terms about France in relation to the European Community; but in this he would contradict the letter and spirit of the Rome Treaty, whereas the Rumanian attitude is perfectly consistent with the CMEA Charter and with the communist insistence on national sovereignty. This attitude, which originally served to safeguard the unity and strength of the communist world when it consisted of a single state, has become, with the emergence of a number of communist states, a sorcerer's apprentice that washes away their unity by encouraging them to pull in different directions.

Consistent though this position may be with the post-patristic communist doctrine and the CMEA Charter, however, it is widely recognised in eastern Europe that it flies in the face of modern technology. It is not possible for countries ranging in population from thirty million down to seven million, with much lower purchasing power than those in western Europe, to enjoy a full development of modern industries on the basis of their separate markets, and this applies in particular to the basic industries that began to be established, on the Stalinist pattern, in each east European country. Khrushchev was among those

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who saw that this pointed in the direction of a single integrated market. Speaking at Leipzig in 1959, he said ' . . . the further development of the socialist countries will in all probability proceed along the lines of reinforcing a single world system of the socialist economy. One after another the economic barriers which separated our countries under capitalism will disappear'. In 1962 he tried to translate this idea into action by his relatively supranational proposal for a unified planning organ in Comecon.

It is well known that this proposal for 'shifting some functions of economic management from the competence of the respective state to the attribution of super-state bodies or organs' (Declaration of the Rumanian Central Committee, April 1964) was strongly and successfully opposed by the Rumanians, whose Declaration went on to say 'these measures are not in keeping with the principles which underlie the relations between socialist countries'. But if the touchy Rumanian nationalism had been the only obstacle, a way might have been found around it. In fact, there are fundamental difficulties stemming from the autarkic national economic systems that Stalin bequeathed to the Soviet bloc, which are in direct conflict with any attempt to integrate their economies.

These difficulties have been well described in Mr Kaser's book on Comecon. They relate partly to the problem of the prices at which goods are to be exchanged. In the absence of a linked system of market economies such as exists in the West, which provides an 'objective' procedure for price formation, each east European country has its own idiosyncratic set of prices. The east Europeans therefore had to adopt 'world' (i.e. capitalist) prices for their trade; yet this system has been severely criticised in eastern Europe, particularly when the trend of world prices was adverse for a particular country, as it was for Bulgaria for example when the world market for raw materials was weak. Indeed, it is hard to see how the east European governments could agree that major decisions about the structure of their economies should be taken on the basis of prices set by a system of which they disapprove and quite different from the prices according to which they each make their internal decisions on production and investment. An integrated east European economy, giving full scope for large-scale production by centralising the decisions on many of the most important investments, would surely have to wait on the development of a common system of prices that is accepted by each country and by and large applied for purposes of national economic planning as well as for intra-east European trade.

Even if a uniform system of prices were to be applied in eastern Europe, however, there are further conditions that would have to obtain before the centrally-planned economies could be integrated. Thus each country would have to apply the same profit criterion to the production of export goods; it would be no use for each country to apply the same prices if some allowed their exporting enterprises to run at a loss (in

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effect subsidising them) while others insisted that their enterprises break even or make a profit. Given the same price system and profit criterion, moreover, there would still have to be a procedure for assessing rival investment projects. There would clearly be many occasions when more than one country wished to construct plant to manufacture a product for which the market was large enough to justify only one new production unit. The feasibility studies would have to be vetted objectively—it is too easy for engineers to produce cost figures and economists market projections optimistic enough to bias the choice in favour of their own country's project. Investments of great importance to economic development would sometimes be involved, and those who had to decide on the merits of the competitive projects would be in the position of a supranational planning authority.

In short, it is hard to see how a number of monolithic nationally-planned economies could be integrated unless they were subsumed in a monolithic supranationally-planned economy. But the nationalism of the east European states and their autarkic economic structure have been too strong to allow this to happen. Only a militantly imperialist Russia, intent on unifying the communist bloc, would have been powerful enough to force it through; but as we have seen it was Khrushchev's Russia, not Stalin's, that perceived the technocratic necessity of integration, and Khrushchev was either unwilling or unable to apply the pressure that would have been required. This being so, the preponderant strength of Russia in Comecon was a positive deterrent to integration, not a motive force; for Russia, whatever its intentions might be, would be bound to dominate any supranational planning authority in Comecon: the Russian government would in fact virtually *be* the supranational authority. The status of the other members of Comecon would be equivalent to that of provinces of the Soviet Union. Even if they were ready to accept the principle of a supranational economic community, this state of subordination to one of its members would clearly be unacceptable.

The obstacles to economic integration in Comecon, then, stem from two basic differences between it and EEC. The decentralised market economies of the West are more amenable to a process of gradual integration than the centralised economies of the East, based on imperative target planning (the problems presented by the Common Market to France's relatively mild indicative target planners and their efforts to extend their planning system to the Community level are a further indication of this). And the balance of power within the Community helps to preclude domination of the others by any one member while that within Comecon does not. Where there is a desire on the part of the members for a fair share of democratic control of the integrated economy, or at least for avoiding absorption by a more powerful state, this kind of balance is absolutely necessary. Professor Hallstein has stressed this aspect of EEC: 'the Community system, the constitution of the Community, is of itself a negation of any hegemony, the organised

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and methodical rebuttal of hegemony'.[3] Integration within Comecon is, by contrast, hamstrung by the tendency towards hegemony that is built into the structure of its membership because of Russia's predominant size.

The existence of Comecon does not, then, imply that there is, or will be in the next few years, an integrated economy in eastern Europe that negotiates, like EEC, as a single unit in its external trade. The east European countries will retain, during this period, their centralised, nationally-planned economies, and the institutions of Comecon do not seem likely to make more than marginal differences to this form of organisation.

It is, however, well known that there has recently been some evolution of the east European systems, under the pressure of their transition to consumer societies, in the direction of decentralisation and a market economy. The current reforms, if they become fully effective, will take Yugoslavia far in that direction. In Russia the Liberman experiments and the Kosygin reforms, bringing criteria of competition and profit, are certainly significant; and the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles are all engaged in implementing some degree of economic decentralisation. In these circumstances it has become less fanciful to suppose, even if the possibility of full integration among east European economies is still a long way off, that a rapprochement with the western economic system may become feasible. Thus Mr Kaser says that 'Renewed efforts to create a multilateral programme may not necessarily be kept within the bounds of [Comecon's] group. Soviet ideology has recently buried the hatchet which, at the time of Comecon's foundation, struck down Varga for discerning the feasibility of planning in the west European mixed economies, and a shared economic language is at least evolving as western Europe and the developing countries embody some of their policies in plans, nationally and internationally. One way for Comecon to enlarge this potential communication would be by the partial transposition of its multilateral programming to a wider arena, such as Gatt, or the proposed United Nations Trade and Development Board, where the plans of developed and developing countries could best be confronted.'[4]

Some, such as members of the Labour Party's Wider Europe Group, go farther than this and envisage an association of east European countries with west European free trade systems. This seems also to be the drift of *The Observer's* policy, although the wording of its editorial comment is not unambiguous: 'President de Gaulle's prophetic vision of the future of the Common Market—as a loose association of sovereign States—may find an echo in the hearts of many British politicians. . . . There may, indeed, be a lot to be said for a somewhat looser form of association than the present Common Market—particularly if this allows not only Britain but some East European countries also to join in

[3] Statement made to the European Parliament, 5 February 1963.
[4] Michael Kaser, op cit, p. 4.

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economic cooperation' (12 September 1965). It is worth examining, therefore, what appears to be involved in economic cooperation between eastern Europe and the West, and between eastern Europe and the west European trading systems in particular.

Eastern Europe and Gatt

The negotiations about Polish membership of Gatt and the discussions on East-West trade in the UN Conference on Trade and Development [5] have brought out many of the problems of closer economic cooperation between East and West, even though no more was being considered than to conduct this trade on the same basis as normal trade between western countries, that is to say with most-favoured-nation tariffs and with the use of quotas limited to certain defined emergencies.

From the point of view of the West, the difficulties derive first from the fact that the trade of communist countries (apart from Yugoslavia) is monopolised by state trading corporations which are subject to the orders of the governments. This means that trade could be used for purposes that were either strategic (e.g. the withholding of oil at a critical moment) or political (e.g. buying elsewhere unless a western country or firm complies with certain political stipulations). Since the governments of most communist countries are by no means friendly to the West, this argument causes western countries to feel the need to hold trade controls in reserve in case they should approach in any sector of their economies a condition of undue dependence on communist countries (which would be hard to define but not so hard to recognise).

Second, it is believed that state monopolies could use their bargaining power to exploit those with whom they trade for purely economic ends: to buy cheaper or sell dearer. It is important to get this argument into proportion. The state monopolies of the smaller communist countries occupy such a tiny corner of the world market for most of the things they buy or sell that they have little scope for any such exploitation. They are much less powerful than a large western firm. But, while there are very few products of which a communist state monopoly is a dominant supplier, the orders that the trading corporations of the larger communist countries, and of Russia in particular, can place are so big that the West is right to regard this power as a potential danger to a degree that does not apply with respect to international trade in general.

Third, western countries fear that the trade with communist countries may lead to harmful economic disruption. This is because it is not possible to ascertain whether exports by the state trading corporations are being subsidised; even if they are not, the pricing systems of communist countries have no logic by the standards of market economies, and exports at domestic prices can therefore represent 'unfair' competition;

[5] The UNCTAD material on this subject is contained in UN Document E/Conf. 46/PC.47 and UN Document E/Conf. 46/34. The problem of the relations between state-trading countries and Gatt is considered in PEP, *East-West Trade* (1965), pp. 156–61.

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and even if the communists stick to world market prices, their planning system is such that large surpluses can appear that would swamp the market. There is a further cause of economic disruption that is present in any trade between more and less developed countries, and that is worth stressing because it appears to those brought up on the static theory of classical economics as an unfortunate aberration rather than a fact of fundamental importance in contemporary world trade. This is that the more developed countries have an overwhelming advantage in the capital-intensive (i.e. modern) industries, while the more efficient of the less developed cannot be beaten in the labour-intensive (i.e. old-fashioned) industries. Thus if trade between the two is reasonably free, with low tariffs and no quotas, the old-fashioned industries will disappear in the more developed countries while the modern industries will never take root in the less developed countries. This applies whether the trade is between Asia and Europe, between western Europe and the United States—or between eastern Europe and the West. Now the loss of old-fashioned industries may be uncomfortable for those sectors of an advanced economy, although the process of change can be eased by government help in reconversion, and is also generally eased and often actually prevented by means of high tariffs or special import controls; but the shove in the direction of modernisation is beneficial provided the transition is organised well. To the less developed country, on the other hand, the bargain seems likely to be one-sided: its modern industries will be nipped in the bud and it will be indefinitely relegated to industrial backwardness. It is eastern Europe, therefore, and not the West that has cause to fear the consequences of freer trade between regions at widely different economic levels.

In fact the east Europeans would have no such fear because (except perhaps the Yugoslavs) they have no intention of abandoning the planned growth of their industries or of accepting the criterion of international competition. The Poles offered to erect a tariff if this would enable them to negotiate like other members of Gatt; but it would not, because there is no reason to suppose that their choice whether to manufacture at home or to buy from abroad (which is the choice with which nations negotiating about tariffs are essentially concerned) would be altered in proportion to any change in the level of their tariff. Nor are they prepared to let their exports compete freely with those of other countries, by making their currency convertible. This would force them to devalue to a realistic exchange rate and would, even if this were done, introduce a new dimension of uncertainty into what is already a very uncertain sector of their national plans.

The Poles therefore favour an arrangement whereby, in return for a tariff cut that enabled them to sell more to another member of Gatt, they would increase their purchases from that member by an equivalent amount. But this, while it is a sensible and useful proposal, has little in common with the most-favoured-nation system of tariff cuts employed by market economies in Gatt: the reciprocal advantage offered by the

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Poles would not be extended to benefit all other suppliers of the product in question, as is the case with a mfn tariff cut; nor would the arrangement be in any way multilateral.

This is not to say that closer Polish involvement in Gatt, or a special form of membership for Poland, would be a bad thing. It might, perhaps, slightly weaken the organisation by adding to those special categories, such as agriculture, textiles, and developing countries, that now escape the rigour of its rules; but the Czechs are in any case already members, and for the Poles to join them would be a step towards better relations between East and West, and favour any convergence of the two systems that might follow from a continued trend towards decentralisation and the introduction of market principles in the East. The lesson is, rather, that the differences between the economic systems of East and West are still such that trade has to be subject to special procedures that are not compatible with full membership of even an organisation like Gatt, which demands no element of integration. The Executive Secretary of Gatt has put it in a nutshell: 'If a free enterprise country comes into the Gatt it accepts a number of commitments. It makes an agreement as to the level of its tariff protection. . . . It agrees not to use import restrictions as a means of protection. It agrees to certain rules relating to subsidies, to dumping, to customs administration, all of which are designed to afford to its trading partners clearly ascertainable and agreed terms of access. . . . None of these conditions exist in a state-trading country.'[6] Even if the present members of Gatt deviate from these principles to a greater or lesser degree, it can hardly be denied that the organisation would be undermined by the introduction as full members of important countries from Eastern Europe that deviate from them wholesale. This is not to say that the difficulties are absolute or eternal. The structure of the Yugoslav economy may soon be decentralised enough to justify full membership of Gatt; and the other East European countries may well later follow suit. Liberal policies on the part of Western countries can moreover help to encourage such developments. But it is not wise to minimise the difficulties or to expect fundamental changes in the near future. The problems of economic relations between East and West are not going to be so quickly or easily solved.

Eastern Europe and Efta

The 'somewhat looser form of association than the present Common Market' for which *The Observer* felt there might be a lot to be said could hardly be looser than the European Free Trade Association. Yet the problems of a free trading relationship with eastern Europe would be those of the Gatt relationship writ large. The economies of the existing Efta members would be wide open to the possibilities of strategic or political pressure, to exploitation by state-trading monopolies, or

[6] E. Wyndham White, *International Trade: Challenge and Response* (Gatt, 1959), pp. 18, 19.

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to disruption due to the difference of economic systems or economic levels. Special controls could doubtless be maintained on trade with the eastern countries, but in this case there would not be a lot of point in pretending that they were a part of Efta. They, for their part, would find the rules of the association more stringent and therefore still harder to accept than those of Gatt. As in relation to Gatt, such difficulties are neither absolute nor eternal; a decentralisation of the Eastern economic systems may eventually change the situation, and Yugoslavia may even now be evolving a system that would make associate membership of Efta possible; it is significant that Efta agreed, on 29 October 1965, to open discussions with the Yugoslavs.

There is however a further, and more important, reason why the association of state-trading countries with Efta would be to the detriment of the existing members. There are grounds to believe that free trade between modern economies must be accompanied by a high degree of coordination of economic policies. To the classical economists, the government's duty was to keep out of economics, and its only part in free trade was to remove national barriers that should never have been there in the first place. But now that almost all governments plan and intervene in economic life in a variety of ways, a free trade area can hardly be sustained unless the plans and interventions of the member governments pull together instead of clashing with each other.

In order that the competition between free-trading partners can be fair, for example, it is necessary for them to enforce similar competition policies (with respect to monopolies and restrictive practices); there is no point in removing the import duty if imports are still excluded by a market-sharing agreement, or by the buying policy of a state-owned monopoly. What may be called 'market planning' is widely practised in certain sectors such as agriculture, energy, and transport: subsidies are granted or prices fixed by governments, and competition will be distorted unless government policies are brought into line. Target planning, whereby industries are compelled to adhere to production targets rather than to aim at profitability under market conditions, is a variant of market planning with particular importance in eastern Europe. 'Welfare planning' can affect the conditions of competition by changing the distribution of resources as between different income groups, between labour and capital, or between different regions.

Thus competition, market, target and welfare planning all need to be coordinated in order to secure fair competition. In a free trade area, moreover, in which the several national economies are open to the economic forces generated in the economies of other members, failure to fulfil the objectives of full employment (or growth) and price stability in any one member can directly affect all the others. A common economic and financial policy therefore becomes necessary, based on a shared doctrine regarding the relative importance of these objectives and the merits of such different instruments of policy as monetary policy or price controls.

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It will readily be seen that these fields in which common policies appear likely to be needed by a free trade area are those in which EEC has from the outset had provision for the formation of common policies, and institutions in which they can be decided upon and by which they can be executed. Together with the free movement of people and of capital, and a common external commercial policy, which are also held to be necessary to the fair and effective functioning of a single market, these comprise the essential differences between EEC and Efta. Failing a coalescence of the two organisations, it will be difficult enough in any case for Efta to evolve these attributes of economic union. The preponderant weight of Britain has the same inhibiting effect on supranational integration as does the presence of Russia in Comecon. If east European countries, with their sharply divergent economic systems and policies, were associated with Efta, its evolution towards economic union, whether on its own or by joining with EEC, would become still more problematic. Thus *The Observer's* reasoning may be turned on its head: so far from being an unnecessarily divisive factor, supranational institutions and provision for common policies such as those of EEC are a necessary concomitant of free trade among modern economies, and this makes it still harder to envisage any fruitful form of membership or associate membership for centrally-planned state-trading countries in the free trade systems of the West.

Eastern Europe and EEC

The idea that the centralised state-trading economies of eastern Europe in their present form could become members or associate members of Efta, let alone of the European Community, is then an example of wishful thinking that a little cold logic will dispel. But this does not mean that, pending structural changes in the East European systems, trade cannot increase and other forms of economic cooperation develop. They have been, and they can, should, and seem likely to go on doing so.

Trade between eastern and western Europe has greatly increased in the last ten years. It is, however, still a smaller percentage of the European countries' total trade than it was before the war; the east Europeans are anxious to buy more from the West; the economic development of eastern Europe seems likely to produce more goods that are saleable in western Europe (shortage of which, and poor marketing, being among the main brakes on trade at present); and western restrictions on imports from the East are likely to be relaxed rather than tightened. Thus the growth of trade seems likely to continue.

Although western investment in eastern Europe is precluded by communist doctrine, technical cooperation has been developing to a point where the distinction is almost becoming blurred. Sales of know-how have been important for some time; and the new trade agreement between France and Rumania provides for extensive technical aid in agriculture and other fields. Recently, however, the well-publicised

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Krupp negotiations in Poland, and other instances of industrial collaboration between western firms and Polish or Hungarian state enterprises, have taken economic partnership a stage farther. With abundant labour and capital shortage in eastern Europe, such arrangements seem likely to flourish so long as the political climate is favourable.

Members of EEC have played a leading part in this development of economic relations with the East (it was natural to mention France and Germany in the last paragraph as pioneers of two forms of technical cooperation). But although EEC has a common tariff and an obligation to develop a common commercial policy, there have as yet been no negotiations between the Community as such and east European state-trading countries.

This is largely the fault of the East. Displeased, for political and strategic as well as certain economic reasons, at this new initiative towards unification in the West, the east Europeans at first treated the Community as if it did not exist. Khrushchev was the first to suggest in public that it might be advisable to do business with this vast new economic unit. Recently the Poles sent a delegation to visit the European Commission in Brussels. But officially the east Europeans still do not recognise the Community as the authority that deals with the tariffs of the Six, and they still claim most-favoured-nation tariff treatment, i.e. the extension to them of the Community's internal tariff cuts that will shortly have reduced the tariffs to zero. This is foolish both in theory and in practice: in theory because, as has been explained above, genuine and fair free trade between a centralised state-trading country and a modern free enterprise country would be incompatible with both systems; and in practice because the Community *is* the body that fixes the tariffs of the Six, and no amount of wishing otherwise will change this situation (the only agency that might do so is General de Gaulle, and this is unlikely, seeing what France would lose by the destruction of the Common Market). The east Europeans will undoubtedly have to come to terms with reality and accept that, if they want to negotiate on tariffs with the Six, they will have to do so through the institutions of the European Community.

The Community has tried to tempt eastern Europe into recognising the existence of the common external tariff by offering the Soviet Union a tariff cut on the oddly *dolce vita* items of caviar, crab (tinned), and vodka. So far this offer has been ignored. Apart from this, the Six have not been successful in forming a common policy towards eastern Europe. This is too important a part of the foreign policies of both France and Germany for them to have been able to sink their different approaches in a common policy; and these difficulties 'make the prospect for any real progress on this front in the near future very remote'.[7]

It is possible that the Community, because of de Gaulle's opposition to its institutions, will remain unable to form a common commercial

[7] Miriam Camps, *What Kind of Europe?* (London, 1965), p. 68.

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policy towards eastern Europe. De Gaulle may either break the Community, whose members might then join in a general west European free trade area; or, and more probably, he might take all the power of decision out of its institutions, leaving it unable to negotiate changes in its tariff—like a huge and helpless whale stranded on the shores of world trade. In either of these circumstances the relations of east European countries with those of western Europe would be likely to continue to develop as in the recent past, with increasing trade and technical cooperation on a bilateral basis. The east Europeans would remain as a number of small or medium-sized states poised between Russia and the West, attracted by the technical superiority of western Europe and feeling the pull of the centralised military and economic power of Russia.

It is, however, still probable that the Community will outlive de Gaulle and resume its progress towards common policies and the strengthening of its institutions. In this case the weight of western Europe in the international economic system will greatly increase, for the Community will negotiate as a unit of population not far short of 200 million with its present membership, at a high level of technology and living standards, and accounting for over a quarter of world trade. The balance of economic power in Europe would tilt towards the West and, in their balancing between Russia and western Europe, the east Europeans would lean more towards the latter than would otherwise be the case.

If this were the end of the story, it would still be a matter of great significance in the structure of European power politics and economics. The small and medium-sized states of eastern Europe have traditionally been pulled in opposite directions by Russia on the one hand and by western Europe, represented mainly by Germany, on the other. With the destruction of German power at the end of the war, the pull towards Russia became irresistible, and it is still sufficiently strong for it to be legitimate to classify the east Europeans as belonging to the 'Soviet bloc'. The existence in western Europe of an economic unit (and, in all probability, eventually a political unit too) nearly as populous as the Soviet Union and much richer and more advanced would, in the long run, redress this balance. Ideology and fear of Germany now stand in the way, but they are likely to fade with the passage of time. Eastern Europe's economic relations with western Europe might well become more important than those with Russia.

There is, however, a still more interesting possibility: that the chemistry of the Community's efforts to transcend the nation-state by means of economic integration and supranational institutions might induce a similar chemical reaction in eastern Europe. The establishment of the Common Market has stimulated 'a veritable rash of treaties and proposals for the creation of common markets all over the world'. Though 'various groups of underdeveloped countries have reasons of their own for wanting to create regional common markets—reasons

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quite independent of the integration movement in western Europe . . . every new plan for regional cooperation among the underdeveloped countries includes as one of its principal objectives the need to strengthen the hands of these countries in dealing with western Europe'.[8] The same arguments appear to hold good for eastern Europe as for the underdeveloped countries. In making his proposal for a unified planning board in Comecon, Khrushchev made it clear that the idea was derived from the supranational EEC.[9] Partly by force of example, more in order to countervail its power, the successful development of the Community will provide a pressure in the direction of unification in eastern Europe.

Some people see the Community, in the long run, not so much causing the east Europeans to unite as attracting the several east European states into its orbit, whether as full members when they have evolved fully-functioning market economies or as associate members when they are on the way to doing so (as Yugoslavia may well now be). This possibility, which depends on radical changes taking place in the economic systems of east European countries, does of course refer to a longer term than that being considered in the analysis, above, of the problems of associating eastern and western countries given their present systems.

Yet other observers envisage that the process of union in eastern Europe will be accompanied by a special relationship with western Europe, leading eventually, perhaps, to a union of the two: 'A larger conception of a cooperative community, involving eventually four major units, America and Russia as the peripheral participants, and West Europe and East Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in time perhaps becoming even more closely linked), would provide a more constructive and politically appealing image of tomorrow than a troubled Western partnership implicitly based on the notion of continued European partition.'[10]

It is the prospects outlined in the last three paragraphs that are of the greatest interest: those implying that the European Community may represent not only a bloc (or a new federal state) but also a process, a chain reaction that induces unification in other parts of the world and eventually, perhaps, between itself and other similar units. It is not only Professor Brzezinski who, in the last quotation and with reference to eastern Europe, discerns such a possibility; the idea of the Community as a catalyst of integration rather than a great power is implicit in the thinking of M. Jean Monnet, the 'father of Europe', as expressed in a number of his speeches and articles: 'The natural attitude of a European Community based on the exercise by nations of common responsibilities will be to make these nations also aware of their responsibilities, as a

8 Sidney Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Markets* (London, 1963), pp. 11–13.
9 See Michael Kaser, op. cit., p. 93.
10 Z. K. Brzezinski, 'Peaceful Engagement: a Plan for Europe's Future', *Encounter*, April 1965.

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Community, to the world. . . . European unity is the most important event in the West since the war, not because it is a new great power, but because the new institutional method it introduces is permanently modifying relations between nations and men'; and, again, the union of Europe is 'not an end in itself. It is the beginning of the road to the more orderly world that we must have if we are to escape destruction.'[11] This concept of integration as a process that, starting in western Europe, will induce integration in other parts of the world and perhaps in the world as a whole may become one of the great contemporary myths (the word is used in no pejorative sense—it is only fair to state that it is a myth with which this writer is in full sympathy). As such it deserves examination in relation to the problems of unity in eastern and western Europe.

East Europe and West Europe: problems of union

The experience of the European Community as well as of earlier attempts to create unions indicates that certain conditions are conducive to union and that a majority of them must be present in a certain degree if union is to take place.[12] These conditions will now be considered in relation to the various possibilities of integration within eastern Europe or as between eastern and western Europe.

One set of conditions has already emerged during the examination of eastern Europe in relation to Gatt and Efta. There has to be a broad similarity of economic institutions if close association or, still more, if integration is to be feasible. Not only is it extremely hard to see how fair competition can be ensured between free enterprise economies on the one hand and highly centralised state-trading economies on the other; but the integrating economies must, as explained earlier, have enough similarity in their objectives and instruments of economic policy to strike a similar balance between such objectives as full employment and price stability, and between such instruments as monetary policy and price controls. This argues against union between East and West so long as their economic systems are radically different. It does not count against integration within eastern Europe, but here another factor must be recalled. It was shown earlier that there are serious obstacles to the fusion of economies based on centralised and imperative target planning rather than on the criteria of markets and profits. A union of centrally-planned monoliths appears as an all-or-nothing process of absorption in a large unit; that of decentralised market economies can, as EEC has shown, take place gradually and without any vast and sudden surrender of sovereignty. Effective integration in eastern Europe will therefore probably have to wait on far-reaching progress towards a system of

[11] Speech by Jean Monnet at the Second World Congress on Man-made Fibres, 1 May 1962, and at Dartmouth College, 11 June 1961.

[12] The conditions are considered in more detail in the writer's chapter on the EEC in Evan Luard et al., *Evolution of International Organisations* (London, 1966). In this chapter the writer has drawn heavily, with respect to the earlier union, on K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (London, 1951).

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market economy, which is by no means out of the question; Yugoslavia, it may be repeated, appears to be well on the way towards this. The introduction of market principles in the other east European countries will, however, take time, though less time than would be required for a similarity with west European economic institutions and objectives to develop, such as would be required before any integration of eastern and western economies would be possible.

A broad similarity of economic levels (living standards, productivity, level of technology) was also found earlier to be desirable if different economies are to be associated in a single market. This condition is on the whole satisfied with respect to a union of eastern Europe, which has a long way to catch up before it could be said to have reached a level similar to that of western Europe.

It is often stated that a political union is likely to follow from the economic union of the European Community. This is a rather misleading statement, because the Economic Community is already charged with the formation of common policies on questions of great political import. Those who speak in these terms ignore the fact that a large part of politics concerns questions of economic policy. It would be more correct to say that the Economic Community is a political union whose responsibilities might eventually be extended to other political questions such as defence. But whatever the terminology, it will readily be understood that the members of an economic union must together undertake a variety of exacting political tasks, and in this they are not likely to be successful unless they have broadly similar political institutions and ideas. This has been true in the European Community: when the Treaties were made each member was a parliamentary democracy centred on Christian-Democrat, Socialist, and Liberal parties. It is true of eastern Europe. It is hardly likely to be true of eastern and western Europe together for a long time to come.

The question of balance between the members has also been considered earlier. Union is not likely to take place if it would be dominated by one member who is much more powerful than the others. The presence of Russia therefore precludes the integration of all the existing members of Comecon. Likewise a United Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' is an abortive concept, unless it is based on the pre-condition of a federal union of western Europe, which is hardly what de Gaulle has in mind; European Russia alone, with over 150 million people, is three times as populous as any other European state. It may be said in passing, though it is not the subject of this essay, that an Atlantic Common Market of North America and western Europe is for similar reasons ruled out at least until the unity of western Europe has been firmly consolidated (and even then it is hard to envisage a union consisting almost entirely of two giants). On this score, a union of the east European countries except Russia would be practicable. As far as the possibility of eventual entry of eastern Europe into EEC is concerned, the east European countries separately would not be likely to

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unbalance it, but they would be hard to accommodate if they were to enter as an already-formed unit.

It has also been found necessary that, at least during the time of formation and consolidation of the union, the largest members should be in close alliance. There is, clearly, a major problem here in relation to eastern Europe. The individual countries have been all too prone to adopt attitudes of narrow nationalism, such as would render union out of the question.

It is, finally and perhaps obviously, necessary for the prospective members of a union to desire it strongly. Many forces will act against it: nationalism, vested interests, inertia. Without powerful motives such as the desire for independence, for defence against an outside power, or for economic gain, and without a profound dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs, these reactionary forces are not likely to be overcome. In the case of eastern Europe, it is not difficult to envisage the existence of these conditions. Dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs has erupted at intervals; independence from Russia is deeply desired by many; a need for economic defence against the Common Market is likely to be felt; and the economic gain from large-scale production for a large market was already seen in most of the countries when the negotiations took place about integration in Comecon. If the other political and economic conditions were already fulfilled, some of these motives might well apply to a union of east European countries with the European Community, in addition to which would be the East's need for capital, the West's need for labour, and the need of both sides for a solution of the German problem.

This analysis has shown that the necessary conditions for union in eastern Europe might well be present in the coming years, provided that the countries there can both overcome their excessive nationalism and find a way of uniting alongside, but apart from, Russia. Union between eastern and western Europe, on the other hand, would have to await a political and economic convergence that will probably be a long time coming, and if eastern Europe has by then already united, questions of balance will make it hard to fuse this unit with western Europe, except within a wider framework.

If a union of the east European countries apart from Russia is indeed possible the West should welcome and encourage it. Polycentrism is an improvement on the hegemony that went before it; but if taken to its logical conclusion it is no more than balkanisation. The geographical connotations of the term are too evocative for the instability of such a system—or rather non-system—to be ignored. What is needed is an 'organised rebuttal' of hegemony, as Professor Hallstein described the European Community, rather than the disorganised rebuttal that polycentrism represents. A united eastern Europe, standing between Russia and the West and too strong to be dominated by either side, would be a much more stable arrangement: neither hegemony nor polycentrism, but perhaps oligocentrism.

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Such a union would have to come about with Russian agreement—the Red Army is stationed in some of the countries concerned. It would, however, be necessary in any case to proceed by stages, with for example an intensification of bilateral economic relations between the prospective members and specific projects like the lower Danube scheme. This would reassure the Russians that no sharp and sudden realignment was contemplated. It cannot, indeed, be the case that the Russians would oppose all schemes for union: the Czechs and Poles have discussed a far-reaching plan of economic association, and it was not Russian opposition but the Czechs' fear of Poland's larger size (absence of that balance which is a desirable condition of union) that prevented agreement. There is no reason to suppose that the Russians would stand in the way of a wider union in Eastern Europe; but people in the West would have to avoid seeing the process as a defeat for Russia: it would no more be a defeat for Russia than the establishment of the European Community was a defeat for the United States.

If this union were realised, then the Nato and Warsaw Pact areas would contain four major units—western Europe, eastern Europe, America, and Russia: what might be called a Greater Europe divided into four main parts. These units would themselves be of sizes that would constitute a reasonable balance should political and economic conditions evolve so that closer relations between them were possible. At the appropriate time their association could be cemented by a political settlement that would include arms control, agreement on economic collaboration, and a solution of the German problem (which would then be, in relation to the whole of the area and the problems involved, of the order of magnitude of the Saar problem in the fifties).

It would be possible for the West to encourage this whole process not only by means of better trading relations through, for example, closer east European involvement in Gatt, but also by judicious assistance such as has been suggested by Professor Brzezinski. The transport system of eastern Europe might be a suitable object of aid in the first instance, with stress on provisions to facilitate traffic between the east European countries whose union it is desired to promote, although communications through these countries from western Europe to Russia should at the same time be improved. A 'Marshall Plan' for the east European economies as a whole might follow at the time of the political settlement.

It may be objected that the sketching out of such grand designs is not a realistic exercise: useless and perhaps harmful. Some of the precedents are discouraging. Dulles's concept of roll-back, the Bolsheviks' world revolution, and de Gaulle's concert of European powers have all been potent sources of dangerous actions. But all political acts are based on a view of the future, and the most dangerous view of all, the one that is absolutely certain to be wrong, is that nothing will change. No more is claimed for the view put forward here than that it is possible, it is desirable, and it is therefore worth trying to bring about.

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EUROPE IN EAST–WEST RELATIONS

George F. Kennan

EUROPE is a concept which has no clearly-defined and commonly-accepted delimitations. No one can really say where Europe begins or ends. It does, however, have an unquestionable internal reality.

The 'East-West Question' is another matter. This is admittedly an inexact term. There are western nations who find themselves on what most of us consider to be the eastern side and vice-versa. But there *is* a reality here which all of us recognise and for which it is difficult to find any more exact description. This reality is the conflict of outlook and interest that does exist between a series of political regimes which are of Marxist-Leninist inspiration and hold it to be desirable and inevitable that all peoples of the world should eventually be governed by regimes similarly inspired; and, on the other hand, a number of the older western societies where people have other ideas about how governments should be chosen and inspired.

It is perfectly reasonable that one should wish to examine Europe's relationship to this conflict. It is one by which Europe's life has been, and still is being, profoundly affected. And there is particular reason why such an examination should be undertaken just at this time, because the last few years have seen changes which affect the nature of this problem and deserve our attention.

We all have in mind the manner in which this question first presented itself when the recent war came to an end. Europe stood then at the centre of the 'East-West Problem'. It was both the principal object of the difference, and a leading participant in the effort to overcome it. The East-West tension was the dominant reality of Europe's life. Her alliances, her international arrangements, her intellectual climate, her view of the future: all these were functions of this global conflict. So overwhelming was its significance for Europe's life that many people found it hard to envisage any satisfactory future for the continent that did not assume the early and decisive resolution of the conflict one way or another, by peaceful means or by violent ones. To many of us it seemed at that time implausible that the continent could permanently endure a division so painful, so artificial, so drastic in its effects. It is not surprising that many people, in these circumstances, occupied themselves with dreams or schemes for removing the schism by violent methods of one sort or another: by internal political upheavals in individual countries, or by war itself.

Today, twenty years after the war, we see that once again the provisional has proved to be more enduring than anything else. This seemingly intolerable political division of the continent has now existed for a period just as long as that which elapsed from the end of the first

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world war to the tragedy of Munich; and if events external to Europe do not interfere too drastically, there is no reason why it should not last much longer still. But during recent years there have been important changes in the conditions that govern it; and it is these changes which I think we might particularly note.

FIRST of all, great as is the unhappiness on both sides of this continued political and military division of Europe, there is now a strongly predominant feeling on both sides of the line that to attempt force to remove the division would create more difficulties than it would cure. It is true that in both East and West there are residual pockets of people who continue to resist this conclusion and who insist on thinking and talking in terms of violent solutions. But it is significant that even these hotheads find it necessary today to claim that what they advocate are only civil conflicts and to argue (unconvincingly, as a rule) that such conflicts would not lead to general war. In any case, these voices of impatience and militancy are becoming weaker on both sides of the line. In general, Europeans are well aware of the difficulty of putting limits to any form of armed violence that might be initiated in the crowded and explosive conditions of the continent. They also recognise the extent to which the vital interests of the two great semi-European super-powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—are now involved in the maintenance of this delicate status quo.

In the light of these appreciations, many people who once regarded the division of Europe as intolerable have now come to accept it as something that can be lived with for at least a reasonably long time, and they are therefore in a frame of mind to give less attention to schemes for its sudden removal and more attention to ways in which it can be made more easy to live with.

A second change has occurred in the nature of the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe's problems. At one time, Europe and its problems lay at the heart of Soviet-American differences. Today the focus of these differences has to some extent shifted away from Europe and has come to rest on other areas of the world: primarily, at the moment, on East Asia.

This of course involves great dangers, which could affect us all; and I would not like to give the impression that I welcome these extra-European complications. But so long as it does not lead to actual hostilities among the great powers, this extra-European focus of the East-West conflict has at least the useful effect of distracting the attention of the two great semi-European antagonists from specifically European differences and of giving to them both an added reason to avoid conflict in the European theatre.

Finally, as the last of the great changes affecting the East-West conflict in Europe, we have that partial breakdown of the attitudes and practices of bipolarity which has been observable in recent years on both sides of the European dividing line. On the western side we have

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the impulses that flow from General de Gaulle's well-known feelings about the independence of French policy and about the need for Europe to speak with a louder voice in the determination of its own affairs. On the other side we have the tendency towards greater individuality and independence that has become visible in the policies of certain east European countries. Recent developments have made it possible for the regimes in these countries to pursue policies founded more strictly on the immediate interests of their own peoples and to exert themselves more responsibly in the direction of the moderation of world tensions and the realisation of constructive possibilities for peaceful coexistence. This is a welcome development. The will to peace on the part of both peoples and regimes in these countries cannot be doubted. Their independent efforts and ideas and contributions are desirable, and indeed essential, if a safer and more hopeful situation is to be constructed on the European continent. As satellites, there was little they could have done to make this contribution; as independent countries, conscious of their individual responsibility and willing to accept it, they can make contributions for which all of us—even those of us who live on the periphery of Europe, either to East or West—should be grateful.

Altogether, then, the division of the continent no longer has the significance it once had. It is becoming at once more firmly established and more acceptable. This postwar status quo, which once looked so hopeless, is becoming more susceptible of constructive interpretation and development; and in this process the European countries themselves are acquiring new possibilities for independent effort and achievement.

It is of course true that these possibilities are still limited by the strictures of military and political alliance, by ideological commitment and by contractual or moral obligations assumed towards one or the other of the great neighbouring super-powers. Europe cannot, therefore, act as though the East-West question did not exist—it cannot act as though this question were not still a limiting factor in its life. It is nevertheless at liberty to consider in what directions it would like that life to proceed in the event that, and to the extent that, this limiting factor loses its force. It is at liberty to seek for itself guidelines by which policy and action may be governed to the extent that the shaping of its future turns out really to lie in its own hands. And in this connection there are certain reflections that to me, as an historian, seem worth putting down on paper.

Twice in this century Europe has literally torn itself to pieces in military conflict—in what amounted to European civil wars. We are all aware of the appalling consequences to which these long orgies of bloodshed have led. This East-West question itself is one of them.

The first world war was, as I see it, the product primarily of two historic changes in the European status quo. One of these was the disintegration and disappearance of the Turkish empire in southeastern Europe, a development which left this great area a bone of contention between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. The second was

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the advance of the Germans to national unity, which meant the appearance of a new great power on the European scene. Both these events constituted major changes in the status quo, surpassing the powers of adjustment of the European society of that day. The European order ensuing from the Napoleonic wars was simply not strong enough to bear the subtraction of one great power at one end of the continent and the addition of a new great power at the other end.

If we ask the same question with regard to the second world war—what were its deeper origins—what do we find? We find first and foremost, once again, the German problem. Why was this? It was primarily because the peace settlement concluding the first world war had failed signally to provide any real solution for the German problem. The statesmen at Versailles had contented themselves with destroying the only other great state in central Europe, namely, Austria-Hungary, that could conceivably have served as a balance to Germany, leaving Germany the only united great power in this area. At the same time, they saddled the Germans with just enough in the way of restrictions and humiliations to make difficult the task of the moderate governments that tried to function there in the immediate post-war years. In this manner they paved the way for the ultimate triumph of the extremists in German political life. As a result of these follies, compounded of course by even more serious ones on the part of many Germans themselves, within fifteen years after the end of the first world war the German problem presented itself once again, and in an uglier form than before.

But we also had, as a contributing cause, the lack of any stable status quo in eastern Europe and the Balkans. Instead of reducing the instability of international relationships in that region, the outcome of the first world war had simply added to it. The two great empires that had previously been dominant there—the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian—were now destroyed; but no new form of supra-national order had been created to take the place of the order and structure they had once provided for the life of the area: an order and structure which were not perfect, which had in many ways lagged behind the requirements of the time, but which were better than nothing at all.

If we take these circumstances in their aggregate, we see that there have been two outstanding causes for the tragic instability that has marked the life of Europe in this century: one, the difficulty of finding an acceptable place in the order of the continent for a united Germany overshadowing all her neighbours in demographic and economic strength; and two, the difficulty of finding acceptable frontiers and an acceptable framework of inter-relationships for a whole family of new states, emerging from the disintegration of the older empires. And it is important to note that in each of these cases the failure of Europe to cope successfully with these problems has proceeded within a framework of international life organised on the principle of absolute national sovereignty, each government being theoretically the sole

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architect and judge of its own conduct, acknowledging no higher obligation than the interest of its own nation as interpreted by itself, subjecting itself to no broader framework of loyalty or responsibility, and to no higher law.

ARE there lessons in these reflections, from the standpoint of the present? I think there are. First of all, there is a warning against the assumption that either of these underlying problems has been basically solved. Both are partly concealed today by the abnormal circumstances that have prevailed since the recent war; but both, surely, would be with us again in many respects if these abnormal circumstances were to be suddenly removed. If no new concepts and approaches were to be introduced to guard against this, a united Germany would again be the only great state in central Europe, and in even greater measure than is the case today a source of disquiet to her neighbours. And if the bonds of alliance and obligation to the two semi-European super-powers were to be severed, and the restraints implicit in those bonds suddenly to be removed, who is to say that the border problems, uncertainties, apprehensions, and manoeuvring for position which characterised the life of central and eastern Europe between the wars would not reappear in a manner no more reassuring than before? It would take an optimistic person indeed to believe that all border and minority problems had now been solved in a manner wholly satisfactory to all concerned. It is true that the extensive deportation or destruction of minorities during the recent war has somewhat alleviated the severity of these problems in one place or another; but it is perfectly obvious that we are still faced with boundary lines, at certain spots in Europe, which do violence to the feelings of great numbers of people and which could, if nothing is done to prevent it, become once again sources of serious instability. This cannot possibly be otherwise; for the geographic distribution of ethnic groups, of linguistic habits, and of traditional loyalties in these regions of Europe is such that no neat, clear, and wholly satisfactory delimitations are possible.

The second lesson that seems to me to flow from these reflections is the impossibility of finding solutions to these problems in an international community based on the theory of absolute national sovereignty. It is clear that a united Germany, functioning as a completely independent sovereign state within an environment of similar states, cannot fail to arouse many of the same reactions and anxieties it has aroused in the past. The only conceivable permanent solution to this problem would seem to be the embedding of the German people in a framework of outlooks, loyalties, and obligations larger than themselves. Similarly, in a situation where borders cannot possibly be made to coincide entirely with ethnic, linguistic, or subjective divisions, the only conceivable solution would be to change the meaning of borders generally in such a way that they no longer have the same painful significance they have heretofore had in relation to such problems. Finally, in a situation

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where no really satisfactory place can be found for minorities within the boundaries of the national state, the most promising solution, surely, is not to try to abolish minorities in general but rather to eliminate the framework of national sovereignty in which they find themselves so uncomfortable, to replace that framework by a body politic constructed on something wider than the national principle—a body politic in which the very term 'minority' would lose something of its meaning because it would be a status shared with every other European nationality, large or small.

ALL this being so, I can conceive of no really promising solution to Europe's long-term problems that would not involve the establishment of something in the nature of a United States of Europe—a supra-national federal political system, that is, in which the rigidities of absolute sovereignty would disappear. Only under such a system would it be possible to find for Europe's seventy million Germans a place that would, at one and the same time, not frighten their neighbours with the spectacle of superior military strength and yet give to the Germans themselves the possibility of unfolding to the full their extraordinary talents and energies. Only in this way could one hope to make tolerable to peoples, both minorities and others, demarcation lines which could never be better than approximate in their relation to the linguistic and ethnographic realities.

The idea of a United States of Europe has, of course, a long history; but I can see no reason why it should be entirely unacceptable, as the description of a long-term goal, on either side of the line. Lenin, it will be recalled, talked in these terms at the outset of the first world war; and while he rejected the idea some months later, he did so for reasons which may be regarded as very largely overtaken by the events of the half century that has since elapsed.

In western Europe, meanwhile, impressive progress has been made in implementing the dream of a merging of sovereignties, at least in certain key areas of modern life. True, this is occurring only in a limited portion of the continent. It does not embrace enough of Germany to provide in itself any final solution to the German problem. It scarcely touches those areas of the continent where border problems are most difficult of solution and most dangerous. But it does indicate the prevalence of new popular attitudes, attitudes which were present in the pre-war period only in embryonic form, and which, in more favourable circumstances, could certainly be made to apply to a wider area of European life.

In a Europe untroubled by the East-West question, if we can picture such a thing, background conditions would not be wholly unfavourable for a solution of the most deep-seated problems on the basis of a merging of sovereignties generally, in favour of the establishment of a federal European state. At the same time, we have to recognise that as of today, the East-West question does indeed exist—very much so, in

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fact—and that it operates to place formidable barriers across the path towards such a solution. Obviously, federation could not have much reality among partners who continued to belong to opposing military and political alliances. And, equally obviously, the fact that countries in the eastern and western parts of the continent have fundamentally different ideological outlooks and social systems presents a formidable obstacle to their possible federation.

Yet one need not take these circumstances as grounds for total discouragement. The extent of the changes which, contrary to expectations, have come over the thinking and practice of European peoples on both sides of the line in recent years may stand as evidence that the future need not always be envisaged in terms of what was possible in the past. The military division of the continent could conceivably be overcome, as a barrier to federation, if the present two alliances could some day be merged into a general security system. This is a possibility to which I can see no binding theoretical objection. Tense and unhappy as have been the relations between the Soviet Union and my own country in the postwar period, their respective security interests are not hopelessly in conflict. The central sources of difference between them—the postwar situation in Germany and the competitive development of nuclear weapons—are both new problems for which neither of these powers was fully prepared, and with regard to which existing precedents and traditional approaches were inadequate. If solutions to them could be found, both countries would have a common interest in assuring the external security and the internal peace of the European continent. It should then be not impossible to create a framework of international engagements in which this common interest could be expressed, and under the protection of which the cause of European unity could be permitted to advance.

The ideological difficulty is, on the face of it, a more serious one. Ideologically impassioned people on both sides of the line will long continue to argue that these differences can never be reconciled within a common political framework. Perhaps this is true. But it seems to me that the discipline of circumstances is pressing us all—all of us, that is, whose societies are in a relatively advanced state of economic development (and that means just about all contemporary European societies)—into moulds and patterns which, however we wish to view them and to describe them ideologically, are increasingly similar one to the other. So great is now the element of *étatisme* in western industrial society, so little do the conditions of this type of society resemble those of the early industrial revolution in which the Marxian concepts had their origin, that the very attempt to discuss these societies and their problems in the terms of mid-nineteenth century German Marxism, or even of early twentieth-century Russian Marxism, has a note of hollow unreality. The modern non-socialist state is obliged, for reasons of its own having little or nothing to do with Marxist calculations, to borrow many of the devices of socialist *dirigisme*. And similarly, the socialist

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state, as we see today by many examples, is obliged to take leaves from the book of western free enterprise. It will be a long time before many people will care to admit the implications of these tendencies; for mankind, as Gibbon once observed, is governed by 'names'; and people part reluctantly from names to which they have once given their faith and their loyalty. But meanwhile the actual differences between societies on the two sides of the line will certainly continue to diminish, and eventually it should be possible to devise procedures by which a state that calls itself socialist can contrive to live in a federal framework with one that does not.

WHILE it is clear, then, that one cannot proceed immediately and directly to the creation of a new order in Europe, it is not too early to begin to think seriously about the sort of order one would wish, ideally, to create. And it is not too early to try to establish, wherever this is possible, conditions that would favour the transition to this new order, when and if practical progress in this direction becomes possible. This does not require the dismantling of ideological beliefs or the abandonment of cherished institutions. It does require the progressive abandonment of restrictions on travel, on communication, on cultural contacts of all sorts. It suggests the desirability of the maximum development of intra-European trade and transportation. It suggests cooperation in technological and developmental fields, such as hydro-electric schemes, fields that lend themselves particularly to international action. And it suggests the avoidance of measures which could complicate or impede the progress of integration on a European scale at a later date.

This last has reference particularly to the measures now being taken to integrate the economies of western European countries. If the methods adopted lend themselves to eventual extension of the area to which they apply, then they are steps in the right direction. If, on the other hand, they are taken in a manner that would tend to sharpen the existing division of the continent, and to rivet one side of it to a set of restricting relationships with an extra-European power, so that general European integration could not take place without involving that extra-European power as well, then in my opinion they go too far. Then they could serve only to impede rather than to promote a constructive solution of Europe's long-term problems. This is the reason, and the sole reason, for my own lack of enthusiasm for much that has been done in the direction of international integration in western Europe.

The same applies to arrangements for collaboration among countries of eastern Europe. Unless a possibility is left for the extension of such arrangements to the continent as a whole, without the integral involvement either of the United States or of the Soviet Union, the road to a better solution of Europe's problems will scarcely be open. To hope for an effective merging of sovereignties within Europe itself is not utopian. To hope for such a merger in an area that would extend all

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the way from Vladivostok across Europe and America to Alaska and Hawaii is surely quixotic at this juncture of history. If there were a possibility of any such development, I am sure the prerequisite for it would be the prior establishment of a unified Europe that could act as a third force to reconcile and to bring together the two great countries that lie on Europe's flanks.

I use the term 'third force' advisedly. I am aware of the negative reactions it arouses in the minds of many people. It means a fundamental change of concepts in many quarters. It is hard—and as a rule inadvisable—to exchange that which is known and tolerable for that which is unknown and uncertain. Some years ago, when I gave a series of radio lectures in England on the question of disengagement, I was made aware by my critics of the fears many people attach to the idea of a Europe suddenly relieved of the political and military presence of the two great neighbouring powers. They see themselves, in such an eventuality, as naked and defenceless before whichever it is of these two great powers they fear the most. More important still, many of those who are not Germans see themselves defenceless once more before the power of a united Germany which they identify in their minds with the Germany of Hitler. In many ways, the ghosts of Europe's past failures and disasters arise to plague the Europeans of today and to undermine confidence in the ability of Europe alone to determine Europe's future.

These anxieties should be acknowledged. Abrupt changes are undesirable. Safeguards are needed at every turn, and if the only basis on which Europe's life could be re-established, in the event of such a disengagement, was that of the absolute national sovereignty we have known in the past, then indeed the present state of affairs may in many respects be safer than anything we could expect to put in its place. But I should part very reluctantly from the belief that Europe ought eventually to find its own unity and its own independence of action, as a unit, on the world scene. It is not just that the dangers of the Berlin situation make it impossible to accept the present division as a satisfactory permanent solution for the continent; although that, too, is true. More important is the inherent incongruity of the proposition that the people of this great continent, with all their enormous talents and achievements, are incapable of producing out of their own midst the conditions for a peaceful and hopeful community existence in the modern age. The proposition that Europe requires to be protected from itself—that it can exist safely only when divided into two great regions, each of them to some extent the political and military province of a great power peripheral to Europe proper—cannot be accepted. It does not do justice to Europe's own genius, and it expects too much of the two great semi-European powers, Russia and the United States, leaning too heavily on them for things they are no better equipped, and in many ways less well-equipped, to provide than are the Europeans themselves.

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If I have concentrated here too much on the role of the East-West question with relation to Europe's problems and too little on the role of Europe in relation to the development of the East-West question, there are reasons for this. In the first place, one cannot speak of the role of Europe as a whole in relation to any major world problem until Europe finds its own unity. Today, Europe is still incapable of acting as a unit, and that is why European unity is at the centre of these reflections. But beyond this, it seems to me that the greatest contribution Europe can make, even at this time, to the overcoming of East-West tensions is the recovery of its own vitality, the assumption of leadership in the solution of its own problems, and the gradual detachment of its own internal development from the sterile military fears and rivalries that lie at the heart of the East-West conflict. There is not much Europeans can do at this moment, except through friendly and conciliatory advice, to moderate those phases of the East-West question that have their theatre outside the European area. But they can, if they wish, act effectively to reduce the acuteness of the East-West conflict by restricting on their own continent the negative influences of ideological passion and military fear, by gradually withdrawing their continent as an object of the East-West rivalry, and by setting, before the eyes of the world and above all before the great embattled super-powers themselves, the example of a triumph of constructive internationalism over the trauma of past conflict, over the strictures of petty chauvinism, and over the paralysing shadow of the nuclear cloud.

(This article is adapted from a talk given by Professor Kennan at the 'European Talks' in Vienna in the summer of 1965.)

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ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION

Jacques Freymond

IT IS UNIVERSALLY ACKNOWLEDGED that since 1962 the cold war's main front has, in a manner of speaking, frozen into immobility. The two chief protagonists have each shrunk back when they contemplated the risks involved in changing the territorial pattern set up as a result of the war. When the Americans grudgingly allowed the Berlin Wall to be constructed in 1961, they were, all things considered, merely indicating their lack of enthusiasm for the 'roll back' doctrine championed by John Foster Dulles. As for Khrushchev, who construed American moderation as a sign of weakness, it took the mortifying experience of Cuba to make him realise that certain limits were not to be exceeded.

Since then, political activity is no longer concentrated along this line of demarcation traced across the northern plain; instead, it is to be found within the respective camps. Alliances are gradually disintegrating. Centrifugal impulses continue to show up in both East and West, and, although no personality of the stature of General de Gaulle now stands up in defiance of the Soviet Government, Rumania has begun to assume airs of independence in some respects parallel to those adopted by France in the western world. National sentiment crops up everywhere with a disconcerting vigour, just at the time when efforts are multiplying to develop and rationalise international economic relations. Resistance to supra-nationality has stiffened both within Comecon and within the European Economic Community.

The fact is that the centre of gravity of the East-West confrontation has shifted outside of Europe: it is found in South-East Asia, and more particularly in Vietnam; in the Caribbean and in Latin America; in the Near East and in Africa.

None the less it is an unstable equilibrium that has been reached in Europe. There is continuing tension in Germany, where the two rival republics stand toe to toe in daily defiance. A war of attrition has taken the place of the earlier efforts at disruption, and here the German Democratic Republic, the DDR, has scored a certain number of points. Neither of the two governments has given up its underlying drive: reunification on its own terms. For Ulbricht, as for Adenauer and his successor Erhard, consolidating their regimes at home as well as at the international level is simply one means of enhancing their power of attraction over the country as a whole. The division of Germany is only one phase in the long and tumultuous history of the German nation, a phase whose duration each separate segment endeavours to shorten by every conceivable sort of manoeuvre.

This equilibrium is also affected by actions taken by other European governments. The state of comparative relaxation now reached has freed both sides from certain imperative obligations which, during the cold war period, had been imposed upon them by the policy of the bloc to which they belonged. Eastern Europe offers to the fast-expanding Western economy possibilities of further development or alternative markets. For their part, the countries of Eastern Europe have never concealed their wish to increase their trade with the West, as this would

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enable them at one and the same time to speed up industrialisation at home and to give more aid to the non-aligned world, and thus to consolidate their influence in such spheres where they are confronted by the West. This convergence of interests has in these last few years found expression in a multiplication of the efforts put forth on both sides to increase the value of such trade. In so doing, the various states, whichever group they belong to, behave more like competitors and rivals than like allies. When it comes to the attitudes of Great Britain, Italy, France, Poland, Hungary, Rumania or even the German Federal Republic, ideology pales before the consideration of the material benefits each expects to harvest. That does not mean that the governments adhering to the communist system accept ideological co-existence. Far from it. As we know, they flatly reject it. But the exchange of goods does bring with it the exchange of persons and the confrontation of ideas. Cultural exchanges, however controlled and limited they still may be, do nevertheless help to modify, if not destroy, the images artificially built up by propaganda. A constantly growing number of people, in the East as in the West, know what daily life is like in the other sector of the continent. A certain osmosis between the two Europes cannot be prevented. As matters stand, these various initiatives have been taken independently of the action or the influence of the two great powers. The middle-sized and small states on both sides of Europe have no scruples when it comes to exploiting the nuclear umbrella offered them by the United States and the USSR, both paradoxically condemned to political immobilism by their very super-abundance of power. Some of these lesser states, such as Britain and the German Federal Republic, do no doubt make an effort to reconcile their enterprises with the expressed wishes of their American protector. But France, for its part, has not feared to demonstrate its conviction that the time has come to do away with the cold-war battlefronts and to inaugurate what it hopes will prove to be a constructive dialogue with the other Europe.

In these circumstances we may well ask, with Professor Brzezinski, if the moment has not come for the United States to take a fresh step to bring to an end the division of Europe. His proposal (in *Alternative to Partition*) is a logical consequence of his analysis of the situation in which the two Europes find themselves, and of the development which has taken place in their internal and external relations. It is true that incertitude due to the failure to settle the German problem ought not to be allowed to drag on, as this weighs heavily not only on Germany but on Europe as a whole, and, we should add, sets up a major obstacle to negotiations for disarmament or for arms control. Khrushchev was not wrong when he asserted that the moment had come to clear up one of the thorniest questions left unsolved by the war. But the solution he proposed, involving as it did a permanent division of Germany, was not acceptable to the West.

It remains to be seen whether any solution can be conceived which is susceptible of satisfying both parties. For Brzezinski, it is within the realm of possibility on certain conditions. First of all, the West should be careful not to weaken its military power and should make it clear, once and for all, that its vital interests are to be respected. It should also avoid giving the impression that it seeks to separate Soviet Russia

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from its European allies. Lastly—and this proposal implies a basic change in the focal strategy of Western diplomacy—it should recognise that the reunification of Germany can only be the culmination of a progressive change in the nature of the relations between the West and the states of Eastern Europe. In other words, the settlement of the German problem cannot, as seems to have been thought hitherto, be a condition on the basis of which relations between East and West can be normalised. Rather it will be the consequence, the end achievement; and, incidentally, is this not precisely what General de Gaulle is seeking?

If so, how are we going to accomplish this progressive normalising of East-West relations? This will be done by the development and application of a policy more coherent and more subtle than the one which has hitherto been applied, a dynamic policy aimed at multiplying economic and cultural contacts, at isolating the Ulbricht regime by the application of a deliberately different treatment, by easing the tensions between Poland and the German Federal Republic, by freeing the USSR from her obsessional fear of Germany, and lastly, by the gradual and calculated intensification of economic exchanges, by going so far as to set up a multilateral system for co-operation between the two Europes, thus affording a reassuring picture of a Western world which has extricated itself from the cold war and has determined to work out true co-operation.

THESE ARE INTERESTING PROPOSALS. It is not to be denied that in Europe itself public opinion desires closer relations between East and West. Even a quick glance through the daily press will show how great the desire is on both sides to develop economic exchanges and cultural relations.

But the obstacles in the way are still very great. For example, it is not certain that the current crisis in the European Economic Community lends itself to a development of closer relations with the East European countries. The reason is that its internal disputes, which challenge the very concept of supra-nationality, may tend to diminish the power of attraction it exercises, since they reinforce the arguments of those within the communist system who remain convinced of the powerlessness of capitalism to overcome its own contradictions. Furthermore, these dissensions, together with the continuing tension between EEC and EFTA, make it difficult to develop a common western policy towards the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Professor Brzezinski is well aware of this; he stresses the errors to be avoided: the attempt to make use of China in one way or another to worry the Soviets; a policy of disengagement aimed at neutralising Central Europe, or, conversely, a spectacular reinforcement of the military power of the West, including the German Federal Republic. The German reactions to the American proposals of August 1965 seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear armaments prove how very hard it is to reconcile the views of the western allies.

But even assuming that the West succeeds in reducing the swing between the two extremes of its policy, the one implementing a position of strength, the other a disengagement jeopardising Atlantic security, and even assuming further that a policy of prudence and patience is adopted, that it is decided not to precipitate events, it should be quite

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clear that abandoning the DDR represents more than merely an important concession to its western opponents by the USSR, and would be much more than a tactical or even a strategic withdrawal. Such a decision would mean that the Soviet Union was publicly relinquishing the pursuit of its revolutionary mission in Europe. But, as Brzezinski quite correctly points out, the USSR has to take into account not only the opinion of its allies in Eastern Europe. It must also keep an eye on China, which will not fail—without Walter Ulbricht having to suggest it even—to call upon all communist parties and all the countries of the non-aligned bloc to witness this new proof of Soviet defection to the capitalist camp. Thus—and this is nothing new—every Soviet decision concerned with European policy—whether it involves accepting some new version of a Marshall Plan and consequently the re-establishment of European collaboration, including a Germany re-unified despite Ulbricht—amounts to a decision of worldwide political import. And if Ulbricht were discarded, this would transfer the centre of gravity and the leadership of the world communist movement from Moscow to Peking, a transfer tantamount to the conversion of the Soviet leadership.

Are these leaders prepared to make such a leap into the unknown? It would not seem so. And neither would the communist elites of the East European countries, desirous though they may be of independence, be prepared to go so far. Despite the years which have elapsed since they achieved power, the communist regimes are not yet sufficiently strong to handle real collaboration with the West, a collaboration which implies, over and beyond a certain liberalising of the economy, the acceptance of the cultural co-existence they so greatly fear.

NOTHING REVEALS MORE CLEARLY than the war in Vietnam the fact that surmounting the division of Europe depends upon world politics quite as much as it does upon the development of relationships within Europe. When Professor Brzezinski was writing his book, the United States had not yet become so directly and totally involved in that war as it has today. The Soviet Government, however prudent it may have shown itself to be up to now, is likewise involved and is compelled by the very logic of the struggle, which sets it up as China's rival for the leadership of the revolutionary movement, to support North Vietnam and the Vietcong. The fact that it has doled out this aid in niggardly fashion and that it calculates its risks does not change the situation. The Soviet Union and the United States are each prisoners of this peripheral war, despite their common opposition to China and their common fear of the revolutionary radicalism of the Chinese.

Such being the case, the way in which the Vietnam conflict has evolved, the special problems faced by a modern army in guerrilla warfare, the very comments of American political and military leaders, the negative reactions of a segment of United States public opinion—all these might prompt the Soviets to conclude that the outcome might be, if not a defeat for the Americans, at least an inglorious and damaging retreat which would impair their prestige not only in South-East Asia or among the non-aligned nations, but even in Europe itself, where criticism of the American ally is becoming more and more outspoken. The Soviet government might well feel that the American people and their government will end up by becoming tired

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of playing the role of protector of the non-communist world bequeathed to them by the former European powers, a role which brings them so many worries. The Russians know that President Johnson and Congress are more and more concerned with the problems involved in the struggle against poverty at home, and with the mounting racial tension. They have noted the clearly asserted determination of the President to have his own term of office marked by the realisation of his dream of the 'Great Society'. They have noted, as everybody else has, the tendency of Americans to concentrate more on their own internal problems, and their impatience, not to say their irritation in the face of scepticism at their efforts, of the lack of comprehension, even the ill-will shown towards them. Thus the Soviet evaluation of the situation might conclude that a fresh American engagement in Europe is less likely than a withdrawal, which would leave the field open to the USSR to deal directly with the powers confronting it in Western Europe.

The circumstances thus do not seem at present to make a new American initiative on the east European front likely. At the most, it might be imagined that a movement to extricate itself from its engagements in Vietnam might in some respects be tied in with a compensatory engagement in Europe. This would mean that, as it witnessed the crumbling away of South-East Asia's will to resist communism, as it faced the impossibility of seeing a putative military victory result in a valid and hence durable political solution, the United States would have to resign itself to abandoning certain countries to their own destinies, in the hope—which few American commentators have expressed—of seeing an indigenous resistance gradually develop to the communist regimes marked 'made in China'. There is no questioning the fact that the anarchy into which the non-aligned nations seem to continue sinking provides good reason for the despair of the good Samaritans, and can also discourage those who have volunteered to defend the established order or disorder. Rather than continuing to defend regimes in countries where the very ground is slipping away from under their feet, the Americans might possibly consider it worthwhile to consolidate their position in Europe and to take advantage of the progressive opening of the Eastern frontiers and the awareness of a common interest among advanced countries in seeking a direct arrangement with the USSR.

But if a reconciliation appears to be within the realm of possibility as seen by those who deal in long-term forecasts, it is none the less true that for the moment the conflict in Vietnam blots out the political horizon. That does not mean that we should give up exploiting to the utmost whatever favourable possibilities open up in Europe. We can put it even more forcibly. There is a real danger for the West in making a piecemeal approach to working out closer links with eastern Europe. It is wrong—at least we still want to think it is—to interpret General de Gaulle's policy as one which aims at severing alliances. The slogan of a Europe reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals does not imply a rejection of the Atlantic Pact. Nor, incidentally, does opposition to supra-nationalism signify a refusal to collaborate in Europe. But it is plain that the cooling-off in Franco-American relations and the tension within EEC make every initiative of the French government to strengthen its contacts with the East take on the character of a challenge to its

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western allies, and that cumulative reactions with possibly grave consequences have thus been allowed to develop.

That is an additional reason for endorsing the proposals put forward by Professor Brzezinski, for expressing with him the hope that, despite the Vietnam war and the great difficulties provoked thereby, the American government will intensify its activities in Europe. What is expected of it for the time being is not so much a spectacular *coup* over the heads of the Europeans, but rather an effort on its part to co-ordinate its diplomatic activity with that of its allies. This will not take place without a previous revision of the picture Washington has formed of European unity, and in the name of which it has condemned both the open pattern of co-operation advocated by EFTA and also the so-called 'nationalist' policy of General de Gaulle.

The road linking the United States more closely with Eastern Europe passes, whether we wish it or not, through Atlantic Europe, and specifically through Paris, and we must therefore continue reiterating that if we wish to put an end to the division of Europe, there is no more urgent task than to patch up the unity of the West by first of all restoring that comprehension and mutual understanding between Paris and Washington which is indispensable to the furtherance of an enterprise quite as much in the interest of the United States as of Europe as a whole.

It is true that the success of this preliminary operation does not depend solely on Washington. That is why we must hope that the French government will be willing to modify, if not its policies, at least its attitude and its mode of behaviour towards its American ally. The diplomatic guerrilla skirmishing that it indulges in with the 'Anglo-Saxons' uselessly complicates the task of all those who are working for the necessary rapprochement.

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POLITICS AS THE ART OF THE IMPOSSIBLE

André Fontaine

AMONG the numerous proverbs which underline the moral ideas and political philosophy of Frenchmen there are two which may appear at first sight difficult to reconcile: 'The impossible is not expected of anyone', and 'Impossible is not French'. Yet may it not be precisely because it is not 'expected' of him, and because he piques himself upon exhibiting his powers, that the Frenchman has a taste for things which seem 'impossible' to other people and even perhaps to himself—reserving always the right, if the obstacle proves too tough, to take the easy way out which the other proverb authorises? The fact is that he embodies two contradictory types, the comfortable stay-at-home and the flamboyant jingo who enjoys tackling chimeras. Don Quixote and Sancho Panza are considered to typify Spain, but they can also be found, more or less, in every Frenchman. If de Gaulle is what he is and if he made Pompidou his prime minister, it is because his idealism takes account of reality; and Pompidou himself would not have served the general's fortunes for twenty years if his solid commonsense were not combined with patriotic aspirations.

It is usual nowadays to cite the contemporary Frenchman's attitude to sport as typifying this two-fold nature: comfortably installed before his TV or on the benches of a stadium, he thrills to victories which cost him no effort and is always ready to shower abuse upon his former heroes, against whom he himself would make a very poor showing, if their score disappoints him.

His attitude to public affairs is very similar. He approves everything that flatters the national pride, so long as it does not cost him too much and is successful. But if the wind changes he will be the first to make the government responsible for the ensuing lean period, while completely forgetting his previous enthusiastic support. General de Gaulle is aware of all this, and he knows marvellously well how to make use of it. That is why he does not ask the great majority of Frenchmen to participate in his activity, but only to applaud it; while it is only for himself and the little team which accepts the risks of the arena to chance their luck and skill. There is another and a more familiar French proverb which says that it is always the same ones who get killed.

What the general has understood, among other things, is that one cannot govern the French people without offering them an idea—which does not mean an ideology, and is indeed to some extent the opposite. For three centuries there has not been a government in Paris which has not claimed to make some decisive contribution to history. The kings aspired to pre-eminence in Europe, the Revolution and the Empire

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simply mixed this idea with dreams of universal emancipation, which were also partly the basis of the 1848 revolution and the Second Empire. The Third Republic gave France immense colonial possessions and restored her to the front rank of power alongside England and Germany. Poincaré and Clemenceau looked for glory in war, and Briand in peace. The defeat in 1940 engendered the Gaullist epic. The Fourth Republic can boast that in spite of colonial wars and financial instability it invented that Europe which some people today would prematurely condemn.

De Gaulle, who is the very incarnation of the national faith, returned to power to save the country from a civil war with which it was threatened by the Algerian affair; how can one imagine his being content to liquidate that Empire without which, fifteen years earlier, he could not have restored the country to its rank as a great nation, unless he offered the country a political plan capable of maintaining it in that rank? Few would dispute the legitimacy of his wish to achieve for their country a role of its own, and an ambitious one. Nothing could be further from their conceptions or, if you will, their self-esteem, than the idea which has been accepted without false shame by many of their neighbours, of leaving America to direct their affairs in exchange for a protection whose form she alone, in the last resort, will determine. It should not be forgotten that it was the Fourth Republic which held in check for nearly five years the rearmament of the Federal Republic; which took the first measures for a nuclear striking force; and which refused, unless it was to have a 'say' in their use, the installation on its soil of American rockets and stocks of atomic weapons. Similarly, only a very small proportion of the French whose opinion was sounded after the President of the Republic's rejection of the Anglo-American Nassau agreements expressed regret at his decision; and similarly again, not a single opposition deputy was found to champion the multilateral force at the time when Americans and Germans were making it their principal talking point.

DOES this mean that all the French are behind their Head of State when he puts the maintenance of national independence above every other consideration? Any careful study of their sentiments would undoubtedly reveal that support for the idea of Europe has never been more lively or more widespread, and especially among the youthful, the peasants, and the technicians. But apart from the fact that in the eyes of many, to whom the subtle distinctions between federation and confederation mean very little, the general himself appears as a great European, it is also true that the majority do not conceive of Europe as an advanced base of the United States but as an autonomous political entity. '*Europe*', wrote Paul Valéry on the eve of the war, '*aspires to be governed by an American commission.*' It must be very definitely asserted that this was never the aspiration of France. Not when she

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was struggling, right up to 1947, to prevent a rupture between the wartime allies. Nor when, in 1950, she launched the Schuman plan which was intended, in the minds of its authors, to evolve some day into some kind of third force. Nor when, in 1954, she made peace in Indo-China in spite of pressure from Washington. Nor when, in 1958, she recalled de Gaulle to power.

To anyone who is not French, this bias may seem stupidly sentimental. He might see it as a reaction of spite, due to resentment at France's loss of her pre-eminent position of fifty years ago, a loss incurred through her sacrifices for the sake of allied victory in 1914–18 and through her defeat in 1940. It is easy, even, to suspect de Gaulle of wishing, under the pretext of Europe's independence, to impose upon her his own hegemony, since he does not hesitate in dealing with his neighbours to use those authoritarian methods which he rightly blames the Americans for employing with their allies. With a little more flexibility he could easily have made many more friends among his neighbours and ensured the success of the Fouchet plan for the political unity of Europe—a plan of which one would never have imagined, considering the modesty of its aims, that it could have stirred up so much passion between its supporters and opponents.

But it would be in our opinion a grave error to see no more in the French attitude than these negative aspects and to attribute solely to personal or national susceptibilities something that arises also, and perhaps mainly, from an exalted conception of the future of Europe. The philosophy of the Gaullistes, and, in addition, of the majority of Frenchmen who have given any thought to these matters, has a basis in the very solid conviction that Europe, the centre of the world for a thousand years, ought once again to be so. It follows that there is something accidental, unwarranted, and temporary in the situation after the second world war, which divided the common home of Dante and Goethe and Racine into two parts, one of them governed from Washington and the other from Moscow. Popular sympathy is assured for any policy which faces the problem of this partition; and since every one recognises the enormous difficulty of solving it, the national sentiment is flattered—because 'impossible is not French'—by the thought that it was a Frenchman who first raised the problem of revising an absurd status quo.

UP to the present three solutions have been put forward. One of them, which is still the official NATO policy, rests on the conception of the 'long haul' favoured by George Kennan, when he invented his containment policy, and by John Foster Dulles: it involves maintaining the Western presence in Germany and Berlin as long as possible and with the maximum of firmness, and consolidating in every way the adherence of the Federal Republic to the West, so as finally to discourage the USSR from trying to split the Western allies. When the USSR has become convinced of the failure of her efforts she will seek a settlement

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which allows for the reunification on a democratic basis of Germany and, through her, of Europe as a whole. The Russian policy, on the other hand, is to turn Germany, at present a privileged ally of the United States, once again into a mere *object* of international politics, which yesterday's victors would agree among themselves to maintain in an inferior status. This amounts, in quite a curious way, to a return to that 'spirit of Versailles' which the USSR and its friends throughout Europe had formerly no words bad enough to describe.

The idea of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, which has been General de Gaulle's for the last twenty years, is an attempt to escape from the impasse in which Berlin and Germany and Europe are cut through the middle, with the consequence that Moscow and Washington are obliged to keep enormous armies facing one another and to maintain armaments so fantastic that no one could ever dream of using them. In a word, the aim is to reconstitute the unity of Europe through the parallel disengagement of its two protectors; but since there can be no question of this without guarantees for the security of the territory thus liberated and also of the powers who are called upon to withdraw, the new Europe needs to have the means of defending itself, though without the possibility of Europe itself or any of its constituent parts becoming a threat to anyone. The French or, if possible, the Franco-British striking force ought to provide the necessary security and at the same time convince the United States that the continent will not fall into the Soviet sphere; and the recognition by Germany of the Oder-Neisse line and her definitive renunciation of all nuclear arms ought to allay completely the legitimate anxiety of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia about German irredentism. But it goes without saying that one could not ask the Germans to give any such undertaking without at the same time authorising German reunification by the only method consistent with commonsense and equity, namely, by self-determination.

To bring about such an agreement might be expected to have a considerable effect in relaxing the mutual suspicions of the two halves of Europe; it should help to restore their fruitful cooperation, and it might lead eventually to a real political union of the continent. This would be all the easier to inaugurate because Western Europe would conserve the open and accommodating character of its structures—which presupposes that they exclude any delegation of sovereignty on essential matters.

SUCH is the grand design which can be traced in the writings and speeches, and even in the actions, of the President of the French Republic. There is no need to insist upon what has already called forth endless comment, his efforts to shake off the American hegemony and substitute bilateral agreements in place of the constraints of NATO. But it is necessary to recall that his most determined actions have been directed against Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and

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against the creation of a multilateral force. In the first case he was concerned to prevent the introduction among the European elements, which he was trying to recompose, of a power which had not renounced the status of privileged ally of the United States and which therefore was in danger, in his view, of becoming an American 'Trojan Horse'. In the second case, to prevent the emergence of a military system by which Germany would have become a second privileged ally of Washington.

One would need to be blind or else insincere to deny that actions of this kind, and especially the second, are welcome to the USSR. And the Soviet leaders, who were for so long unwilling to take France's policy of independence seriously, realised some time ago how useful it could be to them. During recent months relations between the two countries have developed remarkably and we have seen Messrs Gromyko and Couve de Murville exchanging visits which might well be the prelude to a meeting on a higher level. But to believe, as some people do, that this rapprochement might lead to a reversal of alliances implies a total misunderstanding of the general's philosophy and intentions. The man who in 1940 symbolised the will to resist nazism, who in 1947 led the anti-communist crusade in France, who in 1951 advocated bombardment in Korea, and who in 1958–62 frustrated the tendency towards concessions of the western powers in Berlin, this is not the man to shake off one protector only to embrace another. But he believes profoundly, and with some show of reason, that the evolution taking place both in the communist world and within Russia herself will continue, and that the desatellisation of eastern Europe is a not unrealisable dream.

For his part, anyway, he does what he can for it by means of increased exchanges with the popular democracies and by encouraging in the most unequivocal manner every symptom among them of a desire for emancipation. It was in this spirit that France encouraged Rumania's policy of independence, receiving her prime minister in Paris in 1963, and invited the head of the Polish government to make France the scene of his first official visit to a western country. There seems no doubt that this policy is very widely appreciated among the peoples concerned. They aspire to get free from Russia's hegemony, but they are very well aware that it will never be withdrawn in favour of an American hegemony—which, moreover, they fear might assume, so far as they are concerned, the too familiar features of Germany; so they see in the attitude of France, whose material weight at the moment they no doubt overestimate, the best hope for a change in their condition.

Is this policy of Europe for the Europeans really an aspiration towards the 'impossible'? After all, the static Atlantic policy, linked to promises of reunification which no one, in fact, believes will be kept, seems to be equally impossible. The Russian attitude may appear more realistic: it counts upon a progressive weakening of German-American relations as the Germans come to see clearly that the promises cannot be kept; and, as Khrushchev repeated a hundred times, it will all end in

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a new Rapallo. But this attitude is singularly dangerous. For if the Federal Republic decides one day to rise on its own wings, it will not be for the sake of flying into the orbit of Russia; it will be to pursue in its own way the national objectives which it was unable to attain through NATO. And when we consider how swift its economic, and therefore political, penetration of eastern Europe has been, and also how the Soviet Union has lost its dynamism and prestige and is progressively losing the leadership of the communist world, we may ask ourselves who it is that will be found, in twenty years time, to have achieved a dominating position in Europe.

But is not this risk, which is inherent in the static American and Soviet policies, equally implied in the dynamic Gaullist one? Undoubtedly it is, in so far as the latter—in advocating a Europe of separate countries united solely by their common interests—might encourage a return to the old Europe with its rivalries and conflicting ambitions. Is a permanent harmony conceivable for the 'Europe des Patries', in which no member would ever be tempted to check the pretensions to leadership of another member by appealing to one of the extra-European super-powers, which would at once provoke the retaliatory intervention of the other? For this reason, many Frenchmen who find General de Gaulle's grand design both attractive and logical are still concerned about the risk of a relapse into past conditions which have twice nearly destroyed Europe; they would like, therefore, to see established, by those countries of the continent which are so disposed, an organic and definitive reconciliation in the form of a federation open to all who wish to join it. This would probably be, moreover, the only way of adding Europe's voice effectively to the Soviet-American dialogue; it has no chance of being heard unless it can speak through a single government. Otherwise, since both America and Russia have too many problems on their hands to want to give themselves a new one, they will be drawn by the line of least resistance into consolidating the status quo, however absurd, rather than helping a not yet existent Europe.

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GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE POWER BALANCE

Wilhelm Cornides

THE nuclear stalemate is usually described in technological terms. Yet the widely used expression 'balance of terror' contains two different elements. The word 'balance' has been borrowed from the field of mechanics, but the word 'terror' is a psychological term. In conjunction with the technology of nuclear weapons, deterrence and terror have been transformed into a structure of political behaviour which depends on a definite and calculable relation of certain weapon systems. As a result, strategic calculations have become a kind of input-output computation of power, but, as a means of spreading terror, they also contain an irrational element.

The strategic doctrine of massive retaliation, which dramatically magnified the revolutionising effects of nuclear arms, has more recently been overtaken by ideas that tend to stress the static factors in the world situation. Some theoreticians have ceased to speak of a balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and talk instead of a 'balance of imbalances'. The United States is greatly superior to the Soviet Union in terms of intercontinental strategic power, a field in which the USSR has built up a mere minimum deterrent, though one that must be considered effective. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is greatly superior in its strategic power in Europe, especially in intermediate range rockets which could reach western Europe—a predominance against which America's own superiority in intercontinental strategic power can be regarded as a minimum deterrent. In connection with this asymmetrical balance of the respective advantages held by the two sides in the field of strategic nuclear power, the effectiveness of their ground forces depends not so much on their numerical strength in Europe as on their equipment with tactical nuclear weapons and the availability of mobile reserves. The fusion of political leadership and military command—the basic tenet of the Kennedy-McNamara strategy—further underlines the global approach of America's as of Russia's policies vis-a-vis regional theatres of war.

It thus no longer makes sense for Europe to hold on to the classical notions of strategy, attack, and defence as Clausewitz developed them. The various attempts that have been made to produce a realistic 'picture of war' all lack the decisive pre-requisite—the monopoly of physical force which the individual European states have lost and which is now concentrated in Washington and Moscow. The two super-powers have all conceivable weapons at their disposal, and because of the unimaginable risks connected with their use these weapons have been outlawed. The European states are incapable of making war in Europe except in

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alliance with the stalemated super-powers. True, Great Britain and France have developed their own nuclear weapons at the cost of great financial sacrifices. China's case is different as it lies outside the area stabilised by the bipolar nuclear deterrent and as Chinese foreign policy is mainly directed towards the areas of political and social tension in Asia and Africa. The development of its own nuclear weapons now provides China with opportunities for the kind of independent intervention in world politics which the two European atomic powers no longer possess, at least not so long as they remain separate members of the Western alliance.

The entry of Great Britain, France, and China into the nuclear club has given greater emphasis to that intermediate status in the hierarchy of power which enables some states with the necessary ambition, and in certain cases the necessary means, to insist on being consulted on questions of world politics without being capable of determining or altering the basically bipolar division of power. This intermediate status depends on international prestige, knowledge of the world, and a certain kind of immunity from the pressures of world opinion which alone can create the necessary elbow room for a diplomacy enriched by nuclear weapons. France achieved that status in the 1950s, before de Gaulle and before it developed its *force de frappe*. Parallel to the policy of European integration, Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault conducted at that time a clearly discernible policy of the 'double balance' and used what remained of France's former position as a world power to consolidate French primacy within the community of the Schuman Plan countries. The novelty of de Gaulle's policy lies, not in this objective, but in the much greater self-confidence with which he has pursued it and in his highly individualistic technique of undermining the taboos of the super-powers with the aid of self-fabricated myths.

A PURELY structural-functional analysis would undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that all these changes amount to the emergence of new poles of power concentration in the 'lower' reaches of the traditional landscape of states. Yet none of these poles represents as yet consolidated power of the kind that could transform the bipolar international system into a new form of polycentrism. What has emerged, to use Theo Sommer's formulation, are new centres of ambition, but not new globally effective centres of power.

Even de Gaulle has admitted this, at least indirectly, while other Frenchmen such as General Beaufre and, more outspokenly, Raymond Aron have left no doubt at all that they believe the United States and the Soviet Union to occupy, within the international hierarchy of powers, a rank all their own which surpasses that of other states not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.

The second-rank atomic powers are limited to psychological and psycho-strategic warfare, whether they play their role with the special panache of Paris and Peking or with the dignified understatement on

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which London, with an eye to Washington, prefers to rely. In practice it is hardly conceivable that any of them could challenge one of the super-powers or drive both of them, against their will, into an escalation. Everything that has become known of the newer developments in the anti-missile systems makes the independent use of the French *force de frappe* type of nuclear weapons even more questionable than it was before. The constellation which, in 1956, brought the Franco-British intervention in Suez to an abrupt end would presumably function also in future whenever Moscow and Washington felt that other states were driving them towards the brink of nuclear war. If, on the other hand, the two super-powers were themselves prepared to run such a risk, no outside force would be strong enough to prevent them from doing so.

The thesis of the catalytic effect of a secondary atomic power applies, if at all, only to crises which do not affect the vital interests of the two super-powers and, even within that category, only to cases in which the vital interests of a country like France would clash only with secondary interests of the super-powers. Assuming this to be correct, the international system would then have to be defined, not as a genuine polycentrism, but as a 'partially neutralised bipolarism'. The two super-powers, as W. W. Rostow put it, have suffered a diffusion of power; but thanks to their geographical position and their industrial might, they nevertheless remain the principal pillars of the international system.

If one examines the Soviet-American confrontation in Europe from this point of view it emerges that, even after making the most generous possible allowances for Soviet security needs, there still remains a surplus of Soviet power which cannot be explained by any kind of external or internal threat. That means that the military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe serves not only to protect the USSR, but also to perpetuate a social and political system which a large part of the population does not want. The present potential, moreover, would enable the Soviet Union to mount a military offensive against the West, whether or not the Soviet leadership in fact intended or intends to do so in practice. Be that as it may, the Soviet Union's military presence in Europe certainly has, among its other functions, the purpose of exercising political pressure, of arousing fear, of making threats plausible and of heightening the status of the USSR as one of the two super-powers in the international system.

SOMETHING similar applies also to the American military presence in Europe. Apart from serving as a dam against Soviet power, it also provides the United States with status in the international system. That emerges all the more clearly the less the two principal powers succeed in imposing their will on the third world. If, in addition, they were also to be driven from Europe and had to confine themselves to

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their continental power bases at home, their world status would indeed change radically.

In the case of the United States the ensuing change in status would be even more pronounced than in that of the Soviet Union. True, after such a retreat, the American continent would still remain a sea and air base sufficiently powerful to protect the world lines of communications and commerce; but even that position could one day be threatened by a further increase in the Soviet Union's naval strength. The Soviet Union, in turn, could make its threat to destroy America in a matter of minutes just as plausible as the Americans could make their threat of a counter-blow. Once driven from Europe, the United States would be forced to assume a defensive role in world politics and to rely on the indirect strategy of making the best possible use of the freedom of action still left by the nuclear deterrent, and of achieving outstanding successes despite the extremely narrow limits imposed on the employment of military forces. The Soviet Union, by contrast, would, even without a military occupation of western Europe, derive such advantages from its geographical position alone that it would be able, without running any particular risk, to go over to the direct strategy of political and military intervention and to inflict disastrous diplomatic defeats on the United States. Within Europe itself, French and British or combined European nuclear forces could, it is true, maintain a certain equilibrium, always provided that they kept their alliance with the United States intact. But it is an open question whether this alliance could in fact be maintained after a complete withdrawal of American troops and arms. Many military experts believe that a continuing direct military confrontation in Europe is less risky for the United States than a withdrawal to fortress America.

The threat of an American withdrawal, at which Washington has occasionally hinted in answer to de Gaulle's provocative attacks, is therefore presumably no more than a move in the psycho-strategic war game. Once the Americans really started to carry out this threat they would unloose a flood of neutralism in Europe and, at the same time, greatly increase France's chance of pursuing its own global policies. The actual counter-moves of the United States against de Gaulle are therefore mainly in the direction of consolidating the American position in the Federal German Republic, which already houses the greatest nuclear arsenal outside the United States and the Soviet Union.

So long as the interests of the Federal Republic and of the United States continue to coincide in this vital respect, the basically bipolar structure of the international system is also likely to endure. This seems all the more probable in view of the fact that the emergence of a new, truly polycentric system would also be against the interests of the Soviet Union, which has its own troubles with its Chinese rival. The bipolar structure leaves, however, no room for the reconstitution of the German *Reich* within the frontiers of 1937—an objective which has remained the solemnly declared aim of the Bonn policy-makers.

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WHILE the Soviet Union has become a global power in terms of ideology and military and economic potential, its political interests remain primarily centred on Europe—at least to the extent that the position of the USSR as a world power is closely connected with its hold on the Soviet zone of Germany. The American military presence in Europe is different in character, but also intimately connected with the status of the United States as a world power. The continuing presence of American troops in Germany is essential to hold the 'balance of imbalances' in the East-West confrontation. These troops are for many reasons unlikely to stay without tactical nuclear weapons; one reason is that the USA would be unwilling to let France and Britain assume the role of giving nuclear protection to the Germans on the spot, while confining its own strategic role to holding the nuclear umbrella. If there seems to be a certain willingness both of the USA and the USSR to reduce the number of troops and weapons on German soil, this does not imply a willingness to disengage in Central Europe, but indicates an intention to make their engagement less expensive, mutually more acceptable, *and thus more permanent*.

The United States will obviously be the only country capable of matching Soviet military technology at the intercontinental and at all other levels. As France and Britain continue their attempts to avoid total dependence on the United States, by seeking at least to deter direct attack on their territories, their forces may gradually take over from the US some of the burden of covering the Soviet MRBMs directed at Europe. The degree of cooperation between these European national forces and the United States will, however, be prescribed by the American determination to prevent surprise attacks or other inconsiderate military moves of the allies. In European eyes deterrence remains the big problem. It is most unlikely that the United States would immediately respond with strategic nuclear weapons to every border incident or probing action of the Soviet forces in Europe; we are then brought back to the problem of ground defence. Although few people really believe that the Soviet Union is bent on invading western Europe, this remains a potential strategic threat.

Grave doubts exist about the ability to win or even control a battle begun with small-yield nuclear weapons in Europe. Even if escalation to the strategic level is not an absolute certainty, immense destruction of the terrain defended as well as of rear areas inviting interdiction blows is highly likely. In these circumstances a defensive posture relying on moderate atomic firepower will most likely be maintained by the West, sufficient to defend the German border—and thus to hold the central front in Europe—but not so powerful in terms of warheads and range that any border engagement would threaten automatically to engulf the whole of Central Europe in a battle of senseless proportions. This is also the best safeguard against any German intention to trigger-off an American nuclear offensive—a most unlikely contingency in any case.

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IT will not be possible to 'freeze' negotiations on Germany indefinitely. For these negotiations the problem of Germany's eastern boundaries is secondary to the problem of the nuclear or non-nuclear status of the Federal Republic and of a reunified Germany. This issue is also of central importance to the process of European political unification. A greater nuclear role for the Federal Republic than the present double-key arrangements complicates the process of western European integration (as seen in the French attitude to the MLF). It would also be most likely to obstruct progress in the direction of German reunification and—*a fortiori*—of a rapprochement between western and eastern Europe.

Furthermore, all changes in the defence establishments must be seen in the perspective of the dangers involved in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. In this context the non-nuclear status of the German Federal Republic is important. It should be possible to arrive at a non-discriminatory arrangement for German participation in the strategy of the alliance consonant with its full membership, without Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. The MLF entails too many ambiguities to make the argument that it does not involve nuclear proliferation acceptable. Much thought is now being given in Germany to ways of developing the military self-restraint which is necessary to develop a hopeful policy towards the East European countries and the Soviet Union. But it is not easy to do so under the barrage of communist propaganda which is aimed not just at preventing Germany from playing a nuclear role but also at breaking up the Western alliance which guarantees its security. In such a situation both Germany and the United States must be careful to coordinate their initiatives.

If it were clearly understood by the United States and the Federal Republic that arms control and disarmament measures were not the first step towards a total American withdrawal, but rather a complementary step in the evolution of the most effective and sensible guarantee that America could give the Federal Republic, then a host of measures could be considered in a new light: the establishment of additional means of communication between the blocs, measures of selective reduction of troops and forces, various nuclear freeze possibilities, and proposals for a European security system. The situation we have examined makes it abundantly clear that the United States will maintain its military presence in Germany if not for military, then for compelling political reasons. It is therefore worthwhile to explore the possibility of increasing the stability of the present military arrangements in central Europe. This in itself would be unlikely to affect the political status quo, but it could at least indicate that a dangerous corner in the arms race had been turned.

If the Gomulka 'freeze' proposal, for instance, is designed to prevent the German acquisition of missiles beyond the tactical range, a tacit agreement to this effect need not affect the western front line defence we have assumed. It is difficult, however, to foresee formal agreements on a

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lower ceiling of troops and weapons because this would involve the difficult question of verifying withdrawals and inspecting the remaining forces in the West and the East. The best road to less reliance on the whole spectrum of air and missile interdiction forces in Europe would probably be the indirect one of carrying out such troop and force redeployments as are fairly easily recognised by the intelligence experts on both sides without detailed formal inspection arrangements.

After such agreements on force reductions and corresponding measures for reciprocal inspection it might be possible for the West to declare unilaterally the *creation of a defence emphasis zone* along the central sector, equipped exclusively with battlefield weapons, short range liaison aircraft, hardened air-defences and artillery, etc. At the same time a sanctuary proposal might be made; it would be agreed not to strike beyond a certain distance in defending this zone unless such a limit were first overstepped by the enemy. The posture envisaged here is one of clear but selective and non-provocative NATO engagement, which would postulate neither the total de-nuclearisation of Germany or central Europe, nor, equally unrealistic, a fully reunited, independently armed continent with its own nuclear force. Between these two extremes there seems to be a real possibility of establishing over a period of years a stable military barrier in central Europe which is understood on both sides as an unpleasant but probably inevitable fact of life—preferable at any rate to complete reversals of the international system such as the establishment of a denuclearised zone.

No new formal pledge on the part of the United States to remain in Germany as a patron nuclear power seems necessary until the problem really arises what the United States will do *after* a German peace treaty has been signed or a federal constitution of western Europe is established. Neither of these contingencies seems very close at present. But even if such European political problems were settled, US assistance as a guarantor nuclear power would be required to meet the necessities of lasting peace by assuring arms control arrangements in a reconstituted Europe which the two great powers would not wish or be wholly able to relinquish. The promising aspect of the weapons environment we have indicated is that it might provide a non-hegemonial way for the United States to hold the question of a European political settlement open while at the same time permitting the execution of some initial arms control measures in a situation in which America and Germany are becoming convinced that a '*grenznahe*' (close-to-the-border) defence strategy based on low yield, short-range nuclear weapons would promise a stable, effective first line defence.

IT is unlikely that during the period in which this military stability becomes generally recognised the Germans would make unilateral and final political declarations with regard to their eastern frontier, to the political status of Berlin, or to the legal status of the Federal Republic and East Germany. It cannot be convincingly argued that

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such statements are indispensable in order to improve the political atmosphere once it is clearly admitted—what all the world knows anyway—that the American and Soviet military presence in western and eastern Europe (although perhaps in less conspicuous forms) is for the time being accepted as a fact of life. This gives all the assurances the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians can in present circumstances claim for their security. It *is* understood in Western Germany that they would need new guarantees of security when the present system is altered by the reunification of Germany. Until then it is not for the West Germans to suggest to the east European 'states of a new historical type' that the Ulbricht regime's assurances on the Oder-Neisse line are of no use to them. The idea that the DDR should be kept in isolation while the Bonn Government works its way around it and takes up diplomatic relations with Warsaw, Prague, etc. is highly artificial. So is the idea that the West should stir up a new nationalism in eastern Europe against Soviet Russia while it tries at the same time to improve relations with Moscow. From western Europe, and in particular from the Federal Republic, it looks most unlikely that the incitement of national sentiments in east Europe would have no unwelcome repercussions on the other side of the stabilised military barrier where—and this is no mere coincidence—the stirrings of a new nationalism can already be felt. Although the Germans are certainly more self-asserting, they also know by and large that the days are gone for ever when 'Mitteleuropa' could aspire to be a world power in its own right. This would be different for a European Community which had removed the armaments industries out of reach of all hegemonial aspirations of France, Germany, or of both combined.

It seems therefore much more reasonable to give continuing priority to the policy of economic and social integration in the European Communities and thus to demonstrate to the east European nations that —even without formal supranational institutions—century-old feuds can be overcome and a new social and political balance established by free societies. To those who believe that the Germans cannot be trusted to have the necessary patience for such a reasonable policy of peaceful engagement in a new Europe in conditions of military stability, the recent elections may have been a surprise. They showed an overwhelming preference for the three democratic parties which have followed this course—though in varying degrees—since 1949. Both the nationalists on the right and the neutralists on the left suffered shattering defeats. Eighty-seven per cent of the voters were against them. On the other hand those who expect the West Germans to take no interest in anything except their personal prosperity will also have been surprised by the eager, soberly questioning young people who attended innumerable small discussion meetings during the election campaign.

Although the MLF had dropped quietly out of sight, little was heard about an urgent need for nuclear weapons in German hands, but many questions were asked about the future of the whole of Germany. To

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sum up: the West Germans behaved more reasonably than some of their political leaders and many foreign observers expected. There is no need then to pre-empt a new German nationalism with self-fulfilling prophecies that sooner or later the Germans will ask for their full share in nuclear weapons. This may well be the case one day if the Common Market breaks down and no progress is made in bringing the parts of Germany east and west of the military demarcation line into closer contact with each other. But with continuing, if slower, progress of the European Communities, a stable military barrier in Central Europe, and developing economic and cultural ties between west and east Europe, there may well come the day for a European Peace Conference at which the two super-powers *and* the nations of Europe will look jointly at their remaining problems. Then, in the light of the changed world situation, with crises and tensions mounting in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the still unsolved German problem may not look as forbidding as it does today.

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ROADS TO EUROPEAN UNITY

Mark Bonham-Carter

THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS is vitally affected by the future of EEC, and the future of EEC is affected not only by President de Gaulle's views and actions, but also by the role which Britain is willing and able to play. The debate about Britain and Europe continues, though the form which it takes has changed. Many of the arguments which were central to the discussion in 1962 seem to have been pushed to one side. We hear much less about British agriculture or about our obligations to EFTA. No one has suggested that Austria has defaulted on her undertakings by trying to negotiate association with EEC, nor for that matter has the Commonwealth lobby protested against the proposals for an Australian-New Zealand free trade area which would certainly further erode British preferences in those markets. Meanwhile the strictly economic importance for the United Kingdom of membership is more generally accepted than hitherto. The Common tariff has begun to bite and will bite more sharply as time goes by.

Other arguments, including the effect of British membership on a détente with the USSR, are advanced by those who believe that British membership would be disadvantageous to the United Kingdom, to Europe, and to the prospects of peace. Among the most articulate of the anti-Europeans is the Wider Europe Group, and their case as set forth by David Ennals in *The Guardian* on 3 August 1965, is, as I understand it, as follows: he regards EEC as too restricted in scope for this country and too 'federal' (as he would call it) in structure: the supra-national element would for example jeopardise our political independence, to which he attaches profound importance. Second, he believes that the moment is ripe 'for a new attempt at bridge-building—not just between the Six and Seven but involving the countries of Eastern Europe loosely associated in the Council for Mutual Economic Aid'.[1] Third, Ennals goes on to argue that 'everything points towards the need for a new attempt to start a dialogue on the future of Europe—all of Europe—in which all European nations, whether in EEC, EFTA, and CMEA, or none, should play a part'. The suggestion is that were Britain a member of EEC (or about to become one) the chance of starting such a dialogue or of its reaching a successful conclusion would be diminished. This argument does not, however, appear to apply to France. Lastly, there is the fact of President de Gaulle's position which accords in some respects with Ennals' ('Britain's relations with France are better than at any time since de Gaulle came to power. This is partly due to Mr Wilson's diplomacy. . .').

At the heart of any dialogue about the future of Europe lies Germany, and at the risk of stating the obvious, the whole idea of EEC arose from a recognition of this inescapable fact. EEC was designed to reconcile nations hitherto hostile to each other and by integration to

[1] This and subsequent quotations come from 'A Market for All Europe', by David Ennals, M.P., *The Guardian*, 3 August 1965.

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neutralise the disruptive power of the most powerful of these nations, Germany. Critics of Dr Adenauer should never forget that he saw that Germany must be beaten up in a European omelette which could never be unscrambled. The founders of the European movement believed that in an EEC which included both Britain and France there would be no fear of the community being dominated by Germany. When the United Kingdom refused to play its part, the process got under way without her, and as French self-confidence increased and the machinery at Brussels proved itself, so these fears lessened to the extent that when France vetoed British entry in 1963, though it provoked a crisis, the Five did not feel that a mortal blow had been struck at the whole idea.

What is not clear from the arguments deployed by the Wider Europe Group is whether they are opposed to this central conception of the Community, or only in so far as it concerns this country. Sometimes the latter would seem to be the case. For instance David Ennals in his *Guardian* article goes out of his way to describe EEC as 'a great experiment which deserves to succeed. It would be deplorable if we were to gloat at the unhappy predicament of the Five'. Elsewhere in the same article, however, he predicts—correctly—that a clash between the gaullist conception and that of the Five is inevitable. It is significant that the solution he suggests is to postpone qualified majority voting, which would be a major defeat for 'the great experiment', would weaken the cohesion of the Six, and be yet another victory for President de Gaulle. The consequences would extend far beyond trade between Eastern and Western Europe to the structure of the Community itself, the future of NATO, nuclear arrangements, and disarmament.

Experience in Europe (and South America) has shown that regional economic groupings which lack a political element are rarely of more than marginal importance. Moreover a major experiment in political organisation, such as the Community, if it does not advance, tends to retreat. To put so young an organism in a deep-freeze is probably to kill it. The consequences of gaullist pressure on EEC are already apparent: each nation is inevitably tending to look first to its own interests and the determination to discover a common approach to community problems is being weakened. The signs of this are already apparent in Germany and nowhere is it more dangerous than in the nuclear field. Now that the German elections have ended with yet another defeat for the social-democrats, it is difficult to suppose that the demand for greater German participation in nuclear policy will not be revived, and those who celebrated the death of the MLF may one day regret its demise. They might reflect that the MLF would never have been necessary if EDC had gone through, which was also opposed on almost identical grounds. It is unlikely that as the years pass and German economic strength continues to grow, her demand to participate in the defence of Western Europe on equal terms with Britain and France will diminish. The problem, which is admittedly exceedingly difficult, is to achieve such participation without proliferation and without giving legitimate cause for alarm to the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. But we should not be too disturbed by the sheer volume of protest which any solution we propose evokes in Moscow.

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SOVIET POLICY HAS TENDED to encourage fragmentation in the West for the most obvious reasons, and Soviet reactions to the Common Market have followed a tortuous and frequently self-contradictory course. In 1957 the Common Market was simply described as an instrument of American monopoly capitalism, designed to ensure that Europe was incapable of pursuing an independent economic policy. Its economic implications excited little detailed attention, but by 1958 the line had altered. As the anti-German theme in Soviet propaganda was stepped up, so the Common Market became an instrument not of US monopoly capitalism alone, but rather an American-German conspiracy whereby French interests would be sacrificed and German hegemony ensured. By 1959, with the breakdown of the FTA negotiations with Britain and the setting up of EFTA (which on the whole they welcomed), the Soviets appear gradually to have gained a clearer appreciation of the economic importance of the Common Market: America's domination was no longer emphasised; indeed, by 1960 it was said that the United States had lost control of Western Europe's economic integration.

It is, however, when the United Kingdom applied to join EEC that the most interesting phase begins. On the one hand the Soviets had welcomed the split between EEC and EFTA, not only because it increased the fragmentation of the West, but also because it demonstrated the instability inherent in the capitalist system. On the other hand, having announced that the United States had lost control of the western economy, 'Soviet leaders were probably sincerely concerned lest the decline in relative American power be balanced by a consequent increase in German influence, or possibly a Franco-German constellation, thereby giving the Common Market a more anti-Soviet complexion'.[2] Even if this were an important consideration in the minds of Soviet leaders, they must also have been well aware of the uncomfortable consequences which would flow from British accession. It would set the seal on the economic success of European integration. It would refute the thesis that imperialist contradictions made European unity under Western leadership impossible, and, in addition, it would increase the economic power of the Community, its influence in developing countries and among the nations of Eastern Europe. The apprehension which the Soviets must feel at this prospect is wholly intelligible and no one should be surprised by their efforts to prevent such a union of Western Europe coming about. It is obvious why on these grounds communists should oppose British entry into EEC. What is obscure is why anyone who is not a communist should reach roughly the same conclusion, whether he be a French gaullist or a British member of the Wider Europe Group.

If Professor Brzezinski is correct in saying that some Russians would regard a Germany which was neither a member of an integrated Western system nor absorbed within an Eastern system as a dangerous element in Europe, one can only welcome and agree with this point of view. And since there is not the faintest chance of the Federal Republic becoming part of the DDR the Russians would surely be wise to hope not merely that EEC will remain intact, but that the United Kingdom will become

[2] 'Russia and Europe', by Z. K. Brzezinski, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964.

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part of it. Germany within such a community would be a safer neighbour, and as fear is one of the obstacles to a European détente, the possibility of a constructive European dialogue would be strengthened.

The reasons why the Wider Europe Group do not share this point of view conform with a fairly strong tradition on the left in British politics —the tendency to make the best an enemy of the good. John Strachey once admitted that one of the reasons why the Labour Government of 1945–51 rejected successive European overtures from 1947 onwards, was the fear that too intimate an association with continental Christian-Democrats would sully the purity of the socialist experiment then being conducted in Great Britain. Similarly today the Wider Europe Group quite rightly crave for a united Europe which would include 'all of Europe', and in pursuit of this remote prospect they are prepared to sacrifice the progress towards political unity that has been made in the West since EEC came into being, and the further progress that would be made if the United Kingdom were to join. They also seem to take the view that the best position from which to reach an accommodation with the USSR is one of relative weakness. A Western Europe divided between EEC and EFTA must be in a weaker position to negotiate with the USSR than a united Western Europe with a common commercial and political policy. Yet the implication of David Ennals' article is that for some reason or other British membership of EEC would make the kind of bridge-building between East and West which he advocates impossible or unlikely.

This assumption is presumably based on his belief in the importance of 'British political independence', a notion which generally only the ideologists of the extreme left and right still cling to. The evidence of the post-war years has been that nothing has done more to prevent a constructive East-West dialogue than the differences of approach to the dialogue adopted by the nation-states of the West. Among the sinners we must count ourselves. The idea that it is the task of the British Prime Minister to fly off to Moscow and treat directly on behalf of the rest of the continent has in the past had unhappy consequences. One has only to imagine what the British reaction to a similar dialogue between West Germany and Russia would be. It would be widely assumed that another Rapallo was in the making and that something would emerge from the discussions to our disadvantage. Divisions within Western Europe, and the absence of any single agreed policy, are among the reasons why various approaches towards the East have been so ineffectual. By pursuing peace in their way the British have aroused fears of appeasement in Bonn. The Germans have demanded reunification. General de Gaulle has referred to a Europe spreading from the Atlantic to the Urals. There has been very little effort to reconcile these various policies or make them coherent, and so long as these divisions continue the possibility of a constructive East-West dialogue must remain remote. At the same time the pressure towards a direct deal between the USA and the USSR will increase.

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COLD WAR ORIGINS

Wilfred Knapp

OF all the personal meetings which have excited historians none is more remarkable than that between Roosevelt and Stalin at Tehran. Here it was that Roosevelt 'chatted up' Stalin, seeking to establish a personal link with him which would be the central core of post-war unity. Six months later a different meeting, unannounced at the time and of much less *éclat*, took place between Milovan Djilas and Stalin. Djilas too was still optimistic about his future relations with Stalin, but when he commented on the meeting subsequently he said: 'Everything was being stripped bare and reduced to strife which changed only in form and in which only the stronger and the more cunning could survive. . . . It was a world in which there was no choice but victory or death'.[1]

Stalin had no reason to doubt that he was on the side of history. In his youth he had been inspired by the explanation of historical processes given by Karl Marx. But those who believe in the inevitability of history find nourishment for their belief in success—reasonably enough, since the supposed inevitability of history cannot be argued in any other terms. Success for Stalin meant the elimination of rivals as well as enemies, and the establishment of a totality of power. In 1945 international relations were such as to invite an extension of Russian power. With the removal of German power from the heart of Europe, Russia was bound to dominate the east and centre of the continent. The question was only the extent and nature of that domination and this question was answered by the character of the Soviet system and its leadership.

This is not to say that the Cold War originated from a carefully calculated, planned, and timed series of moves to establish domination. Recent arguments about the origins of a different war have established a false dichotomy between planning and improvisation, and obscured the fact that great changes in history are most often made by those who can see farther than their contemporaries in calculating the possibility of change, and who at the same time have the political skill to take advantage of immediate contingencies.

Taciturn and uncommunicative, Stalin has given fewer clues to his ultimate ambitions than did Hitler. But all his actions, and such pronouncements as he made, testify to his fear of those who might oppose him; and the conditions existing at the end of the war gave him a unique opportunity to win victory over them rather than—the alternative he envisaged—to suffer death at their hands. Russia's greatest national enemy, Germany, was prostrate and the way was open both to subject Germany and to establish Soviet control over the avenues by which Germany could attack Russia. America and Britain—still the Britain of Churchill—could be expected in the long run to enter into conflict

[1] *Conversations with Stalin*, p. 74.

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with the Soviet Union; but before that happened it was open to Stalin to consolidate a defensive position of an entirely traditional kind around the borders of the Soviet Union; not only in eastern Europe but in Iran and the Far East as well. Those apparently puny men in eastern Europe who might oppose their will to Stalin's—and it mattered little to him whether they were communists or not—would enjoy short shrift as their countries were occupied by Soviet armies. Further afield even men like Thorez and Togliatti, whose popular following had grown as a result of the war, would find themselves confronted with a socialist fatherland immeasurably more powerful than the economically backward and politically uncertain Russia of pre-war days. If this was Stalin's view of the world in the concluding years of the war, the Cold War was avoidable only if the United States was prepared either to submit to Russian wishes or to take up arms against the Soviet Union.

Here then was the true situation in international politics which must defy Roosevelt's attempts to establish an understanding with Stalin. The extent of Stalin's conquests would depend on the line reached in the war against Germany, and beyond that in Stalin's political skill in exploiting his position. It might have been possible for Britain and America to alter the line of demarcation had they agreed on different military plans and conceived them with a political objective in mind. But unless the most optimistic judgments of hypothetical alternatives had proved valid, the difference would have been marginal.

The means available to Stalin in the establishment of communist power under his direction in eastern Europe were in part provided for in the example set by Lenin in 1917. In part they were improvisations, and the example of Poland shows as well as any the techniques adopted —along with peculiarly Polish incidents such as the deeply tragic Warsaw uprising. The resources available to the western powers were limited. Within the American government there were those closest to negotiations with the Russians—Kennan, Harriman, and Forrestal—who saw the importance of taking up positions of strength. Churchill's leadership, despite limited military resources, made possible the safeguarding of Greece. But the United States suffered from the hiatus of Roosevelt's fatigue and Truman's apprenticeship. Military resources were too limited to establish a decisive advantage over the Russians in Europe without entering into direct conflict with them. Equally important was the limitation imposed by public opinion, which believed that military victory must have settled political problems at least for a decent interval, and was susceptible—the more so in Britain through feelings of guilt about pre-war foreign policy—to the supposition that the Soviet Union was an enemy of fascism and therefore a supporter of a stable international order. In this way the period which began as that of the ' calculating cynicism of the Bolshevik leaders and the amiable indulgence of the western powers ' [2] was extended after the war.

[2] George Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950*, p. 136.

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THE speed with which American foreign policy then changed, and the characteristics of that policy under Truman, Marshall, and Acheson, appear in retrospect as imaginative and as resourceful as they did at the time. This was a foreign policy which took account of the force of ideas and ideology in international affairs without itself falling prey to an ideological commitment beyond an essential belief in liberalism and its institutions. As Kennan then wrote: 'Above all, it behooves us Americans, in this connection, to repress, and if possible to extinguish once and for all, our inveterate tendency to judge others by the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves'.[3] The hope which he expressed that the 'inveterate tendency' would disappear for ever proved too optimistic, and, for better and for worse, Americans continue to hope that the whole world will become increasingly like their own image of the United States. In the short run, however, the policy which Kennan helped to formulate made it possible for the United States to mobilise its military strength and to build up and maintain a political commitment to Europe without offering any hope either of immediate victory in any sense or the rapid disappearance of a state of tension.

It need hardly be said that conditions in Europe at this time made such a policy practicable, and that Stalin proved to be as adept at inviting opposition to his policies as he had been successful in establishing his rule in eastern Europe. Significantly, the alliance between the dependent Europeans and the newly powerful United States was first made in Berlin. There the resistance of the social-democrats to fusion with the communists in 1945–46 broke the community of interest between the victors, and initiated common resistance to the Russians between the Berliners and the West. Nationalism was at a low ebb in Europe and the support which the United States was ready to give for reconstruction won ready acceptance from European governments. They in turn were supported by successive decisions at party conferences and by victories at the polls. In this way a policy of strength towards the Soviet Union, for which the United States provided the sinews, was established and maintained.

By definition, it was successful: for had it not been the Cold War would have turned into defeat or military conflict. Instead, rules of the game and codes of behaviour were established. In a way that is extremely rare, peace was preserved by preparation for war. Meanwhile, outside the crucial area of western Europe, occurred events beyond the control of the great contestants in the Cold War which in a profound sense were to shape the future. It appeared to Stalin that he faced no serious rivals in eastern Europe until he encountered resistance from Tito to those actions by which he had established control in the satellites. The Yugoslav Communist Party, small, illegal, and consequently ineffective before the war, succeeded, in conflict with the Germans, in capturing a great part of the nationalism of the Yugoslavs and establishing an autonomous basis of power. The ideological and institutional

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

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strength of Tito's rule was beyond Stalin's understanding; and when Tito remained undaunted by Stalin's wrath he opened the way for the future both to neutralism and to polycentrism.

Meanwhile the communist success in China presented an insoluble dilemma to American foreign policy. Discussion within the American administration about the future of China had been as important as argument about Europe, but it had been conducted almost entirely in terms of the part the Russians would play there. Such steps as were taken to assist Chiang Kai-shek had the intention of restricting Russian influence in Manchuria and northern China. A limit was set on such assistance unless Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to make a political settlement with the communists. When the possibility of such a settlement diminished, the United States rejected the alternative policy of giving all-out support to the nationalist government in order to resist what now appeared as an autonomous nationalist revolutionary force, winning an increasing number of adherents through its own success and through the inefficiency and corruption of the nationalists. As the Chinese communists then swept on to victory, such diverse observers as General MacArthur and Congressman John F. Kennedy could lament:

> It was the beginning of the crumbling of our power in continental Asia—the birth of the taunt 'Paper Tiger'. Its consequences will be felt for centuries, and its ultimate disastrous effects on the fortunes of the free world are still to be unfolded.[4]

and:

> This is the tragic story of China, whose freedom we once fought to preserve. What our young men had saved, our diplomats and our President have frittered away.[5]

No meeting between an American President and his Russian counterpart has since occurred similar in atmosphere to the war-time conferences. At Geneva in 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin were well aware of the influence which Dulles exercised over the amiable, indulgent Eisenhower, and when Khrushchev realised that American toughness had survived the death of Dulles he prevented the 1960 conference from taking place. At Vienna in 1961 there was little 'chatting up' from either side in the meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Nonetheless, in the course of fifteen years a relationship between the United States and Russia has developed. In 1945 Roosevelt's and Stalin's power within their own political systems were utterly diverse; by 1962 Khrushchev and Kennedy wielded the same power in international affairs and ran similar risks in doing so. The twentieth party congress of the CPSU was a landmark in Khrushchev's revaluation of communist theory on the question of war. For reasons that remain obscure he probed once again at Berlin and ran all the risks of the Cuba crisis; but as he ordered the removal of missiles from Castro's territory he wrote to Kennedy: 'Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are'. Here and in the establishment

[4] MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 320.
[5] Speech at Salem, Massachusetts, 30 January 1949, quoted *ibid.*

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of the 'hot line' between Washington and Moscow, a genuine if fragile bridge has been established of a sort inconceivable in the days of Stalin and Roosevelt. In the last resort Americans and Russians alike would have a common interest in controlling the events of the world to avoid a nuclear war.

IT remains to be seen whether the bridge can be reinforced by an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. However, this political bridge rests on broader piers than the nuclear danger alone, for in spite of its lingering ideological commitment the Soviet Union has become a status-quo power. This change is attributable in part to the change of leadership and in part to that mellowing of the Soviet system which permits an erstwhile dictator to enjoy leisurely retirement. It is due also to the changes in the circumstances of international relations which make any large-scale revision of the territorial and political balance fraught with danger.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union has abandoned its ideological outlook or its wish for the success of the communist movement throughout the world. Indeed the security of the Soviet Union in international relations and the disappearance of Stalinist absolutism make the present Soviet leaders more ready than Stalin to welcome communist success in countries as distant and uncontrollable as Cuba. There is in principle, however, no fundamental obstacle to the pursuit of a *modus vivendi* between great powers coupled with a recognition of the continuance of the Cold War in subversion and resistance to it outside the areas most central to their interests.

Such *entente* as is possible between the United States and the Soviet Union within these limitations will, however, always be threatened and undermined by national revolutionary movements of the sort that defeated both Stalinist and American policy in the post-war quinquennium. Now, as a century ago, nationalism remains the single most potent force in international politics, and those who would like the world to conform to their own pattern will be confronted again and again with the choice of supporting, ignoring or opposing a revolution which runs counter to their own interests and even more to their own beliefs.

The decisions about foreign policy which now have to be taken are no less agonising, and they may be equally difficult for the two sides in the Cold War and for the neutrals alike. Whether, for the Soviet Union, to support Egyptian nationalism and whether, for the United States, to regard the national communism of Vietnam as a threat to the whole of south-east Asia; whether, for Nasser, to support Yemeni republicanism—these are questions susceptible of no generalised answer. They cannot be avoided, for isolationism is no more acceptable to great powers than were the policies of John Bright in the days of Britain's supremacy.

To this extent then the calculation of the course of events which must underlie the formulation of foreign policy is less subject to generalisation than in the early days of the Cold War. Then, the first requirement of

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western foreign policy was the political leadership required to establish positions of strength before electorates had even drawn breath after the end of the war. Now it is political skill of a more traditional kind, capable of assessing a diversity of events and predicting the future. The easiest part of such calculation is in the direct relationship with the Soviet Union. Here certain rules, particularly over Berlin, have now been implicitly laid down; the occasion for a policy of defence does not arise in the way it did during the fluid years immediately after the war, and the possibility of extending the community of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union can at least be explored without severe risks being run.

It is outside the European area that fluidity exists and its sphere cannot be reduced to the generalisation which characterised the revision of American foreign policy in 1946–47. There the most important single characteristic will be the expression of nationalism and the pursuit of national interests. Other conflicts will also be present. In any episode of rapid social and political change the *montagnards* will compete with the *girondins*. Each may look outside for support and improbable alliances may result, of which that between Pakistan and China is but one example. In a situation of this complexity the need for expert knowledge and judgment, permitting empirical assessment of diverse problems and the exercise of political *nous* is obvious. It cannot be assumed that all ideological conflicts between reformers and revolutionaries are reducible to Cold War terms, any more than national feeling and national forces can be subsumed under one or other side in the antagonism between the communist states and their established opponents.

In this situation, neither the hawks nor the doves can always be right, for there are no single prescriptions which can serve as a substitute for flexibility and judgment in foreign policy.

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THE POLISH QUESTION

Alexander Bregman

WHILE historians may never agree on when exactly the Cold War started, it is generally accepted that the disagreement over the future of Poland was the first serious clash between the Soviet Union and the West. The Cold War, like the second world war itself, started in Poland. Can the parallel be pushed a little further? Was the appeasement of Stalin, culminating in the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam, as unnecessary as the appeasement of Hitler, culminating in Munich?

History does not repeat itself and no two situations are exactly similar. While the main reason for the appeasement of Hitler had been the mistaken belief that this was the way to maintain peace, the western attitude towards Stalin and eastern Europe was the result not so much of a deliberate policy, but rather of subordinating all political questions to the necessity of winning the war. Poland's fate was sealed at Yalta, but in fact it had been to a large extent determined by strategic decisions taken much earlier.

Stalin never lost political aims from sight when deciding Soviet strategy. His attitude was dictated by the belief which he expressed in his remark to Djilas: 'This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as the army has power to do. It cannot be otherwise.'[1] Thus Stalin wanted his armies to occupy as much foreign territory as possible. One typical example of the factors determining Soviet strategy is given in Marshal Koniev's recent memoirs:

> I well remember how Stalin carefully studied the plan of the operation [for the winter offensive of 1944–45] and the special attention he devoted to the Silesian industrial region . . . I understood perfectly well what Stalin meant when he went out of his way to draw my attention to this area. He pointed to the map with his finger, drew a circle around the industrial area and said: 'That's gold'.[2]

Marshal Koniev also describes a conference at which Stalin anxiously asked: 'Who's going to take Berlin then, we or the Allies?'

Although by this time Churchill also realised the importance of reaching Berlin before the Russians, western political objectives remained until the end of the war subordinated to strictly military considerations. As the US Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out in a memorandum of 6 April: 'Such psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our opinion is the

[1] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (London, 1962), p. 105.
[2] *Novy Mir*, quoted by David Floyd, 'Generalissimo Stalin', in *Daily Telegraph*, 8 July 1965.

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destruction and dismemberment of the German armed forces.'[3] This sentence sums up American thinking.

Was British thinking different? Only in the last phase of the war did Churchill try to convince the Americans of the importance of reaching Central Europe ahead of the Russians. The most important strategic decisions, which meant that in fact most of this area would be liberated by the Soviet Army, were taken much earlier, at a time when neither the American plans for an invasion across the Channel, nor the British idea of attacking the 'soft underbelly' of Europe, had been influenced by political considerations.

It is, of course, idle to speculate whether a different Allied grand strategy would have permitted the Allied armies to win the race with the Russians towards Central Europe. Perhaps those Americans who still affirm that it would have been possible to invade France successfully in 1943 are wrong. Perhaps the British view, according to which the Allies could have reached Vienna, Budapest, and Prague ahead of the Russians if several divisions had not been diverted from Italy to invade southern France in August 1944, is over-optimistic. But certainly the compromise between American and British strategic conceptions had far-reaching consequences for the future of Central Europe. It meant that whatever chances existed of landing in France in 1943, and thus meeting the Russians much further east than was the case after landing a year later, were lost. It meant also that no attempt to attack through the Balkans would be made.

But military considerations affected the fate of Poland and the whole area in other ways as well. Thus in 1942 the British were willing to accept Soviet territorial demands as some form of compensation for not being able to help them by opening a second front in the West. Although Stalin's demand for a treaty recognising Soviet territorial gains obtained from Hitler was rejected by Eden in Moscow in December 1941, by March 1942 Churchill was prepared to accept it. He told Roosevelt on 7 March:

> The increased gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principle of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her . . . I hope therefore that you will be able to give us a free hand to sign the treaty which Stalin desires as soon as possible. Everything portends an immense renewal of the German invasion of Russia in the spring, and there is very little we can do to help the only country that is heavily engaged with German armies.[4]

At that time Roosevelt rejected Churchill's suggestion. He would rather reverse the policy and promise Stalin the second front in order to make him abandon his territorial claims. In Professor Feis' words, 'the Soviet government was to be lured away from one boon by a choicer one, away

[3] Quoted by Herbert Feis. *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton, 1957), p. 608.
[4] Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. iv (London, 1951), p. 293.

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from its absorption in frontiers by the attraction of quick military relief'.[5]

At first Roosevelt's stratagem succeeded. Stalin feared to insist on the recognition of his conquests, lest Roosevelt's eagerness for a second front should weaken; in London, Molotov signed the treaty with Britain which contained no word about frontiers. But as there was to be no second front in 1942 or in 1943 the idea of appeasing Stalin by concessions at the cost of Poland and the Baltic states was bound to be revived, and it was Roosevelt who advanced the argument he had rejected in 1942. In the spring of 1944, on the eve of the invasion of France, Secretary of State Hull stated: 'We could not afford to become partisan in the Polish question to the extent of alienating Russia at the crucial moment.'[6]

A year later, when victory over Germany was virtually complete, other military considerations prevented any strong stand in defence of Poland's future. On 23 April 1945, only two weeks before Germany's surrender, President Truman called a meeting to discuss the Soviet refusal to honour the Yalta agreement on Poland. At this meeting all the military men and their spokesman, the Secretary of Defence, Mr Stimson, insisted that a clash with Russia should be avoided. General Marshall was most insistent on this point. According to Forrestal,

> General Marshall was even more cautious [than Admiral Leahy] and brought up what was undoubtedly in all their minds. He said he 'hoped for Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time when it would be useful to us. The Russians had it within their power to delay their entry into the Far Eastern war until we had done all the dirty work' and he was inclined to agree that it would be a serious matter to risk a break.[7]

True, at this conference the President decided to accept that risk and for a while American policy became firmer. But the firmness did not last and in any case it was too late to avoid the consequences of the earlier policy.

THE exaggerated concern to avoid anything which could annoy Stalin resulted again and again in abandoning any idea of a strong stand with regard to Poland and other matters in dispute. Churchill gives several instances of these preoccupations and their repercussions on the fate of Poland. Describing a meeting of the Cabinet on 4 September 1944, when the Soviet refusal to let Allied planes with supplies for the Polish Home Army fighting in Warsaw land behind the Soviet lines provoked a deeper anger than any Churchill could remember, he writes:

> I should have liked to say, 'We are sending our aeroplanes to land in your territory, after delivering supplies to Warsaw. If you do not treat them properly all convoys will be stopped from this moment by us'. But the reader of these pages in after-years must realise

[5] Feis, op. cit., p. 61.
[6] *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), p. 1442.
[7] *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), p. 51.

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> that everyone always has to keep in mind the fortunes of millions of men fighting in a world-wide struggle, and that terrible and even humbling submissions must at times be made to the general aim. I did not therefore propose this drastic step. It might have been effective, because we were dealing with men in the Kremlin who were governed by calculation and not by emotion . . . The cutting off of the convoys at this critical moment in their great advance would perhaps have bulked in their minds as much as considerations of honour, humanity, decent commonplace good faith, usually count with ordinary people.[8]

Unfortunately, such 'humbling submissions' were made by the West only. Stalin saw no necessity to make concessions to avoid a quarrel with his allies. Even when the Soviet Union's situation was desperate, as in 1941, no attempt was made to get Stalin to promise to respect the frontiers and the independence of Poland. General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, noted in his diary on 17 February 1944: 'Our attitude to Russia was of always giving and never bargaining to get something back.'[9] This attitude was largely responsible for the fact that whatever possibilities the West had to support Poland within the limits dictated by military strategy, were wasted.

The best example of the policy of always giving and never asking for something in return is provided by the huge material aid sent to Russia under Lend-Lease without any strings attached. In 1941 or 1942, when the Soviet Union was hard pressed, Stalin would probably have been prepared to make some political gesture, such as renouncing the claim to territories obtained through the pact with Hitler, if this had been the price asked by the West for its support. At any rate, the attempt could have been made without risk. But the demands continued to come from one side only.

Immediately after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 the British government put great pressure on the Polish government in exile to sign a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union without insisting on recognition by the Soviet government of the pre-war frontier. Churchill explained Britain's dilemma in his *War Memoirs* (vol. iii, p. 349):

> We had gone to war with Germany as the direct result of our guarantee to Poland. We had a strong obligation to support the interests of our first ally. At this stage in the struggle we could not admit the legality of the Russian occupation of Polish territory in 1939. In this summer of 1941, less than two weeks after the appearance of Russia on our side in the struggle against Germany, we could not force our new and sorely threatened ally to abandon, even on paper, regions on her frontiers which she had regarded for generations as vital to her security.

These assertions carry little conviction. If it was impossible to admit the legality of the Russian occupation of eastern Poland in 1941, how was it possible to do so three years later? Russia had become Britain's ally

[8] Churchill, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 124.
[9] Quoted in Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West* (London, 1959), p. 108.

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by virtue of Hitler's attack, not on Stalin's initiative; could this be said to create an obligation to respect Soviet conquests?

The decision to help Russia without asking anything in return was in fact the outcome of the general belief among British and American experts that Soviet resistance to the German invasion would collapse in a short time. The Polish leaders in exile shared this view, put succinctly by the US Secretary of the Navy to President Roosevelt on 23 June, the day after the invasion of Russia: 'The best opinion I can get is that it will take anywhere from six weeks to two months for Hitler to clean up on Russia.'[10] The President's special envoy, Harry Hopkins, found in London a glimmer of hope that the Soviet forces would be able to hold out until winter. Churchill's overriding concern was to help the Russians to go on fighting, and it was shared by the President: 'No more than Churchill had Roosevelt at this time thought of asking anything in return except that the Russians should keep up the fight.'[11] Both leaders must at the time have considered any Soviet concessions on paper as useless anyway.

It is possible that at this stage Stalin himself had no very high hopes of survival. And yet, to strengthen his position, he spoke more of post-war frontiers and spheres of influence than of aid. The result was that Stalin asked for concessions and the West helped in order to ensure that the Russians would keep the field.

Although Churchill complains in his *Memoirs* (vol. iii, p. 347), that 'the Soviet Government had the impression that they were conferring a great favour on us by fighting in their own country for their own lives', he acted as if it really was a favour which needed to be paid for. There might have been some justification for this if Stalin had any alternative except to fight. Both Churchill and Roosevelt believed that he had; they feared a separate peace. As early as 5 September 1941, after a visit of the Soviet Ambassador, the Prime Minister stated in a telegram to the President: 'We could not exclude the impression that they might be thinking of separate terms.'[12] Such fears persisted for most of the war years and became an important factor in the policy of appeasing Stalin.

In fact, Stalin had no such alternative. His choice was between fighting on or surrender. Peace depended not upon him but upon Hitler alone. In the summer of 1939, once Hitler was ready to sign his pact with Stalin, the matter was settled whatever further concessions the Allies were ready to offer the Soviets. Thus concessions made by the western powers in order to prevent Russia signing a separate peace with Germany had been unnecessary. Had Hitler been prepared to pay Stalin's price at the expense of Poland and other states, he could beat any offer the Allies could make; after all, his forces occupied these lands. With Hitler not ready for a deal, the West had nothing to fear and no reason to pay to avoid an outcome which was never on the cards.

[10] Quoted by Feis, op. cit., p. 10.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 409.

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THE absence of political considerations in strategic decisions, the tendency to underestimate the Soviet capacity to resist the German onslaught, the unfounded fears of a separate peace, all those factors, which helped to determine Poland's fate and the fate of much of central and eastern Europe, had one thing in common: a lack of understanding of Soviet aims and policy.

For Churchill Soviet policy remained 'a secret wrapped in mystery' and for the greater part of the war years he believed that Stalin was concerned solely with the country's security. In the passage of his *Memoirs* already quoted he spoke of eastern Poland as a region Russia had 'regarded for generations as vital to her security'. Eden shared this view. In his *Memoirs* he writes of his first meeting with Stalin in December 1941: 'Russian ideas were already starkly definite. They changed little during the next three years, for their purpose was to secure the most tangible physical guarantees for Russia's future security.'[13] Roosevelt was even more certain that no thought of expansion entered Stalin's mind. In judging Soviet policy he was guided by what he himself said to the Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile, Mikolajczyk, in 1944: 'Of one thing I am certain, Stalin is not an imperialist.'[14] The President also told the former Ambassador in Moscow, Bullitt, that in his opinion Stalin wanted nothing but security, 'and I think', continued Roosevelt, 'that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, *noblesse oblige*, he won't try to annex anything and will work for a world of security and peace'.[15]

The truth is however that during the war Stalin wanted to get Allied acceptance of what he had gained by the pact with Hitler and then to extend Soviet domination further in all directions. It would be idle to speculate how far he hoped to expand his empire. He was probably not certain how far he could go without risking a clash with the West.

The acceptance by the western leaders of the theory that Stalin's aim was security only had far-reaching consequences, for Poland in particular. It led Churchill to believe that provided Russia got 'regions which she regarded for generations as vital to her security', such as eastern Poland, she would be prepared to respect Poland's independence. Although the country would be shifted westwards, it would still be free. Consequently Churchill put the greatest possible pressure on the Polish government in exile to accept the Curzon Line.

Even now some historians believe that had the London Poles been prepared to come to terms with the Russians by accepting the Curzon Line, they could have saved the freedom of the rest of the country. They argue that Stalin was reluctant to impose a satellite regime on Poland and would have much preferred to come to an agreement with the Polish government in exile, perhaps similar to that he later concluded with the Finns. All the evidence shows, however, that this was not the case. A

[13] *The Eden Memoirs* (London, 1965), p. 289.
[14] Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Pattern of Soviet Domination* (London, 1948), p. 65.
[15] Quoted by John Lucacs, *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe* (New York, 1953), p. 799.

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puppet administration for Poland was being prepared long before the break with the London Poles. The Poles had no chance of being treated in the same way as the Finns even though they had been allies while the Finns had fought against the Soviet Union. Because of its geographical position Poland was much more important than Finland to the men in the Kremlin. Even so, the Finns would not have escaped satellite status but for the special circumstances of the summer of 1944, when strong Finnish resistance was tying down some twenty-five Soviet divisions which were badly needed for the thrust towards the heart of Germany. So instead of fighting on to occupy Finland, Stalin decided to make peace with the Finns and move his troops elsewhere. The Red Army was not in occupation of the country, and a satellite regime could have been imposed only by further fighting or by internal subversion, on which the Kremlin could scarcely pin any hopes.

A more appropriate and instructive comparison can be made between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Both were in the Allied camp. But while the ' romantic ' Poles stubbornly resisted Soviet territorial demands, President Benes, the great ' realist ', had done everything possible to remain on good terms with the Soviets and made no fuss about abandoning the eastern part of the country to the Soviet Union. Yet the final outcome was the same. Czechoslovakia's independence did not last three years.

Stalin knew how to disguise his expansionist aims as security guarantees. Once his claims to the adjoining territories were accepted, he demanded ' friendly governments ' in neighbouring countries. At first this demand was considered legitimate, too. It was not realised that from the Soviet point of view only communist-dominated governments could be considered friendly ones. In fact, there was hardly any difference between ' security ', as the Russians understood it, and expansion. In the name of security Russia could go on imposing its rule on one country after another. The domination of Poland was necessary to ensure the security of the new frontiers resulting from the annexation of its eastern regions. To ensure the security of communist-dominated Poland it was necessary to dominate as much of Germany as possible. And so on. By the time Churchill realised his mistake, at Yalta or shortly afterwards, it was already very difficult to go into reverse, especially as the Americans still refused to regard the Soviet Union as expansionist. As late as April 1945, when Soviet determination to impose a puppet regime on Poland was obvious, Stimson, the American Secretary for War, said at a meeting in the White House that ' he thought that the Russians perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security '.[16]

EVEN if we accept the view that Soviet policy aimed only at ensuring Russia's security, it was wrong to assume that Stalin considered this security threatened only by Germany. The danger he feared after the war came from ' world imperialism ', i.e. from his allies rather than his enemies.

[16] *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 50.

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Few western politicians realised this. Yet warnings had not been lacking. In *The Real Soviet Russia*, published in 1944, David Dallin, a well-known Sovietologist, described the Soviet concept of foreign policy (p. 82):

> The struggle with the 'hypocritical, rapacious American democracy', as Lenin put it, as 'the bulwark of dying capitalism', will require the use by the Soviet Government of ideological weapons entirely different from those now employed against nazism and fascism. According to this concept, the Soviet Union will continue to face the serious threat of war until all or at least the majority of the nations of Europe and the Far East abandon the economy of capitalism, or at least until they enter into a close alliance with the USSR. The only supranational organisation that can preserve peace is a Union of Soviet Republics expanded to maximum proportions and embracing within its confines 'countries which have abandoned capitalism', as Stalin has expressed it. . . . The alliance of part of Germany, and later of all Germany, with the Soviet Union, or Germany's direct affiliation with the USSR, will afford the latter a measure of security against military attack which it could not possibly enjoy under conditions of capitalist encirclement. The combined forces of Soviet Russia and the new Germany will easily be able to repel any attack. Together they will exercise a decisive influence upon the immediate future of all European countries.

To bring part or all of Germany under its control, Russia had to get control of Poland. Even if the western allies could not prevent this step towards Soviet conquest of much of Europe, nothing forced them to help Stalin to achieve it or to give it their formal agreement. Psychologically, Britain and America had already accepted defeat in Poland at a time when the Red Army was still far from the Polish borders. Eden tells in his *Memoirs* (p. 416) of his talks in Moscow in October 1943 with Molotov about Poland:

> There was a particular problem on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had asked for guidance. So far we and the Americans had flown in explosives in small quantities to help the resistance movement in Poland. I wanted to know if we should go further and send arms. Molotov's reply was discouraging. He thought that arms could only be given into safe hands and he doubted if there were any safe hands in Poland.

Poland had the largest underground army in occupied Europe, which a few months later was to fight for 63 days in the Warsaw rising against the Germans. These were the 'unsafe hands' of which Molotov spoke. But it is not so much *his* attitude which is surprising, as the fact that the British government felt it necessary to ask the Russians for advice whether to give arms to their allies. There was hardly any necessity to do so and Stalin could only conclude that the West was ready to abandon the Poles.

In retrospect, the fate of Poland (and eastern Europe) with all its consequences cannot really be described as inevitable. It was due to the

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neglect of political considerations in taking strategic decisions; to lack of understanding of Soviet policy, its aims and methods; to ineptitude and to a loss of nerve; and, finally, to the readiness to make concessions without asking for anything in return. Stalin probably never expected the West to agree so easily to his domination of Poland and other countries of eastern Europe. During a talk with Djilas in 1944 he stopped before a map of the world on which the Soviet Union was coloured red and exclaimed: 'They [the British and the Americans] will never accept the idea that so great a space should be red, never, never!' [17] And yet that was only the old Soviet territory without the new satellite empire. If Stalin did not expect the West to accept this, how could he believe that the British and the Americans would accept a vast extension of his 'red' territory?

What happened later, when Stalin was faced with determined western resistance to Soviet expansion in Persia, in Berlin, in Korea and elsewhere, shows that he was always prepared to withdraw when the risks became too great. Even the fact that the Red Army had been in occupation of an area did not prevent withdrawal under such circumstances, vide Persian Azerbaidjan. One is thus entitled to conclude that the story of Poland could have been different, too, had the western allies shown greater political intelligence and determination.

Wartime coalitions seldom survive the end of hostilities, and a clash of interests between the western allies and the Soviet Union leading to the Cold War may have been unavoidable. But at least it could have started from positions much more advantageous to the West had not Poland and eastern Europe generally been so completely abandoned.

The lessons of Poland were not quickly or universally absorbed; they are still relevant today. It was the first defeat for the West in the Cold War, but it was not presented as such. Ever since, whether during the Berlin airlift, Korea, Cuba, or Vietnam, the same kind of voices first heard on the Polish issue, castigating the victim or minimising the importance of the prospective loss, and advocating appeasement, have invariably been raised in the West, using on each occasion the familiar pattern of arguments to rationalise non-resistance, exploiting peaceful sentiments or fear. Had they been heeded, the net result would have been an important, possibly decisive, shift in the balance of power against the West. However, they were not, and Soviet expansion was contained. Yet at the same time they were instrumental in spreading the communist inversion of meaning of words to the West, a process which is undermining its political will. We no longer talk of peace, but of 'peaceful coexistence'. The term 'Cold War' originally referred to Stalin's policy vis-à-vis the West; nowadays those who want to resist communist pressures and expansionism are not infrequently branded as 'cold warriors' by those who continue to sap the political determination of the West and who refuse to draw lessons from all the confrontations which began with the case of Poland.

[17] Djilas, op. cit., p. 70.

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THE TURNING POINT

Louis J. Halle

FROM the summer of 1945 to the spring of 1947 was a period of uncertainty for the American people and its government. It began with the official assumption that the new international organisation, based on unanimity among the five great 'peace-loving' powers, would henceforth maintain a peaceful world order from which power politics—including such devices as the balance of power and spheres of influence—had been banished. The vision, which went back a long way in American history, was of a Jeffersonian organisation of all mankind.

Even by the end of the war, however, when this period began, it had already become evident to Americans that the realisation of this vision would not be immediate. At least for the time being, then, the official foreign policy that had been projected for the post-war world could not be made to work. What this meant was that, for the moment, the United States was without a workable foreign policy. It was, to be specific, without a workable foreign policy until the spring of 1947.

What was required in the first instance, for the replacement of the projected foreign policy by a policy applicable to the developing circumstances, was a conscious recognition of the realities to which it would have to be applicable. The lack of a conceptual scheme for appreciating the post-war situation, and of a formulated policy for dealing with it, was most seriously felt in the State Department, which had the responsibility of advising the President on the situation and of dealing with it under his direction.

To put ourselves back in those times we must recall that in 1945 and 1946, by contrast with what was to come, there had as yet been almost no development of Russian studies in the United States. The sophistication of a later day was as yet lacking. The institutes of Russian studies that were to proliferate on American campuses in the late nineteen-forties had not yet been founded. Experts in the Russian language, in Russian history, in Russian society, or in Russian doctrine were not readily to be found within the borders of the United States.

The deficiency that this represented was in part the consequence of the fact that, until 1933, we had not recognised nor entered into official relations with the Soviet Union. In the late nineteen-twenties, however, certain Foreign Service officers in the State Department had the foresight to bethink themselves of the need that would arise if the day came when the United States did find itself involved in relations with Russia.[1] Consequently, certain young officers were selected for two years of intensive training in the Russian language and in the general background

[1] The two officers who appear to have taken the principal initiative were G. Howland Shaw and Robert F. Kelley. I am indebted for the information on it that I give here to Mr Kelley and to Mr Reginald Kazanjian, who as a Foreign Service officer was close to these matters at the time.

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of Russian affairs. Two were assigned to receive this training in each of four successive years, after which budgetary reductions put an end to the programme. Of the eight young officers put through this training, two would later serve as American Ambassador in Moscow. They were George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen.

In February 1946, when Mr Kennan was deputy chief of mission at the American Embassy in Moscow, he sent the State Department a paper, sixteen pages long, in which he undertook to analyse and explain Moscow's international behaviour, to suggest the behaviour that was to be expected of it in the future, and to draw certain conclusions for the consequent formulation of American foreign policy.

Able analyses of international situations by officers in the field had been received in the State Department before this, and have been since. For the most part they are lost in the floods of paper that deluge the Department and submerge its staff every day. The timing of Mr Kennan's communication, however, was strategic. It came at a moment when the Department, having been separated by circumstances from the wartime policy towards Russia, was floundering about, looking for new intellectual moorings. Now, in this communication, it was offered a new and realistic conception to which it might attach itself. The reaction was immediate and positive. There was a universal feeling that this was it, this was the appreciation of the situation that had been needed. Mr. Kennan's communication was reproduced for distribution to all the officers of the Department (so that even one who was exclusively concerned with Latin American affairs at the time received his copy). We may not doubt that it made its effect on the President, and that it was communicated to the War and Navy Departments as well.

This document presented the picture of a Soviet governing regime, with absolute mastery over the Russian society, swayed by an unreasonable but neurotically powerful hostility to the world beyond the area of its control. Marxism is merely the 'fig leaf of . . . moral and intellectual respectability' that covers the nakedness of a policy that is brutally cruel, disingenuous, and unlimited by any scruples. This regime, by its own attitude and devices, is virtually insulated against knowledge of the outside world that does not support its mythical preconceptions. It works to undermine and destroy the world that it regards as representing 'capitalist encirclement', and does so on two planes: the official plane of overt governmental activity and the 'subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which the Soviet government does not admit responsibility'.

The governing power of the Soviet Union is not, however, schematic or adventuristic. Impervious to the logic of reason, it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. Its success as a form of internal power 'is not yet finally proven'. The supreme test will be its power to survive such crises as were caused by Lenin's death and will be caused, again, by

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Stalin's passing. In the absence of a genuinely popular allegiance to the doctrines in which it clothes itself, its internal system is bound to be strained by 'recent territorial expansions'.

The American response, said Mr Kennan, must be in the first instance to achieve an understanding of Russian realities and to communicate that understanding to the American public. Then our American society must look to its own inner soundness and the presentation to other nations of 'a much more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past'.

In urging that an understanding of the realities be communicated to the American public, Mr Kennan wrote: 'I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if the realities . . . were better understood by our people'. The paper ends with a warning: 'the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping'.

From this notable document, composed at the same time as Churchill's Fulton address, dates the formulation of a new American and Western policy to meet the brand new threat and challenge that finally stood revealed when the smoke of war had cleared away. Mr Kennan was brought back to Washington where, in the following year, he would organise and head the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of State.

One more document deserves special mention in this chronicle. Mr Kennan was to have the leading role in carrying out his own recommendation that an understanding of the realities by which American policy was challenged be communicated to the American public. The principal device by which this was accomplished was an article in the quarterly, *Foreign Affairs*, which appeared in its issue of July 1947. Its title was 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' and it bore, in place of an author's name, the letter 'X'. Since this article represented the newly formulated position of the United States government, it would have been self-defeating to put it forward simply as the thought of one man, even if the discipline of the career service had not limited the public expression of personal views by its members.

The impact of the article on the American public, and even in larger spheres, was a counterpart of the impact that the communication from Moscow had had in the State Department. It met, among the members of the public, the same need that the earlier document had met among the members of the government. From the beginning, its authoritative character was known and there was no point in trying to keep secret the name of its author, which now for the first time sprang into public prominence. It represented, in the broadest terms, the formulated policy of the United States for the post-war world, thereby bringing to an end

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the period of transition and uncertainty that had begun with the winter of 1944–1945.[2]

The principal addition that this document made to the earlier communication from Moscow was a word and a concept. The word was 'containment'. 'It is clear', the text read, 'that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. . . . Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points . . .' This was followed by the prediction that, if containment were effectively applied 'over a period of ten or fifteen years' (i.e. until 1957–1962), the result might be a radical modification of the Russian threat as it then existed.

IT will be helpful now, as we recall the unfolding of these matters, to keep in our own minds the distinction, not clearly perceived at the time, between immediate policy to meet the immediate challenge and, what was so long overdue, the permanent new orientation of the country towards its external environment.

Secretary of State Marshall had been in office only a month when he undertook to deal with the basic orientation of the United States in an address at Princeton on Saturday, 22 February 1947. It was after he had already left that the British Ambassador telephoned the Department to request an immediate appointment with him, saying that he had two notes from his government to lay before him without delay.

Rather than ask the Secretary to come back to Washington, Under-Secretary Dean Acheson, who was Acting Secretary in his absence, suggested that the Ambassador send a representative with copies of the notes to discuss them with the officers of the Department chiefly responsible for the matters with which they dealt. Then whatever staff-work was needed could be got under way immediately, in anticipation of the Secretary's return Monday morning. First Secretary Sichel of the British Embassy, dispatch-case in hand, thereupon went to the Department, where he called upon Mr Loy Henderson, Director of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. He pulled the two notes from his dispatch-case and handed them to Henderson to read.

The first referred to the deteriorating situation in Greece, where the Government was at the brink of economic and military perdition, where it appeared that the communist rebels might be about to capture the country for Stalin's rapidly expanding empire—which would thereby emerge, at last, upon the shores of the Mediterranean. Until now, Britain, pursuing the policy set by Churchill in 1944, had been providing the economic and military assistance that the Greek government needed

[2] This well known article, which today has the character of an historically important document, is reproduced as Appendix I in Mr Kennan's *American Diplomacy: 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951).

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to stave off this disaster. Now, because of Britain's own economic crisis (the note said), it could give no further financial assistance after 31 March. His Majesty's Government hoped that the United States would be able to take over the burden. The Greek requirements for 1947 were estimated at between $240 million and $280 million.

The second note that Henderson read, as Sichel sat by, had a similar message about Turkey, where Britain had also been giving the economic and military assistance needed by Turkey if it was to hold its own against active pressure that Moscow was putting upon it.

What the two notes reported was the final end of the *Pax Britannica.* Now, after two world wars, Britain had exhausted the last of the means with which, for almost a century and a half, it had maintained its power and discharged its responsibilities over the wide world. Consequently, it was not only withdrawing from Burma and India, it was also withdrawing from the eastern Mediterranean, where it appeared certain that it would be replaced by Stalin's new empire, already moving into that area—unless the giant American nation, acting quickly and against its ancient tradition, could bring itself to go in first. The British notes informed the American government that it had thirty-eight days.

The situation that the men in Washington faced on 21 February 1947 was uncompromising in its demands. The British were not suggesting that the United States might see its way clear to easing their burden in Greece and Turkey by giving them some additional help with it; they were saying that they had no choice but to drop it forthwith.

Mr Sichel's call on Mr Henderson was followed by nineteen days of intense and fruitful activity in Washington. At the end of that time, on 12 March, President Truman went before a special joint session of Congress to deliver a Message that, in its historic importance, ranks at least with the Message of 2 April 1917, in which President Wilson asked Congress to recognise the existence of a state of war with the Imperial German Government.

President Truman was not a Woodrow Wilson. He commanded no such eloquence as deserves to be remembered in itself. The higher vision was never his. Wilson had written his classic Message by himself the night before its delivery. Truman had to depend entirely on the governmental bureaucracy, operating by negotiation and compromise among its members, to provide him with a text. The process by which this was done is described in almost hour-by-hour detail by Joseph M. Jones, who participated prominently in it.[3] Mr Jones, as a professional practitioner, takes this procedure for producing presidential addresses for granted and manifests his loyalty to it. However, the detached reader of his account may allow himself to view it with an appropriate horror.

In judging the President's Message to Congress we should bear in mind the opposition between the perspective of current events, in terms of which men act, and the perspective of history, in terms of

[3] Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York, 1955), Part IV, Chapter 2. For much of the information in this article I have relied heavily on this excellent book.

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which their actions are recalled and judged. In the perspective of history, the conquest of Constantinople by Mohammed II in 1453 is important, *inter alia*, because it inaugurated the revolution in warfare produced by the introduction of artillery. For Mohammed, however, what was important was not the inauguration of a revolution in warfare but the capture of a city. For the Truman Administration, what was important was to obtain Congressional authorisation and appropriations for aid to Greece and Turkey. The proclamation of abstract doctrine, although it would loom larger for the historian, had to come second. The host of bureaucrats working directly under Mr Acheson were operators rather than political philosophers. This is what Mr Truman was too. Woodrow Wilson was the last American President to be both an operator and a philosopher, but it is not a foregone conclusion that in this situation he would have done better than Mr Truman.

However that may be, the sentence announcing that the United States, finally abandoning its traditional isolationism, would now undertake, in succession to Great Britain, to establish a *Pax Americana* all around the globe—this sentence was so negligently placed in the text, and so negligently composed, that it could go quite unnoticed. The London *Times* was not unrepresentative of press comment on the Message when it observed that 'Mr Truman's speech does no more than extend the prospect of American support to a new area, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East'.

As always, the topical situation was what dominated men's minds. Later, those who had been responsible would be surprised and delighted to find out how they had made history.

IT became widely apparent, immediately after 12 March, that the United States could not stop with the rescue of Greece and Turkey. A commitment had been assumed of which the limits were, for the moment, unknown. This was evident to Acheson in the State Department, who immediately ordered the initiation of staff studies to determine how many countries were going to need how much American aid of what kind. It was also apparent to the most perceptive of journalistic commentators, Walter Lippmann, who in his column of 13 March wrote that the decisions represented by the President's Message 'call for an estimate of how the total military and financial resources that can be made available, may most effectively be applied to meet demands which arise from every quarter of the globe'.

An event acquires historical importance only by its consequences. The consequences of Mr Truman's Message of 12 March did not stop with aid to Greece and Turkey. They continued with the European Recovery Programme and the policy of actively containing the Russian empire from the Elbe to Korea. They continued with the measures of opposition to further Russian expansion which finally inaugurated the Cold War. All this was implicit in the President's Message of 12 March, which thereby represents a turning-point in history.

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The emergency that the Government in Washington faced had two aspects. The distress of Europe from Britain to Greece was alarming in itself, since it implied a proliferation of chaos to which, for a variety of reasons, the United States could not have been indifferent even in the absence of the Russian menace. The other and complementary aspect was the Russian menace. The United States was now committed to meeting the emergency, but it had some choice of how much emphasis to place on the one aspect or the other in the formulation of the course it followed and the rationale by which it justified that course. Throughout all the developments after 12 March—indeed, after 21 February—the tension between the emphasis on rescue and the emphasis on containment is manifest.

In this critical spring of 1947 the overt and all-out political conflict between Russia and the West, which would come to be called the Cold War, presented itself as in imminent danger but not as a foregone conclusion. Under the circumstances, the men in Washington were mindful of the need to avoid any conduct that would put the responsibility for starting the Cold War, if it should start at all, on the West rather than on Russia. (Another way of saying this was that, if Europe should at last be divided into two opposed camps, the United States should not be the one that divided it.) The general view, inside the American government as well as in the more sophisticated American press, was that it had been a mistake, in the Message of 12 March, to have sounded the trumpet-call for ideological battle against Russia, and to have put the programmes of aid to Greece and Turkey in that context.

Moreover, as long as Europe was not yet irreparably divided between East and West, it was of practical importance to avoid any conduct that would in itself produce such a division. The recovery of a western Europe that was economically severed from eastern Europe would thereby be made far more difficult, expensive, and uncertain. There was every reason, then, to shape developments so that the Russians would be tempted to participate in a general programme of reconstruction for all Europe.

For seven weeks, from 10 March to 24 April, Secretary Marshall had been in Moscow, at the meeting of Foreign Ministers who were trying, without success, to agree on a common policy towards Germany and Austria. The course of action pursued by Russian Foreign Minister Molotov at that meeting suggested to the other participants that Stalin's government was not averse to collapse and chaos in the West. Upon his return to Washington, Marshall delivered, on 29 April, a radio-address to the American people in which he reported the apparent Russian disposition to obstruct or delay the settlement of matters essential to the recovery of western Europe. He concluded by observing, in this context, that the United States could not ignore the factor of time. 'The recovery of Europe', he said, 'has been far slower than had been expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. I believe that action cannot await

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compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise daily. Whatever action is possible . . . must be taken without delay.'

The occasion on which Secretary Marshall would announce what was thenceforth to be known as the 'Marshall Plan' appears not to have been regarded as of any particular importance until its immediate and far-reaching consequences became manifest. It was not until 28 May that he decided to accept Harvard's invitation to speak at its commencement exercises on 5 June, and then he did not have in mind any particular subject for his remarks. When the suggestion was made that he use the occasion to set forth the ideas on European recovery that had been developing he accepted it in spite of Acheson's objection that a commencement address was unlikely to get the attention in the press that one would want for these ideas. The Secretary's Special Assistant, Charles E. Bohlen, drafted it, and the Secretary revised his draft in the airplane on his way to Harvard. It is evident that no one in Washington, with the possible exception of Acheson, had attached first importance to it.

Here, then, is another example of how we fail to see the historic significance in current events until it becomes manifest in their consequences. The historic significance is not there to be seen as yet. On the same day as Marshall was casually announcing the 'Marshall Plan' at Harvard, President Truman, in Washington, was denouncing as an 'outrage' the communist coup that had just taken place in Hungary—and it was President Truman's statement that made the bigger headlines next morning.

Acheson, afraid that what Marshall said would pass unnoticed or unappreciated in Europe, took quiet action on his own to avert this. On June 4 he invited to lunch three British correspondents assigned to Washington and, after impressing them with the importance of the Secretary's address next day, urged them to telephone the text to London as soon as it was released, and to see to it that a copy was delivered to Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin immediately, whatever the time of day or night.

I don't suppose that any of those who, sitting on their folding chairs in Harvard Yard, listening to the Secretary of State, appreciated the fact that they were present at an historic occasion. The Secretary did not appreciate it himself.

THE threat of an imminent collapse in western Europe had drawn the United States across the Atlantic in 1917 and again in 1940–41. It was, I think, a foregone conclusion that a similar threat would draw it again in 1947. Circumstances dictated this, and the statesmen merely gave expression to it. Much depended, however, on the shrewdness, the intelligence, the very style of the expression. Statesmanship might have faltered and fumbled. Confusion might not have been avoided—and, in fact, it was not altogether avoided in the initial move to assist Greece and Turkey. The fact that this was not now the case is attributable

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to the statesmanship of a few men, with whatever reservation one may wish to make in favour of luck or providence.

Foreign Ministers Bevin in London and Bidault in Paris eagerly embraced the Marshall proposal on its own terms, which they could not have wished to alter. Here was occasion for a degree of international accord that is rare even among the best of allies. The Marshall proposal posed no such dilemma for the west Europeans as it would have if it had been cast in the form of a challenge to Moscow, or if, taking advantage of the weakness of their position, it had suggested any kind of imposition by Washington. In these months of April, May, and June, then, and for more than one reason, the statesmanship of a few outstanding individuals had a scope and influence that the muddle of bureaucracy, domestic politics, and international relations usually forbids.

When the text of Marshall's address was delivered to Bevin at his home there began, immediately, a period of intense and momentous diplomatic activity in the European capitals. That activity, based on the vision of a united Europe with its own consolidated programme of recovery, supported by the United States, culminated at the end of June in a series of meetings at which the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Russia were to organise the initial planning.

For the West, the element of suspense, when the first of these meetings began in Paris on 27 June, was provided by the question whether the Russians would come in or stay out. The final realisation of the developing Cold War depended on the resolution of this question. If the Russians stayed out, requiring their satellites to stay out too, then Europe would be finally cloven and the Cold War would be finally joined. On the other hand, an implicit if not explicit condition of eastern European participation was the renunciation by Moscow of the policy that was now opening up the Cold War.

In his Harvard address Secretary Marshall had said:

> Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. . . . Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government.[4] Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

The Marshall proposal, and its eager acceptance in London and Paris, confronted Moscow with the final decision whether to join the West or fight it.

[4] The 'I am sure' in this sentence betrays the almost unique constitutional weakness of the United States Government in the conduct of foreign relations. In what other country is the foreign minister able to state his government's foreign policy with so little assurance? (This article is based on some chapters in Professor Halle's forthcoming history of the Cold War.)

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GERMANY IN THE COLD WAR

Evelyn Anderson

WITH the wisdom of hindsight the partition of Germany, as it emerged after the war, seems to have been inescapable. It owes nothing to the various war-time plans for Germany's dismemberment which, in one form or another, were favoured by all the Big Three up to the Yalta conference but which were abandoned soon afterwards. The present partition was not planned by anyone. It is, on the contrary, the outcome of plans that miscarried and of hopes that were disappointed—Western as well as Soviet plans and hopes.

Among the very few points on which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin seemed to be in genuine agreement during the war was their common determination to avoid committing themselves in advance to any definite settlement of Germany's political future. That was hardly by accident. Their agreement on the demand for 'unconditional surrender' without any indication of their own plans for Germany had a variety of different motives. But, among other things, it was also a convenient way of delaying decisions which the Russians as well as the western allies each held it to be in their separate interest to postpone. Underlying these prevarications was, in Roosevelt's case, the fear and suspicion that victory over Germany would spell the end of their alliance; and, in Churchill's and Stalin's case, the certain conviction of the same outcome. With this prospect in mind, even the attempt at achieving a lasting, mutually acceptable agreement on Germany's future seemed an altogether futile undertaking. So long as the issue remained undecided, both the Russians and the Western allies could go on hoping that, with luck and skill, they might nevertheless somehow succeed in bringing Germany over to their side or, at the very least, in preventing the other side from incorporating Germany into its own sphere of influence. There was, after all, nothing particularly new in this East-West competition for Germany's allegiance or friendship. And although victory was to create a temporary power vacuum in the place of Germany's former might, it was also plain that even utter defeat and unconditional surrender could not for ever deprive Germany of its pivotal position in the European balance of power. Nothing the war-time allies might do could change the country's geographical location in the centre of Europe or destroy the numerical strength, the conspicuous efficiency and industriousness and the manifold, highly-developed skills of its population. If any of Germany's war-time enemies harboured serious illusions on that score, they did not do so for long.

In actual practice, the Western allies were rather slower than Russia was in gearing their policies in Germany to this long-term prospect, and in the immediate aftermath of the war they did little beyond reacting to Stalin's initiatives. Sooner or later, however, all the occupying powers

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came round to the view that their policies in and towards Germany ought to be based on the assumption that the country's human and material potential was bound to regain for it an important place among the European powers. Europe, to be sure, had lost its former position as the leading initiator in world affairs. But that did not diminish the importance of at least the larger and more advanced European nations as the actual or potential allies of the newly emerging super-powers. The power vacuum temporarily created in central Europe by Germany's defeat made it all the more tempting for the victors to try to create accomplished facts before Germany could once again assert its own will, and by pursuing its true or false national interests, limit its conquerors' freedom of action. It was this constellation, or its prospect, which induced the war-time allies, almost imperceptibly and, up to a point, against their own intentions and better convictions, gradually to recast Germany's role and to transform the German nation from a common enemy into a coveted prize, fought over by increasingly hostile rivals.

ALL this seems a good deal clearer in retrospect than it was towards the end of the war or in the immediate post-war years. But even then none of the powers which participated in the post-war occupation regime thought it compatible with their security and thus even remotely conceivable to abandon Germany to the other side. Nor did anyone at the time foresee or intend that the line separating the Western zones from the Soviet zone of occupation should harden into a quasi-permanent state frontier. Had that been the intention, the zonal border would almost certainly have been drawn on different and more durable lines with the long-term viability of the future two states in mind. Above all, Stalin in that case could not possibly have agreed to the four-power regime for Berlin which, to this day, presents East Germany and the USSR with an insoluble problem. In fact, while the western allies hoped that a de-nazified and regenerated Germany would at some future date once again take its place among the western democracies, Stalin appears to have thought it at least feasible that he might succeed in using the Soviet zone, and Berlin especially, as a base from which to organise the eventual incorporation of the whole of Germany into the Soviet orbit more or less simultaneously with the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe. Nothing else can plausibly explain why he agreed, without any obvious reluctance, to the choice of Berlin in the midst of the Soviet zone, rather than one of the zonal border towns, as the seat of the Allied Control Council. Berlin—his agreement implied—was to retain its position as Germany's capital, and it was precisely the presence of the western allies in Berlin which, Stalin must have calculated, would facilitate his attempt to extend Soviet influence to the western part of Germany.

It was not very long before all such hopes, or plans, had to be abandoned as wholly illusory. Neither side, it emerged, could be

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persuaded, tricked, or compelled to yield up to the other what it had liberated or conquered. The mutually exclusive Soviet and western designs for Germany's future were both frustrated at the line marking the limit reached by the writ and the physical power of their respective occupation forces—the line which divides the western from the communist half of Europe and which, almost incidentally, partitions Germany to this day only because neither side was strong or ingenious enough to absorb the whole of Germany without another war. The competition for Germany was not the basic cause of the East-West conflict, but it was in Germany and in connection with their German policies that the two sides first reached the stalemate which left them both profoundly dissatisfied and which obstructed the conflicting aspirations and security interests of both of them. It was this stalemate rather than any particular set of actions or reactions which produced what came subsequently to be known as the cold war, and it was the bitter sense of frustration it engendered which endowed the cold war with its peculiarly strong passions.

To take this view does not mean that there was, and is, nothing to choose between Western and Soviet policies in Germany. The Germans themselves have certainly left nobody in doubt about their own preference whenever and wherever they had a chance of making a choice. But no matter how strong one's own partisanship, the fact remains that Germany's partition along the now established line is, for different reasons, far more intolerable for the East Germans than for the West Germans, and far more unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union than to the Western powers. Even apart from the problem of the Berlin island, and even if East Germany should eventually succeed in lifting itself out of its perennial crises, the German Democratic Republic could never hope to match the much stronger, much more populous, and much more richly endowed Federal Republic. That is one crucial fact. Another is that the trauma caused by the war has remained far more active in Eastern Europe than in the West, and that it has been re-activated by certain policies of the Federal Republic, among which its refusal to recognise the Oder-Neisse line and the application of the Hallstein doctrine to the East European victims of Hitler's aggression play an outstanding part.

Failing an all-round East-West settlement, the USSR and its smaller allies in Eastern Europe are, for these and certain other reasons, likely to remain deeply apprehensive about West Germany's potential menace to their security. Their apprehensions are no less real for being inextricably mixed with an obvious urge to score propaganda points. There can be very little doubt that such apprehensions are a genuine motive inspiring the communist agitation against West Germany's access to nuclear weapons, just as they played a genuine part, despite all propagandist exaggerations and distortions, in the earlier communist agitation, in the late 1940s and early 1950s against West Germany's rearmament and inclusion in NATO. That remains true even though

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the creation of NATO and all that followed from it was itself largely a counter-move to the Soviet Union's own post-war expansion. Once the opening gambit has been executed, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish, with any degree of objectivity, between 'moves' and 'counter-moves'. The crux of the matter is precisely this, that, for a very long time now, every move conceived by one side as a defensive or preventive security measure has been invariably, and almost by necessity, seen by the other side as an act of potential aggression or expansion.

There is, however, this important difference, that, at least in the immediate post-war period, all the initiatives leading up to the cold war were taken by Stalin, while the western powers, at that early stage, confined themselves to *ad hoc* responses and improvised counter-measures. Stalin's initiatives were of course most marked in the systematic sovietisation of Eastern Europe, for which the western powers, despite vague war-time agreements about divided spheres of influence, had been, psychologically and politically, wholly unprepared. They were even less prepared for Russia's parallel, though more circumspect and eventually unsuccessful, bid to include Germany, too, in the Soviet orbit.

SOVIET preparations for this attempt had begun long before victory was assured. Ulbricht, Pieck, and a host of other German communists then living in Russia were enrolled in special training courses designed to equip them for the future leadership of their country under Soviet guidance. There were also parallel Soviet training courses for carefully selected captured *Wehrmacht* officers, many of whom subsequently occupied leading positions in East Germany. Even before the war had been formally brought to an end, a number of important German communists, Ulbricht among them, were sent back to their country. On 8 May 1945, the day on which the German surrender to Marshal Zhukov was signed in Berlin, they were ordered to organise local administrations in the German capital in which all the key posts, it is almost superfluous to add, were occupied by communists. Berlin was, by inter-allied agreement, supposed to be under four-power rule, and all decisions taken concerning Germany or the city of Berlin were supposed to be unanimous. But for nearly two months after the German surrender, the Soviet Command managed to delay the arrival of the western allies. When they were finally allowed to come they were, despite the unanimity rule, presented with a number of accomplished facts. There were not only the new communist-dominated local administrations of the capital but also new communist-dominated trade unions and four political parties which had been unilaterally licensed by the Russians and which, for purposes of easier guidance and control, had been made to cooperate in the so-called anti-fascist democratic bloc. Moreover, on the day after the German surrender, Stalin had publicly announced that the Soviet Union did not intend to dismember Germany.

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By then the Western allies, too, had come round to this point of view, but that did not alter the fact that Stalin's declaration was in direct conflict with the policy agreed on at Yalta and that he issued it unilaterally, without prior consultation with the western allies, in the evident hope of scoring a point with the Germans.

All this, together with certain subsequent moves such as the attempted fusion of the communist and social-democratic parties, faithfully followed the blueprint prepared for the post-war conquest of power throughout Eastern Europe. Clearly, in Germany the task was infinitely more difficult and complex than in countries where the Russians were in sole control, but the communists could but try. The anti-fascist bloc, though licensed only in Berlin and the Soviet zone, was evidently meant to be one of the main levers for the eventual conquest of power in the rest of the country. To make that goal more palatable, German communist propaganda at the time strenuously denied any wish to establish socialism or communism. Their sole purpose, they explained, was that of organising an anti-fascist bourgeois-democratic regime. They coupled this explanation, moreover, with incessant and impassioned pleas for national unity and for the establishment of inter-zonal, all-German parties and other institutions, and for the speedy establishment of an all-German government ' based on Berlin '.

Yet, while this campaign continued right up to the autumn of 1947, Soviet opportunities for unilateral action outside their own occupation zone became increasingly limited once the western allies had established themselves in Berlin. True, in matters concerning Berlin itself, the western allies continued right up to the spring of 1948 to make important one-sided concessions to the Russians and to accept a number of *faits accomplis* unfavourable to themselves. But they did not do so in connection with the wider issues affecting Germany as a whole or the overall relations between the occupying powers. Even in the affairs of Berlin there were certain significant exceptions to their acquiescence. The most important of these, as it later emerged, was the protection they gave to the Berlin social-democrats to organise, against Soviet and communist protests, a referendum among their members on the question of fusion with the communist party. In the Soviet zone itself fusion was simply imposed. But the Berlin social-democrats who were allowed to make up their own minds overwhelmingly opted for independence. Although it was hardly appreciated at the time outside Berlin, this vote in fact constituted the first important open setback for Stalin's German plans.

The second setback, which came soon afterwards, in May 1946, is significant in this context mainly because it dealt the first public jolt to inter-allied cooperation. Cooperation had, admittedly, all along been more apparent than real. From the very beginning almost all the meetings of the Allied Control Council had ended in deadlock, chiefly as a result of Soviet delaying tactics or their invariable refusal to make

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or implement any concrete proposals for practical inter-zonal cooperation. The most hotly contested issue in that early period, and indeed during the war-time allied conferences, was the reparations problem. It was agreed in principle that Germany would have to pay reparations and that Russia as the most severely devastated country should receive the lion's share; but the allies continued to disagree on how this principle was to be translated into practical measures. The Potsdam conference eventually decided that the four powers, after having left enough resources to the Germans to subsist without external assistance, should satisfy their reparation claims by separate removals from their individual zones of occupation, and that the USSR, in addition, should receive a certain amount of capital equipment from the western zones in exchange for the delivery of east zone food and raw materials to the western zones. The Soviet Union had never kept its side of the bargain and had failed to deliver its agreed share of food and raw materials to the western zones. The USA and Britain were, moreover, faced with an increasingly severe food crisis in Western Germany which, from 1946 onwards, compelled them to assist their occupation zones with subsidised food imports. It was this situation which led General Clay, in May 1946, to suspend until further notice all industrial reparations deliveries from the western zones to Russia.

The Russians were incensed by this move, and not only because it deprived them of hoped-for reparations. Until General Clay took and announced his decision, the innumerable conflicts between Russia and the West over problems concerning Germany had been largely hidden from the public under a cloak of formal cooperation. General Clay's measure constituted the first public intimation that the western powers would henceforth place their own separate interests above their desire for continued cooperation with the Soviet Union. So far as reparations were concerned, the Russians managed in any case to get far more out of Germany than the 10,000 million dollars worth of goods they had all along demanded. What they in fact extracted from the Soviet zone of occupation alone is estimated to fall not far short of 18,000 million dollars. Their determination to receive substantial compensation for their own fearful human and material war-time losses was of course understandable enough. But there can be little doubt that their wholesale dismantling and confiscations played a considerable part in alienating for ever the people they had hoped to win over and in frustrating their long-term aim of gaining ascendancy over the whole of Germany. As their ruthless dismantling policy prevented them, moreover, from implementing the inter-allied agreement on the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit, and as it coincided both with their obstructive and delaying tactics in the Allied Control Council and, outside Germany, with the progressive sovietisation which they enforced on the liberated countries of eastern Europe, some form of western counter-action was only a question of time.

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STALIN had probably hoped for more time. Only a much longer period of at least outward and formal inter-allied cooperation could have provided him with the opportunities he sought to extend German communist, and thereby Soviet, influence to the western zones of occupation. He may also have counted on a resurgence of American isolationism and a consequent American withdrawal from Europe. If so, he was soon to be disillusioned. Speaking in Stuttgart in September 1946, James Byrnes, then US Secretary of State, announced that the United States army of occupation would remain in Germany for an indefinite period. Shortly after this announcement the SED (as the East German communists called themselves after the merger) suffered a resounding defeat in the first and last free post-war election in the undivided city of Berlin. In a last minute attempt to reverse the trend indicated by these two events, Stalin made his one and only conciliatory gesture to the Germans. The wholesale dismantling of plants in the Soviet zone was suddenly stopped. A considerable number of enterprises previously confiscated by the Russians were handed back to the East Germans, while promises were given to reduce the amount of reparations from current production.

It was too little and too late. Neither the Germans nor the western allies were in the least impressed by this gesture. The western allies, in fact, had by that time become so suspicious of Soviet intentions that they were just as unwilling as Stalin was to make any further concessions. That emerged with exceptional clarity at the disastrous Moscow Foreign Ministers' conference in the spring of 1947, when even the hitherto observed conventions of formal cooperation suffered a visible breakdown. Whether or not the simultaneous proclamation of the Truman doctrine and the launching of the Marshall Plan soon afterwards were additional factors in persuading Stalin that he had nothing further to gain from a show of cooperation with the West, the fact remains that he evidently drew this conclusion and embarked on one of his abrupt policy turns. In the world at large this found its first pointed expression in the Soviet veto against Poland's and Czechoslovakia's participation in the Marshall Plan—a move which, not without justice, has been described as the first open declaration of the cold war. A little later in the year the new Soviet policy was formally launched when Zhdanov, at the foundation meeting of the Cominform, once again declared the world to be divided into two irreconcilably hostile camps and foreshadowed a new world-wide communist offensive.

In Germany the offensive began soon after the *coup* in Czechoslovakia, in the spring of 1948, when the Russians made their first moves leading up to the Berlin blockade. Their original plan to use the former German capital as a springboard for the conquest of all Germany had by then been written off as a total failure. They were, as it turned out, no more successful when, as a second best, they attempted to achieve at least undivided control of Berlin itself by starving its population into submission to Stalin and Ulbricht. Sustained by the western airlift, the people of Berlin defied the Soviet blockade for nearly

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eleven months. When the failure of the blockade had become indisputable and it was finally called off, in May 1949, the present division of Germany was for all practical purposes an accomplished fact. It was during the blockade that the SED finally split Berlin by setting up its separate East Berlin city government. It was also during the blockade that all the essential preparations for the foundation of the two separate German states were completed, with their formal proclamation following in quick succession in the autumn of 1949.

From that time onwards both Russian and Western policy in Germany concentrated almost exclusively on the task of re-creating the two separate parts of Germany in their own separate images and, as an almost automatic concomitant, on doing their utmost to discredit the German state attached to their opponent's camp. The western efforts in that direction met with no particular difficulties in view of the Federal Republic's spectacular recovery and the glaring contrast between its own increasing well-being and the dismal political and economic conditions in Ulbricht's German Democratic Republic. The Soviet bid, on the other hand, to consolidate communist rule in the German Democratic Republic proved an infinitely harder task than any parallel attempt elsewhere in the Soviet orbit. As the leader of a Stalinist regime, Ulbricht may not have been less capable, and he certainly was not less ruthless, than his counterparts elsewhere, but he had to contend with very exceptional difficulties which to this day have not been resolved. Not only had Soviet reparations policies turned the GDR into an economic wasteland, but, in contrast to all other European countries under communist rule, the German Democratic Republic could not even pretend to lay claim to any kind of national continuity or, indeed, anything that might be called nationhood. The people subjected to the Ulbricht regime were thus compelled not only to suffer hardship and terror, but in addition to forgo their national identity. From 1952, when Ulbricht formally opted for final separatism by proclaiming 'the construction of socialism' in conditions of intensified class war, even the declared desire for reunification (or, as it was officially phrased, reunification at any price) was denounced and punished as a cardinal deviation.

GIVEN these circumstances, it was almost impossible to decide what the people in the Soviet zone wanted most—tolerable living conditions, basic liberties (including the opportunity to vote the hated regime out of power), or reunification. In any case, when the explosion came with the East German workers' rebellion of June 1953, it quickly emerged from the spontaneously improvised slogans and demands that in the minds of the GDR population all three issues were so closely interlinked that they could no longer be kept apart. The protests against a further increase in working norms, which had sparked off the rebellion, widened in no time into a clamour for radical changes in every other field, changes which, if brought about, would have resulted not only in

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the overthrow of the Ulbricht regime, but in the immediate liquidation of any kind of separate East German state. When this anti-Stalinist rebellion broke out, Stalin had been dead for more than three months. Very shortly after his death his successors had requested the Ulbricht regime to moderate its patently dangerous ruthlessness and to give the GDR population a more tolerable deal in the form of the so-called 'new course'. By the time this request was heeded, it was already too late. Yet, as the new men in the Kremlin were to demonstrate by their repression of the uprising with Soviet troops and Soviet tanks, they were as little prepared as Stalin had been to relinquish their hold on the GDR.

In retrospect, their intervention in 1953 seems no more than one in a long series of Soviet policy moves both during and after the Stalin period which, seen as a whole, present a picture of remarkable continuity and consistency. Whatever else may have changed during the past two decades, Soviet attitudes to the German problem seem today in all essentials the same as in 1953 or 1948–49, when the division of the country was first accomplished. By and large, this is of course also true of western attitudes. The result as well as the symbol of this parallel *immobilisme* has been the perpetuation of the Berlin problem and the intermittent eruption of more or less serious crises over Berlin. It ought to be stressed that the Berlin problem, contrary to frequently made claims, has been a far more serious one for the communist world than for the West. From the Soviet point of view, Khrushchev, admittedly, succeeded in solving at least one aspect of the Berlin problem, with which even Stalin had been unable to cope, when he effectively stopped all further mass flights of GDR citizens to the West by empowering Ulbricht to build his monstrous Berlin wall. But while this move may have played an important part in saving the GDR from collapse by depopulation, it contributed nothing to the achievement of the equally or perhaps even more important Soviet objective of dislodging the western allies from Berlin and cutting the lines of communication between the city and the Federal Republic. Nor does it seem likely, in view of the western stand during the Berlin blockade of 1948–49 and the series of Berlin crises which Khrushchev manufactured from 1958 onwards, that Moscow can still feel confident that it may yet achieve this objective without serious risk of war.

From the western, including the West German, point of view there is of course no particular reason why the present state of affairs should not continue. They may deplore it, but it does not present them with insoluble problems. But the Russians, not to speak of the GDR itself, can hardly be expected to look at it in the same light. They may perhaps get over the fact (though even that presumably still rankles) that Berlin is the only place in the world which their armies conquered and occupied but which they nevertheless never succeeded in bringing under their control. It is rather more difficult for them to resign themselves to the fact that the events of the past two decades have, as they must see it, neatly reversed the role which Berlin, according to Stalin's original

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design, was supposed to play. Instead of serving as a Soviet bridgehead from which to reach out for all Germany, Berlin, or rather the West Berlin enclave, is, in their eyes, an intrusive western outpost within the very confines of the area covered by the Warsaw Pact, an alien, hostile body with which they dare not interfere and which yet inevitably tempts them to do so. West Germany's increasing wealth and growing power and prestige have aggravated this problem even further for them, and what applies to the Soviet Union applies, in this context, with still greater force to the GDR. Yet, while this state of affairs is, to varying degrees, unsatisfactory for everyone directly or indirectly concerned, it seems next to impossible to visualise a revision that would not make matters even worse from either the western or the communist point of view. All the different solutions which have been proposed, officially or otherwise, as a means of bringing about German reunification and of ending the anomalous position of the Berlin island have proved unacceptable, and were bound to prove unacceptable, because they would have upset the now established balance of power in Europe in favour of either the one or the other side. True, there are far more perilous world issues right now than those concerning Germany or Europe generally, but that only makes it all the more important to avoid actions which, in addition to all other world conflicts, could lead to new critical confrontations in Europe. It certainly cannot be excluded that surviving Russian and East German grievances over Berlin will induce them to provoke fresh international clashes over this issue. But there seems to be at least a very good chance that they—like the western powers—will be even more careful in the future than they have been in the past to prevent such crises from developing too far or getting altogether out of control, if only because both the principal powers concerned, Moscow as well as Washington, are already faced with more than enough problems in other parts of the world.

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THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA

Hugh Seton-Watson

SOVIET foreign policy from 1917 onwards had two distinct objects, the promotion of communist revolution and the defence of the interests of the territorial state which was heir to the Russian Empire. Sometimes these objects could be reconciled, at other times (for instance, in Germany in 1923 and in China in 1927) they were in conflict. In the mid-1930s a determined attempt was made to fuse them into a single purpose. It was simply asserted, with the support of dogmatic pronouncements for foreign consumption and of the MVD within the Soviet borders, that the cause of the world revolution *was* whatever the Soviet government said it was. The eternal and immanent interests of the working class of the world—and by extension, of the yet unborn workers in agrarian nations which did not yet possess a working class—were served by whatever the one 'teacher of genius of all progressive humanity' did or planned. This fusion worked fairly well for a decade or so. It began to come unstuck when Yugoslavia was excommunicated and when the communist regime in China made itself felt in the world. In the mid-1960s little is left of it.

In pursuit of their aims the makers of Soviet policy have made use of military force, diplomacy, economic pressure, and different forms of revolutionary subversion, varying the admixture according to the target and the international balance of power. Sometimes the most convenient tactic has been to cooperate with 'capitalist' governments, supporting them, in Lenin's felicitous phrase, as the rope supports the hanged man. At other times it has seemed better to put up the barricades, consolidate the home base, and hurl threats and insults at the outer world. In the last ten years of his reign, Stalin tried both these methods. The wartime coalition allowed him to cajole, deceive, or frighten his allies into accepting his conquest of a hundred million Europeans, not to mention a few useful islands in the North Pacific. But he had to retreat from Persian Azerbaidjan, Berlin resisted him, and neither threats nor intrigues could destroy Tito. So for his last years he confined himself to terror at home and within his Empire, and obstruction and passive hatred towards those he could not rule. A few months before his death he appeared to be changing his tactic again. In his *Economic Problems of Socialism* he asserted that the most dangerous conflicts on the international scene were not between the 'socialist camp' and 'the imperialists' but among the latter. This was essentially a directive to all communist governments and parties to do their best to aggravate the tensions between France and Germany, Japan and America, Britain and her allies.

Stalin's death was followed by a period of transition, in which the main concern of the Soviet leaders was with the struggle for succession,

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but in which problems of foreign policy inevitably occurred. The 'Age of Khrushchev' is a reasonable description of the period of just less than a decade between his overthrow of Malenkov and his own downfall. During this decade the situation of the Soviet Union in the world was changed out of recognition, even if the basic aims of its leaders remained much the same. Khrushchev himself introduced something of his personality into the conduct of foreign affairs. Ebullient, inquisitive, jovial, and arrogant, he was a very different figure from the master he had served so many years with such servility and, it now appeared, with such suppressed rancour. Both Stalin and Khrushchev had risen to power through the party Secretariat, but whereas Stalin treated the party with cynical contempt, Khrushchev appeared to retain a certain sincere ideological fundamentalism. Both in his dealings with East European communists and in his support of 'national liberation movements' he seemed to show a certain generosity quite alien to Stalin. In so far as this element of idealism caused him to venture into parts of the world which Stalin had left alone, and to challenge established conventions of international power, it made Soviet policy more dangerous.

Far too little is known of the inner processes of Soviet politics to enable us to estimate Khrushchev's personal role. But the main events of the last ten years are on record, and it is at least possible to compare the situation of the Soviet Union at Khrushchev's accession and at his downfall. This brief survey can be conveniently divided into four main areas—Eastern Europe, the third world, China, and the West.

THE summer of 1953 opened with the riots in Plzen in Czechoslovakia and the much more serious rising in East Berlin and other cities of the Soviet Zone of Germany. Those events contributed to the fall of Beria, but whether the former police chief had plans for a deal with the West on Germany remains uncertain. Defeat of the insurrections did not, however, lead to a uniform policy of repression in Eastern Europe. A 'New Course' of economic concessions and milder government was introduced in Hungary under Imre Nagy, from whose subsequently published Memorandum we know that he had the approval of Khrushchev as well as of Malenkov. In February 1955 the 'resignation' of Malenkov was exploited by Rakosi to remove Nagy from the Premiership, but Khrushchev did not allow a return to Stalinist methods. In June he made his pilgrimage to Belgrade and signed a statement which spoke of 'different roads to socialism'. Then came the 20th Congress of the CPSU, followed by the publication abroad of Khrushchev's 'secret speech'. Events followed rapidly: the Poznan insurrection in June 1956, the removal of Rakosi in July, growing agitation by intellectuals and workers in Poland and Hungary, a polarisation of the internal conflicts in the Polish and Hungarian parties around the personalities of Gomulka and Nagy, and the Polish crisis and Hungarian Revolution in October.

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At the end of 1956 it could be argued that the new Soviet policies on Eastern Europe had brought political defeat to the Soviet Union. However, Khrushchev was able, through his control of the central and provincial apparatus of the CPSU, to maintain his position, and his decision to back Gomulka soon brought its rewards. The liberties won by the Polish people in October were gradually worn away, and Polish foreign policy remained firmly linked to that of the Soviet Union. On balance the Polish people, and especially the peasants, gained from the change of leadership, but Soviet interests were not damaged. For several years Soviet authority seemed to be fully restored in Eastern Europe as a whole, and to be exercised more humanely. A new stage, however, appeared from about 1961 onwards, when the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute began to be felt. The Soviet government now needed the support of the East European governments and parties in its quarrel with China. It could no longer command their loyalty: it had to pay a price. This was most strikingly shown by the Rumanian government, which brilliantly achieved a position of independence within the 'socialist camp' (maintaining correct relations with China, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the orthodox People's Democracies, at the cost of a marked though not yet a dangerous deterioration of its relations with the Soviet Union), while also improving its cultural and economic contacts with the West.

Looking back over ten years, one can see a steady pressure of national feeling, which has not only pressed on the communist parties from outside but has also penetrated them from within. The Soviet government has not been able to prevent this process, and indeed has almost stopped resisting it. Sometimes it has been compatible with Soviet interests, sometimes not, Poland and Rumania provide opposite extremes.

The Polish government continues to devote great efforts to canalising Polish nationalism in an anti-German direction. It is helped by the refusal or inability of the German Federal Republic to accept the Oder-Neisse frontier. The Polish government needs an unrecognised frontier, and an ever-present German bogey, in order at least to minimise the unpopularity which its illiberal policies have earned it among its subjects. It has nothing to gain from acceptance of the frontier in Bonn: it is the Bonn government itself which would gain from such an action. If the German bogey in Poland could be reduced to realistic proportions—to the simple truth that Germany will remain one of a number of potential dangers to Poland, instead of the myth that Germans are by some irremovable innate and hereditary characteristics a nation whose aggressive nature is different in kind from the nature of other nations—then the main basis of public consent to the policies of the Gomulka regime would be removed. The argument that complete solidarity in all matters with the Soviet Union is the only means of defending Poland against this danger would fall to the ground. In its place, there is every reason to expect that Polish desire to recover Lwow, Vilna, and

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the eastern provinces would revive. This the Soviet government does not wish to happen, and so is understandably pleased with Gomulka—and with the policy of Bonn.

In Rumania, by contrast, national feeling is directed not against the Germans, or against any nation allied to the West, but against Hungarians and Russians. The Soviet government has no interest in Hungarian-Rumanian hostility, or in persecution of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania by the Rumanians. Still more unwelcome is Rumanian hostility to Russian culture, and the reviving Rumanian interest in Bessarabia, which is now even publicly discussed. The Rumanian achievement is perhaps the most striking of all the changes in Eastern Europe since Stalin died. The industrial progress and the national mood of self-reliance are impressive.

It should be noted that of all the East European states, Rumania has the most unfavourable geographical position, closest to the Soviet Union and most isolated from the rest of the world. If Rumania can get away with its independence, others can do the same. The future of Czechoslovakia, in which the position of the Stalinist apparatchik Novotny appears precarious, is quite unpredictable. And after ten years of retreat, it does not look as if there is much the Soviet government can do to stop the East European states from going each its own way, provided that ideological defiance and acts of violence are avoided.

STALIN neglected the 'third world'. It would be more correct to say that he did not admit that there was a third world. The independence of India, Burma, and Indonesia was fictitious, and Nehru, Nu, and Soekarno were mere puppets of 'the imperialists'. This was official Soviet doctrine, and the teacher of genius no doubt believed it: it also gave him a good justification for a passive policy which suited his cautious temperament. It was the Chinese communists who first broke away from this dogma. They found the Indian government's political attitudes exploitable during the Korean War, and their cultivation of the neutrals reached its climax with Chou En-lai's personal triumph at Bandung in April 1955. It was only at the end of 1955 that the Soviet policy changed, and for this it would seem that Khrushchev was personally responsible. His visit, with Bulganin, to India and Burma was a political victory, and had been preceded by the arms loans to Egypt. Next year came the Port Said expedition, which enabled the Soviet government to posture as the saviour of the Arab world. 1957 was also a good year for the Soviet Union in the Middle East; penetration of Syria went well, and the Soviet government posed as that country's saviour from a Turkish attack planned by the American imperialists. The formation of the United Arab Republic was, however, a setback for the Syrian communists, and the uncertainties of the Arab scene in 1958 caused Khrushchev to take a moderate attitude at the time of the crises in Iraq and Lebanon. During 1959 the Soviet interest in Asia brought more embarrassment than profit as the conflict between

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India and China about Tibet became acute. In 1960 the Congo provided new opportunities of revolution-mongering, but Moscow did not play its hand very successfully. Much more promising was Cuba, but in 1962 the danger proved greater than the advantage.

Undoubtedly there is a Soviet 'presence' in the southern half of the world in 1965 which did not exist in Stalin's time. Cuba has a communist government. The Soviet government has a strong position in Egypt, Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville, even if it has to compete in all of them with Chinese influence. Prospects for communist successes exist in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and the Sudan, but they are problematic. Moreover, there are a number of dangers, arising from the new Soviet presence, which must be set against the gains made since Stalin died.

The first is that the revolutionary forces in the southern continents are uncontrollable. Castro has his own ideas about the leadership of future Latin American liberation movements. Egypt and Ghana have gone into the international revolution-mongering business on their own account. Algeria did the same while Ben Bella was in power: if the Algerians are now more quiet, other centres of autonomous revolution-mongering may well appear. All this not only gives opportunities to the Chinese, but involves dangers of escalation which must alarm the Soviet leaders.

The second type of danger comes from situations in which racial conflicts arise between indigenous communities. The successes of the Soviet Union in Asia and Africa in the last ten years have been mainly due not to diplomatic skill or profound political insight, but to the mistakes of the colonial Powers and the United States, and to Soviet denunciations of 'colonialism'. The essence of Soviet policy has been to maximise race hatred all over the world. Now, when the racial conflict was between the people of a colony and a ruling group the vast majority of whose nation lived in a country far away, this was a straightforward matter. But even South Africa is more complicated than that. Already there is a clear difference between policies of black racialism and of multi-racial social revolution: the official South African communists, with Soviet approval, advocate the second. Soviet policies for South Africa are likely to conflict with those of Pan-African movements directed by governments in West or East Africa, which may receive Chinese support. The situation is even less promising in countries where the racial conflict is between communities which are not white. Here a choice has to be made, and denunciations of American imperialism do not get one very far. One such area is the south-east tip of Asia and the adjacent archipelago. Here the Chinese civilisation meets the utterly different Malay world which stretches from Malaya through Indonesia to the Philippines. They are in closest contact in Malaya, but also in smaller numbers elsewhere. Until recently the main force of Malay expansionism has been the government of Soekarno, whose armed forces have been equipped by the Soviet Union, while the Indonesian Communist party (inclined towards China), is now becoming fully aware

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of the hostility of the Javanese masses to the Chinese in their midst. The basic conflict between the forces backed by the Soviet Union and by China was dramatically revealed by the abortive insurrection of 30 September 1965. Another area of racial complexity is the Caribbean. From Virginia round to Pernambuco, with some gaps in Central America, is a zone of Negro settlement, and the islands have a still stronger Negro element. Intermingled with them are people of European, Amerindian, *mestizo*, and East Indian stock. The difficulties which face the Soviet Union and communist parties in this area are well illustrated by British Guiana, where the political party which is influenced by communism is supported by East Indians, with the Negroes in opposition to it. To encourage an anti-Negro group in an area where Negro discontents offer some of the best revolutionary potential in the world, makes little sense, yet it is also difficult to renounce a weapon that is ready to hand. Here again, anti-imperialist incantations are no answer to the problem.

The third danger, less visible today yet in the long term perhaps the most deadly, is the effect of anti-imperialist propaganda, and of the proliferation of new states, within the Soviet Empire. It hardly seems conceivable that the Uzbeks or Georgians will not one day point out that they have no less right to self-determination than the Upper Voltese or Somalis. The Soviet government for at least forty years has been busily producing Central Asian and Caucasian intelligentsias. In all other colonial empires the intelligentsias, the main beneficiaries of such modernisation as colonialism has achieved, have become the leaders of movements for national independence. The totalitarian system of Soviet government prevents the formation of hostile political movements. But national feeling finds ways of preserving and expressing itself, and when the pressures are relaxed it increases. It is at least possible that the official institutions of the Central Asian republics will in time be used by Central Asians for their purposes. These men are not fools, and they are better informed than they used to be. They have before them the examples not only of Egypt and Algeria but of Yugoslavia and Rumania. It is inconceivable that the Soviet leaders are not aware of this danger, which is bound to be increased by their own anti-colonialist propaganda, by the actions of the East European states, and perhaps above all by the proximity to Central Asia of China. They must see the danger approaching; they can manoeuvre and bribe and threaten and postpone, but time is not on their side.

DURING the last ten years the Soviet Union has had two confrontations with the United States, the first protracted and inconclusive in Berlin from 1959 to 1961, the second short and sharp in Cuba in 1962. It is possible that there may be another in Vietnam, but it is fairly clear that both sides wish to avoid this. It cannot be said that in the ten years the Soviet Union improved its relative position. It is true that it made great progress in nuclear weapons and missiles, but

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the United States did not lag in these fields. It is true that there have been frequent divisions within the Western Alliance, which owed little to Soviet action but which the Soviet leaders were able to some extent to exploit. However, not even the mood of appeasement in Britain in 1959–60, the grandiose ideas of President de Gaulle, or the extravagant suspicions of American policy which have appeared from time to time in Bonn since the death of John Foster Dulles, have dangerously weakened the bonds of interest between the United States and Western Europe.

If the Soviet Union has not made significant progress in its challenge to the power of the United States, it has suffered a major set-back in its relations with China. The origins of this conflict are still largely obscure. Too many factors are unknown which must nevertheless have played a part. It is clear that there was marked personal friction and disagreement on tactics between the Chinese and Soviet communist leaders from the 1920s onwards, that Soviet economic aid to China after 1949 was on a small scale, and that the Chinese in the 1950s resented the refusal of the Soviet government to provide them with nuclear weapons, but on all three of these important problems we have only scraps of knowledge. It also seems likely that Khrushchev resented the encouragement given by the Chinese to the resistance of the Polish communists to Moscow in 1956, though he may later have been glad of Chinese support at the time of the Hungarian Revolution. During 1957 Sino-Soviet relations appear to have improved: the consolidation of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, the launching of the first sputnik and the disillusionment of the Chinese leaders after the 'hundred flowers' episode, brought the two parties closer together, and the Moscow Declaration of the twelve ruling parties in November 1957 probably marked the climax of their rapprochement. Less than a year later relations were once more tense. In the crisis arising from events in Iraq and Lebanon, Khrushchev proposed a summit meeting which was to include India but not China.[1] In the subsequent crisis caused by Chinese bombardment of the off-shore islands in August and September 1958, the Soviet Union gave the Chinese no support. It seems likely that this marked a turning-point. It is possible that the Chinese believed that they had been given precise grounds to expect Soviet help in their attempts to reconquer Formosa: whether this was a misunderstanding, or a real failure of the Soviet government to fulfil its obligations, there can be no doubt that it created great bitterness in Peking. The off-shore islands crisis coincided with the campaign in China for the creation of Communes, which was at first accompanied by extravagant claims about the impending achievement of full communism in China; these must have been intended as a provocation to the Soviet party, and were so interpreted in Moscow.

[1] Khrushchev's first proposal involved a meeting at the United Nations, of which China is not a member, but a few days later he modified it.

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It seems likely that, when more evidence is available, 1958 will be seen as the crucial year, and it may well appear that a narrow-minded inability by Khrushchev to understand Chinese attitudes played an important part. From 1959 onwards the conflict has been increasingly open. The Chinese showed their disapproval of Soviet aid to Egypt and Iraq, and the Soviet government deliberately refrained from supporting the Chinese point of view in the first Indian-Chinese crisis brought about by the Chinese suppression of the Dalai Lama's regime in Tibet. The disgrace of Marshal Peng Teh-huai in the summer was a defeat for Soviet influence in China. In April 1960 came the polemical article *Long Live Leninism*, and neither the meeting in Bucarest in June nor that in Moscow in November and December could reconcile the antagonists. During 1961 and most of 1962 the conflict took the thinly concealed form of Albanian attacks on the Soviet party and Chinese attacks on Yugoslavia. Direct mutual denunciation by the Soviet and Chinese parties began at the end of 1962. The development of the quarrel since that time is so well known that there is no need to say more of it here.

At the end of Khrushchev's period of government China was not only not a friendly Power, but was virtually an enemy. The profound hostility between the two regimes was more important than any of the individual political, economic, strategic, or ideological disagreements that had caused it, or than the personal dislikes which had made it more bitter on both sides. Neither the solution of the individual problems nor the removal of leading personalities was likely to be able to end the hostility. Essentially, ideological fanaticism had become fused with grave conflicts of state interests, including such enormous problems as the relations of both the Soviet Union and China with India, Japan, and the United States, and the claims of China to reassert her authority over Mongolia, the maritime provinces of the Soviet Far East, and perhaps also parts of Soviet Central Asia.

BOTH the Soviet Union and the outside world in 1965 are different from those of 1952. Economic realities and intellectual ferment have put the party bureaucracy on the defensive. It is, however, a dangerous error to confuse trends, however powerful, with their possible ultimate results, to think as if the future is already here today. There is a process of *embourgeoisement* at work in Soviet society: it has already affected managers and officials, and is penetrating the party machine. Nevertheless the *apparatchiki* of the CPSU are not mere Russian-speaking versions of American business executives. Marxism-Leninism is still expounded as the complete and final truth in press and meeting, factory and class-room, and no challenge to its doctrine is permitted. The view of international politics publicly expressed in the Soviet Union remains a querulously aggressive mixture of quasi-Victorian self-righteous Russian imperialist cant with sentimental revolution-mongering fundamentalism. This view of course does not

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fit the realities of the world of 1965. The Soviet Empire has not gained strength relative to the United States, and unity of the 'socialist camp' is no more than a memory. The fact that both the monster Powers recognise the deadly facts of the nuclear balance of terror is an undoubted gain in realism as compared with the last years of Stalin. Against this must be set the vast upsurge of race hatred, on an international scale, in the last ten years. It is a dangerous world, in which not only is any small nation at the mercy of a larger, but the monster Powers often appear to be at the mercy of a few racialist demagogues in any new state racked by tribal violence. The real needs of the human race—to take Khrushchev's much-used phrase, 'Life itself'—call for common action by the monster Powers to remove these dangers. Yet cooperation is still inhibited by ideological obscurantism. It is clear that it is not only on one side of the 'Iron Curtain' that the next years will bring a long series of agonising reappraisals.

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Published at 13/6 by Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Annual Subscription 45/-

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CHINA AND THE COLD WAR

John Gittings

IT is widely believed that the responsibility for China's present isolation in world affairs should be placed squarely on the shoulders of the communist government in Peking. The combination of traditional Chinese isolationism, it is argued, with rigid Marxist-Leninist dogma, has erected a formidable barrier to communication which no reasonable action of ours could have possibly affected. This is held to be true even of those early months of 1950 when the West was prepared to suspend judgment on the new China. As Mr Guy Wint has put it, even at that early stage, China 'far from offering a dialogue with the outer world, conducted a hysterical monologue against it', until the United States 'was goaded into inflexibility by the insults from Peking and the apparent madness of everything that came out of China'.[1]

The corollary to this argument is very relevant today; namely, that it is still pointless to attempt to improve relations with China unless or until it changes its policies ('renounces the use of force') or its leadership (to be replaced by a somewhat nebulous 'second generation'). It is also an argument which conveniently absolves the West from any blame for the present state of affairs.

There are of course many people who do criticise the West's China policy, but their criticism is often qualified by what A. J. Liebling once described as the '*ademonai, kodemonai*' argument. *Ademonai* (Japanese for 'on the one hand'), America should have recognised China back in 1950—it is even claimed rather unconvincingly that it was about to—but on the other hand (*kodemonai*), China deliberately thwarted America's good intentions by intervening in the Korean War. Of course (*ademonai*), China should be admitted to the United Nations, but (*kodemonai*) it is quite impossible so long as it rejects a 'two Chinas' solution.

This kind of reasoning, advanced more in sorrow than in anger by those who genuinely look forward to the day when China will take its rightful place in the family of nations, but who are at a loss as to how this can be achieved, is often accompanied by a real bewilderment that China should so frequently appear to act against its own best interests. This might be called the '*num*' argument. Surely (*num*) the Chinese leadership should have realised that by allying itself to the Soviet Union in 1950 it was tying itself in an economic and political strait-jacket. (The same question has been stood on its head in recent years. Surely China should have realised that it was economically disastrous to part company so abruptly in 1959–60 with its Soviet ally.) How can China have failed to realise that the Sino-Indian border war

[1] *Communist China's Crusade* (London, 1965), p. 70.

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of 1962 would alienate potential well-wishers all over the world? Why should it impose conditions on its entry into the United Nations when it is at last in sight?

Admittedly the signals emanating from Peking have not always been easy to interpret. As James Reston wrote recently in the *New York Times* (2–3 October 1965),

> China seems to be trying something new in the field of diplomacy. What she does is the opposite of what she says. What she fears she brings about. What she desires she blocks. It is all a little odd.

But there is something wrong about arguments which either deny a Western share in responsibility for the present situation, or regard Chinese foreign policy as in some way inexplicable or 'odd'. If it seems all China's fault, then perhaps we are too insensitive to the effect of our own actions. If it seems inexplicable, then we have obviously not tried hard enough to understand.

I intend to examine three fundamental themes in Chinese foreign policy as it has developed since the founding of the People's Republic. All three have become permanent features of Peking's outlook on the world, and there is no prospect of their modification in the foreseeable future. The West will therefore have to come to terms with them.

Rejection of Bipolarity

The first salient feature of Chinese foreign policy, which the Sino-Soviet dispute has thrown sharply into relief in recent years, is China's rejection of a bipolar approach to international relations by the Soviet Union and the United States. This is an area where China's foreign policy has apparently shifted most over the last fifteen years, from the decision in 1949 to 'lean to one side' (that of the Soviet Union), and the belief that no third road was open to China, to the rejection of the Soviet side and the pursuit of a uniquely Chinese road. I suspect, however, that even in 1949 China allied itself with the Soviet Union more for reasons of expediency than out of any conviction that the alliance would prove durable. This is not to under-estimate the strength of the communist leadership's ideological attachment to the cause of proletarian internationalism, but this must be balanced against the increasing evidence of anti-Soviet prejudice at that time even in the ranks of the central committee of the CCP. In 1949, China needed a 'reliable ally', to use Liu Shao-ch'i's phrase. At the height of the cold war, it would have been inconceivable for China to sit on the fence or to open its territory to the rivalries of both super-powers. Reliability rather than quantity of economic aid was again the main requirement stressed by the communist leaders for the reconstruction of their economy. Furthermore, at a time when China would be acutely vulnerable to military pressure from either super-power, alliance with one was essential in order to deter the other.

The possibility of an alliance, or even an informal understanding,

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with the United States was foreclosed not only by the Chinese leaders' ideological stand but by recent history. While it is true that Russia's behaviour towards China had been as 'imperialist' as that of America and Britain in the past, it took place for the most part in peripheral areas—Manchuria, Mongolia, and the north-west—of which China's political elite had little direct experience. By contrast, the tangible evidence of Western imperialism was to be seen in the gunboats on the Yangtze, in the clubs on the Bund, and particularly in the areas of commerce and utilities, with which Mao and his colleagues had in their youth come into daily contact. Much of the inspiration behind the nationalist revolution of the 1920s had come from the Soviet Union; the object of nationalist struggle during the same period was the non-Soviet Western presence in China. American aid to the Nationalists during the civil war, while never sufficient to prevent their defeat, was more than enough to confirm communist suspicions, especially when contrasted with the 'hands-off' policy of the Soviet Union.

It is a sign of the blinkers which the cold war had imposed upon responsible opinion in the West in the early 50s that China's alliance with the Soviet Union should have been greeted with such widespread dismay. To most people in the West, alliance with Stalin meant subservience. As the *New York Times* commented editorially (18 August 1952):

> If Mao Tse-tung doesn't know what the Kremlin is doing, he is not wise enough to lead a nation. If he does know, and connives at it, he is not honourable enough to deserve the respect of his innocent followers.

The analogy with the so-called 'satellite' countries of eastern Europe was wide of the mark. The communist revolution in China had succeeded without the backing of the Red Army; Mao himself, unlike his predecessors, had gained his party's leadership without any endorsement from the Comintern in Moscow. China's geographical size and potential influence gave it rather more bargaining power with the Soviet Union than the 'satellites' enjoyed, although this was for the time being severely limited by the state of economic chaos to which it had been reduced by so many years of internal war. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, was in fact concluded on 14 February 1950 after two and a half months of hard bargaining, and there are indications that the Chinese leaders had hoped for better terms than they secured, especially in economic aid, where they had to be content with a modest credit of US $300 million spread over five years.

Recent Chinese accounts trace the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute to 1956, the year of the 20th CPSU congress and of Khrushchev's destalinisation. The same year is taken in most Western analyses as the starting point of the dispute. The story of Sino-Soviet relations between 1950 and 1956 is still virtually a *tabula rasa*, and much work has yet to be done on the subject. It can however be said with confidence that China's relationship with the Soviet Union in those years was

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neither the honeymoon idyll as portrayed by Chinese propaganda, nor a period of Soviet domination as alleged in official American propaganda. A number of areas of tension in the alliance can already be identified; others would doubtless be revealed through the sort of close textual analysis which has been so successfully applied to the more recent period of Sino-Soviet relations. In two major areas of tension—economic aid and the question of Soviet privileges in Manchuria and Sinkiang—there was a marked improvement in 1954, after the death of Stalin. The Korean War was another bone of contention; first because China was not apparently privy to the decisions which led to its outbreak; second because Soviet military aid was grudgingly provided and insufficient in the first year of the war; and third over the bringing of the war to an end, which Stalin appears to have obstructed against Chinese wishes. Additional sources of disagreement included China's belief in the uniqueness of its revolutionary model and its application elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, Soviet tactics in the United Nations, which seemed at times to be designed more to keep China out than to secure its admission, and perhaps Soviet collusion in the Kao-Jao 'anti-party' plot of 1953.

Would the Sino-Soviet alliance have lasted as long as it did without the stimulus of international bipolarisation which the cold war provided? The answer is probably yes. The Soviet Union's relationship to China was one of teacher-pupil, with all the emotional overtones usually associated with it. For a certain limited time, the teacher has something useful to teach, and the pupil responds with an eagerness approaching hero-worship—the 'learn from the Soviet Union' euphoria which Mao personally inspired. There comes a time when the teacher outlives his usefulness. For China, this was when it became apparent that the conventional Soviet economic model was totally inadequate to bring it to the take-off point for rapid economic expansion, and that Khrushchev's alliance obligations to China would be sacrificed in the interests of greater Soviet-American understanding. This is when the hate component of the classic love-hate relationship between teacher and pupil becomes dominant, and the teacher himself begins to envy his pupil's precocious achievements. The cold war did not delay this process of disenchantment so much as intensify the relationship while it lasted, so that the eventual break-up was all the more extreme.

For those in the West who are accustomed to look at international relations entirely in terms of the European cold war, regarding events outside Europe simply as extensions of the Soviet-American equation, China's decision to operate independently of and in opposition to both the two super-powers at one and the same time appears as an act of supreme folly or arrogance. However, from China's point of view, the rejection of bipolarisation is an essential step in its maturation towards national independence. In this it is not alone. Its experience is common to the vast majority of the newly-emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It can even be seen in a modified version among the

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traditional cold-war European allies of the two super-powers. This historical process of disentanglement from the European cold war is generally taken for granted among smaller nations. It is only because China is so much larger, and therefore more able to challenge the supremacy of Russia and America, that its quest for a separate identity is viewed with such alarm, as much in Moscow as in Washington.

The force of Nationalism

This brings us to the second combustible element which stokes the furnace of China's dynamic foreign policy—nationalism. The 1949 revolution was the culminating wave in the flood of nationalism which had swept over China for the past half-century. The fact that it was inspired by a communist philosophy does not detract from its essentially nationalistic nature any more than the totalitarian nature of Chiang Kai-shek's philosophy conflicted with the pronounced nationalism of the KMT government. The belief that communism and nationalism are incompatible or necessarily at loggerheads—a belief that was not shared by scholars or sober observers of the scene—stems from the early years of the cold war when a communist country like China was regarded as little more than a 'tool of Soviet imperialism'—to use Mr Acheson's phrase. In China's case, communism is manifestly not an alien ideology imposed from outside; indeed there is a close organic relationship between it and the political traditions of the society for which it caters.

The evidence of the pursuit of national interests in China's foreign policy is sufficiently obvious not to need elaboration. The point I wish to make here is that the emotive flavour of nationalism has been and still is exceptionally strong. It is a sort of giant-size chip on the shoulder which encapsulates a hundred years of humiliation and frustration at the hands of the Western powers. It was to be seen in the first flush of victory in 1949, when China, as Mao put it, had finally 'stood up' after years of being 'insulted' and of being thought of as 'uncultured'. Although deference to the Soviet Union was at that time tactically wise, the new leadership did not scruple to advocate 'the way of Mao Tse-tung' as a unique solution to the battle against imperialism, nor to insist that while Mao's brand of Marxism-Leninism coincided with that of Stalin, it had been arrived at 'independently' and 'creatively'. Many of the recent Chinese polemics in the Sino-Soviet dispute are characterised by the same prickly sense of national identity and of resentment at the insults and outrages—real or imagined—that Khrushchev inflicted upon the country. Khrushchev's sarcastic criticism of the people's communes and of China's economic backwardness appears to have rankled as much as his more tangible sanctions in cutting off military and financial aid. China's determination to become a nuclear power and break the Soviet-American monopoly is at least partly motivated by a feeling of outraged nationalism at the Soviet refusal to assist in the process. One Chinese document put it in these words:

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> Is not China very poor and backward? Yes, it is. The Soviet leaders say, how can the Chinese be qualified to manufacture nuclear weapons when they eat watery soup out of a common bowl and do not even have pants to wear? The Soviet leaders are perhaps too hasty in deriding China for its backwardness. They may or may not have judged right. But in any case, even if we Chinese people are unable to produce an atom bomb for a hundred years, we will neither crawl to the baton of the Soviet leaders nor kneel before the nuclear blackmail of the US imperialists.[2]

Another point to be emphasised is the part which this sense of outraged nationalism plays in China's hostility to the United States. American 'aggression' against China is seen in Peking not as a comparatively recent development of Soviet-American cold war strategy, but as stemming from the century-old tradition of Western imperialism against the colonial countries. The Chinese communists have always denied that the containment of international or Soviet communism as such is the reason for America's military presence in Asia. They describe the containment policy as a 'smokescreen' intended to obscure America's real objective of colonising the Asian countries and of overthrowing China. Similarly, America's alleged instigation of the Korean War was regarded not as a flanking attack against the international communist movement but as a direct assault on China's territorial integrity. This attitude is summed up in the old classical phrase 'when the lips are gone, the teeth are cold', which applies to the whole range of China's experience at the hands of imperialism, from the annexation of neighbouring states and the spheres of influence of the nineteenth century to the war in Vietnam today.

The exclusion of China from the United Nations has been another potent source of humiliation, for which the Chinese have compensated by denying that the organisation as at present constituted has any value. (A reconstituted UN, including China, would *ipso facto* be another matter.) The UN resolution branding China as an aggressor was a further slap in the face, whose reversal Marshal Ch'en Yi has not surprisingly called for before China will consent to take its place in the United Nations.

China as a World Power

China's rejection of bipolarity in international affairs, and its desire to regain its national identity in its fullest scope, made it inevitable that it would see itself, and that others would see it, as a potential world power ranking with the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of its population, size, and influence, it could hardly be otherwise. The area where it expects and is expected to play this role most effectively is the 'third world' with which it has most in common, and the growth of Chinese influence in this area dates back to the Bandung Conference of

[2] Statement by the Chinese Government spokesman, 1 September 1963 (*Peking Review*, 6 September 1963).

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1955, when China began for the first time to develop a fully articulated and independent foreign policy of its own. Most Western accounts of Chou En-lai's behaviour at Bandung emphasise that he skilfully made China appear more 'moderate' to the outside world. This is only partly true; the basic principles of present Chinese foreign policy—rejection of the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, support for movements of national liberation, and the need for Afro-Asian solidarity in the face of colonialism—were incorporated in Chou En-lai's speeches although in more moderate terms than are now used. Of equal importance to the Afro-Asian participants in the Conference was the fact that China had emerged as independent of the Soviet Union and an Asian power in its own right. Bandung marked the beginning of Chinese rivalry with the Soviet Union (and America) for influence in the third world.

China's progress towards an independent great-power status had brought about a marked difference of attitude towards it between the European powers and those of the third world. The latter are sometimes reproached with failing to identify the Chinese threat which the West thinks it can see so clearly. However, the great Western powers see China as a rival to their established positions. Any increase in its strength and influence automatically diminishes theirs. This attitude is partly shared by those of its neighbours and others in the third world who still have close ties with the West. But in general China's emergence is viewed with at least qualified approval as an example of the success of non-European and anti-colonial nationalism which sets the pattern for others who are in the same boat. Those who desire to thwart China from becoming a great power are mainly confined to the 'free world' and its dependent allies, for they alone see China's emergence predominantly in the context of the cold war.

The 'Chinese Threat'

While there is some confusion in the West as to the exact nature of China's foreign policy objectives, there is general agreement that they are a bad thing whatever they are. This is an area of international affairs where lack of expert knowledge is not an obstacle to sweeping *ex cathedra* statements. These can be readily found by a random sampling of official American—and Soviet—pronouncements on the question of China. Indeed, there is a close parallel between some of the wilder Soviet allegations, such as the claim that China is the principal supplier of the world opium market, and those which are assiduously spread by the CIA. Another example is the belief that China is pursuing a 'racialist' foreign policy, simply because it seeks and meets with support principally among the non-European third world. It would be equally true to say that adherence to the Atlantic Alliance by Britain reveals HMG's support for a policy of Aryan racialism.

Allegations like these are not very important in themselves, but the climate of opinion which allows them to flourish is not conducive to a

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rational assessment of China's foreign policy. McCarthyism was not typical of responsible American opinion in the early 1950s towards the Soviet Union, but its existence allowed the scales of judgment to be heavily weighted towards irrational and exaggerated fears of the 'Soviet threat'. Similarly, the terms of reference according to which the majority of objective assessments of Chinese foreign policy are made, are often compromised by a number of *a priori* assumptions which have no basis in fact. Unless we can bring ourselves to identify clearly the irrational components in our attitude towards China, we are unlikely to get very far.

To begin with two of the charges most frequently made against China, that it has not yet 'renounced the use of force' as an instrument of policy, and that its actions have proved it to be an 'aggressive' power.

As far as I am aware, no nation has as yet renounced the use of force *per se*. It is considered permissible if used in self-defence (whether pre-emptive or after the event), or in 'internal matters' (a definition which Britain extends to include its colonial territories, and which the United States extends to include the whole of Latin America). Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the people of a country have the right to overthrow their government by force if necessary without outside interference. Traditionally, we condemn such people as 'rebels' if they fail, but congratulate them if they succeed. China, with a greater degree of consistency, approves in advance of all 'movements of national liberation'.

It is common knowledge that Britain, America, France, the Soviet Union, and many other countries have on a variety of occasions invoked the use of force in circumstances which are contrary to the UN Charter. Moreover, the possession of nuclear weapons by the great powers, and the intention to use them if necessary either pre-emptively or even in response to a conventional attack, does not suggest the renunciation of force. China, as it happens, is the only nuclear power to declare that it will not use nuclear weapons first. But in any case, what is the point of calling for verbal renunciations? It is surely incontestable that all great powers will use force on occasion when they wish to or can get away with it. Several examples should be fresh in our minds, and they do not concern China.

The charge of aggression against China is more precise, and is backed up by three concrete examples—Tibet, Korea, and the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. In the Chinese view, all three examples fall within the definition of the legitimate use of force in self-defence, or as a pre-emptive measure, or as an instrument of internal policy. Tibet is regarded as part of China where it is entitled to act as it pleases; it is also strategically vital for the protection of the western frontier. Chinese intervention in Korea was prompted by fear that the crossing of the 38th parallel by the 'United Nations' forces would endanger the security of China's eastern flank and threaten its industrial base in Manchuria. The

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border attack against India in 1962 was felt to be pre-emptive—India's rather naive plans for an offensive of its own were widely reported in the Western press at the time. China's action demonstrated the strength of its commitment to the border, and its determination to teach India a lesson; it did not reveal a desire to take over the whole of Assam.

Morally, we may regard China's actions in these three cases as unjustified, but we must recognise that they were undertaken for specific reasons, not because Mao or anyone else is innately 'aggressive'. We cannot automatically deduce from China's behaviour in Tibet, Korea, or the Sino-Indian border what it is likely to do in Vietnam, Thailand, or Malaysia. Some regimes have in the past displayed a propensity for aggression as a way of life. Hitler's Germany and Japan in the 1930s are the obvious examples. They were branded 'aggressive' at the time by those who correctly forecast the purpose behind their military preparations and analysed the meaning behind their expansionist dogmas. But nothing that China has said or done reveals a desire for territorial gain in itself.

Military Expansion

The fundamental purpose of American and British policy in Asia—particularly South-East Asia—is variously explained in terms of the 'containment of China', the 'domino theory', or—to use the latest euphemism coined by Mr Patrick Gordon Walker—the 'creation of a natural balance of power'. All these explanations mean the same thing, that China must be deterred from pursuing an otherwise inevitable course of military and/or political expansion.

The military aspect is the weakest part of this argument. China has shown no signs of wishing to acquire the military capability with which to carry out physical expansion. Its armed forces are ill-equipped to mount any sustained operation beyond Chinese frontiers, and their equipment, training, and deployment suggests an intense pre-occupation with defence. Its navy has no offensive capability to speak of, and that of its air force is inconsiderable. (This assessment is shared by almost every Western expert in the field.)

China regards American 'encirclement' as posing the greatest threat to its security. America's presence in Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and Japan has been regarded for the past fifteen years as a 'spearhead' for possible invasion of the Chinese mainland. It is no good arguing from our Western vantage-point that such an invasion is out of the question. The Chinese leaders think it is at least a credible contingency, and it will take a lot to convince them otherwise. China's military strategy and planning is based on the hypothesis of an American nuclear attack followed up by a conventional invasion. (The secret army documents recently released by Washington—the *Kung-tso T'ung-hsun*—make it clear that this is a high-level policy and not merely propaganda.) It is this belief—in addition to motives of prestige—which has led China to attach top priority to becoming a nuclear power.

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It hopes eventually to acquire at least a minimum or 'trip-wire' nuclear capability with which to deter American action. Meanwhile, the development of the nation-wide militia, recently intensified after having come to a halt during the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, is intended to cope with the effects of a conventional invasion.

Once again, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not make China any more 'aggressive' than any other nuclear power, and it is sheer hypocrisy for those countries who began the nuclear arms race to condemn China for joining in. Those who argue that China, unlike its more responsible nuclear betters, would have no scruples about unleashing nuclear war on the world, should ask themselves whether the Chinese are really prepared to court the massive destruction which such a war would bring on them. This is a very different matter from claiming—as China does—that it could 'survive' a nuclear war. Every self-respecting nuclear power has made similar claims—especially when it is still in a position of inferiority. As Morton Halperin has shown in his excellent study of *China and the Bomb*, China is well aware of the devastating consequences of nuclear war and extremely sensitive to the implications of the strategic balance of power.

The prospect of Chinese 'nuclear blackmail' is often raised in the West. It is regrettably true that nuclear weapons are one of the factors which contribute to a country's status and influence in the world. But again it is incumbent upon those who believe that China is in a different and more dangerous category from the other nuclear powers to specify how, why, and where, China might use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. It is difficult to envisage any Chinese foreign policy objective which (a) could be realised only through the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, and (b) would be worth the serious risks attendant upon such action.

Why in any case should China want to expand into Asia? Short of intensive genocide, there is no part of Asia which is both sufficiently unpopulated and economically desirable to provide a net gain for Chinese occupation. The political and military disadvantages of any such expansion would be crippling for China. Its own experience teaches it that revolution cannot be imposed from outside, and that occupation of a hostile populace is bound to fail. Does anyone believe that China would—for instance—occupy a future 'power vacuum' in Indochina for the sake of five million tons per annum of surplus grain? As for the notion that China will one day walk down the island chain of South-East Asia to Australia, a map and a pair of callipers should reveal its inherent absurdity.

Political Expansion

The question of the expansion of China's *political* influence in Asia—and indeed in the world—brings us back within the bounds of rational argument. Here it is clear that China does present a significant challenge to the existing authority and influence of the other great powers.

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It is also clear that a frustrated great power, as China is today, will for some time be an unsettling factor on the international scene. What is questionable, however, is the assumption that China poses a 'threat' to world stability in excess of the potential threat presented by any major power possessing a sizeable amount of military and political strength. Whatever the nature of this threat, it is even more questionable whether it can be averted by the old-fashioned policy of containment on the anti-Soviet model. The problem is not how to thwart China's growing influence, but how to come to terms with it.

It is important in the first place not to exaggerate China's desire to behave as a great power on the world scene. It has shown no inclination to acquire the kind of political and economic commitments overseas which Russia and America are prepared to assume. The classic economic incentives for colonial adventures do not apply to a country like China whose economy rests on an agricultural basis. For the foreseeable future, China is likely to be much more preoccupied with economic construction at home than with empire-building abroad.

However, the competitive instinct of great-power rivalry may well involve China in areas overseas where it has no particular interest. It will be especially anxious to do so at the expense of the two great powers whom it holds responsible for its present position of isolation. To this extent, China's foreign policy is a function of American and Soviet policies as well as of its own, and a diminution of tension with America and the Soviet Union should limit the number of areas and occasions where they come into conflict with China.

This is not to deny the theoretical importance of China's commitment to the cause of revolution and anti-imperialism. It is a doctrine which coincides with China's two main concerns in the foreign policy field, opposition to America and rivalry with the Soviet Union. But in practice, doctrinal requirements are set firmly within the context of national interest, and China's support for revolution overseas has been cautious, limited, and expressed mainly in terms of propaganda.

The subordination of doctrine to national interest is seen most clearly in South-East Asia. Here China's main objective is the exclusion or limitation of America's hostile presence in the area. It follows that it is interested in securing stability in Asia, for lack of stability leads inevitably to the intrusion of foreign influence. To take a recent example, the break-up of the Indian sub-continent could only bring about the extension of American and possibly Soviet involvement. There is no reason to believe that China wished the Indo-Pakistan war to continue, and indeed its manoeuvres and ultimatums had the effect of inhibiting both India and Pakistan from continuing to fight.

It is significant that China has so far intervened or given aid only to communist movements or governments in Laos, North Vietnam, and North Korea, the three countries bordering on China where the United States has itself intervened. Thailand is an interesting marginal case. Until this year China refrained from support for local insurgents, but has

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now decided to sponsor a newly-formed national liberation movement. This decision coincides with the rapid increase in America's use of Thailand as a base for airborne operations against Vietnam. In neutralist countries like Burma or Cambodia, China maintains good relations with their existing governments rather than exploit the existing potential for communist insurrection.

Indeed, it is doubtful whether China would like to see the 'spread of communism' throughout South-East Asia, if it meant the emergence of a strong communist rival. China has shown no signs of supporting North Vietnam's objective of a Greater Vietnam, incorporating all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Nor would China necessarily welcome the absorption of Malaysia by a communist Indonesia.

'National Liberation'

I am not seeking to rule out Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Asia or elsewhere, where this can be done safely and without harming Chinese interests. We should however recognise that these movements do not in themselves depend upon Chinese support. They exist wherever there is gross political, social, or economic inequality, in countries which are subservient to American control, or which are infected by a sense of frustrated nationalism. These movements are attracted by the revolutionary model which China offers; the *Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung are as potent a source of 'subversion' as any amount of military aid from Peking.

Such movements cannot be averted by the containment of China. America's commitment to Vietnam has had precisely the opposite effect. Originally designed to complete China's containment and to preserve South Vietnam as a Western bastion, it has brought into being both an indigenous liberation movement and the involvement of North Vietnam and China. Not only do our military commitments in Asia compel China to assume commitments and hostile postures of its own in response, but they create the social and political conditions in which nationalist movements will assume a communist complexion. Left to their own devices, Asian countries like Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia have evolved a variety of indigenous political forms. Those which are dragged into the cold war with China find themselves presented with an arbitrary choice between totalitarian democracy *à la Saigon*, or communism *à la Pékin*, neither of which may be what they want. But if they are compelled to choose, they will choose the latter.

* * * *

If we are to come to terms with the existence of China as a world power, then we must accept two inescapable conclusions. First, we must accept that the days of American and British influence in Asia are numbered, and that a 'natural' balance cannot be artificially created by sophisticated weaponry and foreign troops. China's influence, on the other

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hand, is bound to increase. It is this, not Chinese expansion or aggression, which at present we seek to deter. As Dr Kennedy has commented in his study of *The Security of Southern Asia*, our commitment in Asia stems from 'a determination to prevent China from re-asserting her traditional influence in the areas on her southern border'. This is neither a legitimate objective, nor is it going to succeed. All we can do is to modify the *form* which the growth of Chinese influence takes by removing Asia as far as possible from the cold war arena, and by allowing the natural balance to emerge in less of a crisis atmosphere.

Secondly, until at least some of China's legitimate grievances are remedied, and as long as it is regarded with such excessive fear and hostility, it will be a profoundly disturbing influence in world affairs from our point of view. The alternative—a rapprochement with China—will be a slow and painful process. And the initiative will have to come from us, since China as the weaker and aggrieved party is psychologically inhibited from making the first move, and has been driven into a position of extreme rigidity by years of hostile containment.

There is unfortunately little to suggest that any steps towards a rapprochement are being seriously considered. On the contrary, the tendency today is towards the transference of the cold war from Europe —where it is clearly obsolescent—to Asia. Unless the West learns in time from its mistakes in the old cold war, the consequences of this new cold war will be even more disastrous than anything that has happened so far.

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RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

W. Zimmerman

THE authors of the comprehensive Soviet textbook, *International Relations Since World War II*, informed their readers in 1962 that 'in the postwar years the role of international relations in the life of human society has grown sharply'.[1] 'It is precisely for that reason', they go on, that 'the programme of the CPSU devotes so much attention to problems of contemporary international relations.' The importance of this statement was further emphasised in the succeeding paragraph, which begins 'It goes without saying' (the traditional genuflection to orthodoxy which often intimates imminent doctrinal alteration) and goes on:

> The course of social development is determined ultimately by the development of productive forces, by the class struggle, by those internal processes in the area of economics and politics which take place in each country. Not all the forces determining social development are manifested directly in the sphere of international relations. However, no serious scientific analysis of the tendencies of international development in the contemporary epoch is possible without due consideration of the increased role of international relations and its new laws of development.

This remarkable passage represents in condensed form a striking metamorphosis in Soviet thinking about the role of international relations. The change occurred in the years after Stalin's death in 1953,[2] and especially after the twentieth CPSU congress in 1956. Whereas in the traditional Marxist-Leninist perspective of the world historical process, international relations played a derivative, subordinate role, for Soviet commentators in the Khrushchev era international relations became an important variable, strongly conditioning historical development. As a result, there were important developments in the study of international relations in the USSR and in the Soviet way of looking at them.

The amount of information on international relations made available was substantially expanded, and the subject emerged as a legitimate area of inquiry for specialists below the apex of the party and government apparatus. Soviet writers at this juncture began to present

1 *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny* (Moscow, 1962), vol. I (1945–1949), p. vi. Italics in original. A slightly abridged English version of the illuminating introduction to the first volume may be found in 'The Nature and Specific Features of Contemporary International Relations', *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1962.

2 Strictly speaking, harbingers of the change may be detected at the nineteenth CPSU congress in 1952 and in Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism*. Cf. Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Harvard, 1963).

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international relations as a 'young science arising "at the intersection" of a number of social sciences',[3] and to delineate the boundaries of the subject-matter with which it should rightly be concerned. During the last two years of Khrushchev's rule there were some indications that another chapter in this story had opened. Greater attention was paid to methodology, and the different levels of sophistication between analysis by specialists and more general commentary became, in a few instances, more noticeable.

The crucial structural feature of contemporary international politics in the new Soviet conception was that there was no longer one dominant power. That was the novel feature to which Soviet theorists referred when they wrote about the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism and connected it with the changed distribution of power.

Previous shifts in the distribution of power had resulted in changes in the order in which the capitalist states were ranged. Thus, as a result of the second world war, England yielded first place to the United States.[4] The United States 'positions of strength policy' was undermined pari passu with the formation of the socialist camp and the development by the USSR of the atomic bomb and the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile. The United States lost the geographically-based impenetrability on which its position of dominance rested. It could no longer avoid a crushing blow at its heartland if its decision-makers unleashed a war; its capacity to choose the optimal moment for entry into a world war was destroyed. Now the United States would be involved in war from the outset.

But no capitalist power could take first place instead of the United States. Nor could any other state (i.e. the Soviet Union). Although it had lost its hegemonial position, the United States retained the capacity to obstruct the hegemonial aspirations of any other state. The implication was as obvious as it was bizarre to a person schooled in Leninism. In the present historical phase, no single power was dominant. The dominant power *category* had been eliminated.

The pre-atomic concept of great-power status, which did not differ appreciably from concepts generally associated with Stalin ('permanently operating factors') or Mao ('masses decide everything'), was carried over into the nuclear age. Where Khrushchev parted company with Stalin and Mao—as well as Lenin—was in relegating these elements of power (output, size, and population) to a distinctly secondary (but not unimportant) place. They have become subsidiary, in the age of nuclear weapons, missiles, and rockets, to atomic weapons and high-speed delivery systems.

Those states which possessed atomic and hydrogen weapons *and* high-speed delivery systems took precedence. Elephants lacking 'atomic

[3] *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* . . . vol. I, p. xxvi.

[4] e.g. S. Viskov, 'The Crisis of Imperialism's Foreign Policy,' *International Affairs*, January 1962, p. 21.

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teeth' were not in the same class with tigers that did in fact possess these weapons. Lacking atomic capability, a state could retain its great-power status but had to defer to the atomic powers.

The two major atomic powers were also unique in that they were world powers with a capacity for global policies. The remaining great powers were able to make their influence felt only on a geographically limited scale and did not appear to take the 'global picture' into consideration.[5] Soviet comments, of course, were replete with statements that the United States and the Soviet Union were 'the two greatest powers in the world' or 'the two world giants'. The United States and the Soviet Union were in a category of their own, apart from the remaining great powers.

Thus the Chinese had a point when they alleged that the 'only country the leaders of the CPSU look up to is the United States.'[6] In the Soviet view, the contemporary international order was headed by these two powers. A considerable gap in power terms separated them from other states, including the remaining great powers, and was derived from qualitatively different capabilities.

With respect to relations between the United States and its major West European allies, Soviet analyses since the twenty-second party congress have strongly emphasised the narrowed range of issues over which the United States could command deference from its West European allies.[7] At the same time, and of even greater importance as an indication of the lessened rigidity of Soviet conceptions of the hierarchical order, the Soviet experts pointed to the increased capacity of the European powers to influence American policy,[8] including the capacity 'from now on' to involve the United States in nuclear war 'without prior notice'. Having acknowledged this possibility for states which cannot claim to rival the USA, a corrective would seem to be introduced into the traditional expectation that power relationships are unidirectional, and into the Bolshevik penchant to perceive international relations in rigidly hierarchical terms.

At the same time, the competition between the two world powers provided the framework within which other structural changes took place. Thus by the end of Khrushchev's tenure in power, states appeared to have taken precedence over the 'world systems' of capitalism and socialism as the main actors in the international arena. The change reflected Soviet adjustment to the passing of rigid bipolarity and to the fissiparous tendencies within the two camps.

5 This attitude has been evident in Soviet polemics with the Chinese, who, Soviet observers suggest, are blinded by their 'special aims or interests', and are therefore unable to realise the *global* implications of a decision to grant China thermonuclear weapons.

6 *Peking Review*, 20 December 1963, p. 16.

7 See especially the articles by A. Sovetov: 'Contradictions in the Western bloc', *International Affairs*, June 1963, and 'New Trends and the Realities', *ibid.*, August 1963.

8 West Germany, according to Sovetov, has undergone a 'gradual but quite obvious transformation from a grateful debtor and obedient executor of the will of US imperialism into a force that is having a marked influence on its overseas partner'.

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Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Soviet description of the hierarchical structure of the modern international system was that it diverged in fundamental respects from conventional Bolshevik expectations about power relations—and this was presented in the name of creative Marxism-Leninism. In particular, in this, the 'new, third stage of capitalism's general crisis', it was no longer the case that the international system was a rigidly hierarchical order headed by a single dominant power. Instead, the leading powers were the two world powers. Their competition provided the framework within which, in the view of some Soviet observers, even small formally independent states, although economically tied to imperialism and politically linked to American imperialism, could not always be considered dependent countries. Moreover, in the last years of Khrushchev's rule, Soviet observers, responding to the greater assertiveness of the second-level great powers in the two camps, began to show increasing concern over the danger of catalytic war—thus suggesting that the question of war and peace was no longer solely a matter of relations between the leaders of the two camps.

The main contradiction in the world nevertheless continued to consist of the relationships between these two, and it was to this relationship that Soviet observers looked in analysing the global distribution of power. Here an interesting progression is to be noted. Before 1959, the term used in describing the balance-of-power situation was 'distribution of power' (usually *sootnoshenie sil*, occasionally *rasstanovka sil*). After 1959—although formulations involving the generic phrase 'distribution of power' prevailed quantitatively—formulations containing *pereves sil* (favourable balance or preponderance of power) made their appearance. At the end of 1961, finally, the focal term of reference became *ravnovesie sil* (equilibrium). These shifts in formulations corresponded to changing Soviet appraisals of the distribution of power and of the imminence of revolutionary advance. After Cuba and the beginning of the open debate with China, the focus shifted from a description of the communist camp's *gains* to an emphasis on the West's *losses*, and the *organisational* unity of the socialist camp was no longer mentioned. By 1963 *ravnovesie*, with its connotation of stability and equilibrium, best expressed the expectations of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet elite integrated the temporary reversal into the world historical process by once again prolonging its time perspective.

The reverses experienced by the Soviet Union in the last years of the Khrushchev regime, coupled with the constraints imposed by the atomic age, raised a new challenge to Soviet thinking about international relations. Soviet analysts were confronted with the task of demonstrating how the creation of 'international relations of a new type' could be accomplished while avoiding the violent destruction of the existing international system. In handling this problem, Soviet commentators created the doctrinal legitimation for regarding Leninism as irrelevant to atomic-age international politics by declaring that the period when

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the nature of imperialism alone determined international relations had been historically transcended.

When the balance sheet of the Khrushchev era is drawn, this latter development, even measured against such historic events as the disintegration of the communist camp, may stand out as one of its most salient features.

(This article is a greatly abridged extract from a longer study being prepared for publication.)

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DOCUMENT:

FOREIGN POLICY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

ONE of the advantages of a socialist state is that it can build its home and foreign policy on a strictly scientific basis, on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, correctly defining the prospects of the further development both of the society of its own country and of all mankind as a whole. The Soviet Union determines its foreign policy on the basis of a profound analysis of the given international situation, with due consideration for the historical laws of the present era, whose main essence is the transition from capitalism to socialism. Our own times are also marked by the tremendous scope of the national liberation movement, the appearance of dozens of young independent countries, the fight of the people against the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression, against the threat of another world war, and these peculiar features of modern development are fully taken into account in Soviet foreign-policy doctrine. . . .

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth recognise their responsibility to the international proletariat, to the peoples of the whole world for the course and the outcome of the fight between the forces of socialism and imperialism. They always act in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and start out from the real objective conditions. They influence the development of liberation movements by creating for them favourable international circumstances, by taking energetic measures to repel the imperialist export of counter-revolution, by offering these movements resolute political support, by providing all-round material assistance for the young countries, including arms (Algeria, Indonesia, the UAR, and others). At the same time the socialist countries adhere strictly to the principles of non-interference and self-determination.

For the people of the socialist countries the fight against imperialism means not only a class war against it in the international arena, not only the support of revolutionary and liberation movements, but above all successful economic construction, improvement of the living standards of the toilers, the development of socialist democracy. . . .

Concrete assistance from the Soviet Union during the period when they were carrying on an armed fight against the imperialist aggressors was received by the people of China, Korea, Viet Nam, and Cuba. Everybody knows the great part played by the USSR in the establishment and consolidation of the first German workers and peasants state in history—the German Democratic Republic. . . .

In the socialist commonwealth, which consists of countries differing in the historical conditions of their development, starting from different levels in their construction of socialism, with different specific features which influence the forms and rates of that construction, temporary divergences may arise over concrete questions of one kind or another. The Soviet Union allows for this in its policy, and, guided by the principles of socialist internationalism, friendship, and brotherhood, bases

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itself on the principle that the interests of each country must be properly combined with the interests of the commonwealth as a whole, and it respects the sovereignty of the fraternal countries and the national dignity of their peoples. The CPSU is firmly convinced that the factors which bring the socialist countries closer together (identical social system, a single ideology, a common fight against imperialism, and a common eventual aim, the building of socialism and communism) are of incomparably greater importance than whatever may at any particular moment give rise to disagreements among them. Therefore the central committee of our party continues and will resolutely continue to bend its efforts to the consolidation of the countries of the socialist commonwealth. . . .

The processes at work in the capitalist world reveal the deepening of its contradictions. The class struggle of the proletariat has become more intense. It is fought for the satisfaction of basic economic needs, for the curbing of the economic and political power of the monopolies. In the anti-monopoly general democratic fight, the proletariat rallies around itself all the toilers. . . .

Today, because of the threat to peace from the imperialists of the USA and the revenge-seekers of the Federal Republic, the task is to restrain and isolate these shock troops of international reaction.

The application of general principles is determined by the concrete circumstances. Adherence to principles does not in any way imply the rejection of flexible ways of applying them. Marxist-Leninists, being purposeful proletarian revolutionaries, are able coolly and soberly to weigh up and decide at what moment, in what conditions, and in what field to employ this or that method which will guarantee success in the fight against the forces of reaction and war.

The art of a realistic foreign policy consists in the scientific evaluation of objective reality, in the correct indication of the tasks which have become ripe, and in the means to be used. The success of the policy lies in its consistency, in the ability to solve secondary problems with due consideration for the fight on the main front. Serious damage may be caused to a socialist country in its foreign policy both by pragmatism, by the subordination of general tasks to current problems, and by a doctrinaire attitude, by the inability to link general principles with concrete deeds dictated by the situation, ignoring the concrete nature of truth. Both these extremes are profoundly alien to the central committee of our party and to the Soviet government. Profoundly alien are intrigue, and a voluntarist, unrealistic approach to the events of international life. Firmness in upholding principles, and the necessary flexibility in applying them and in tactical actions, a scientific approach to the assessment of the situation—these qualities of Soviet foreign policy are particularly valuable at the present time, when world imperialism is becoming more active in the international arena. . . .

The present intensification of tension in the international situation is the result of the attempts of the most reactionary forces of the USA, by means of aggression and armed intervention against the freedom and independence of peoples and against the territorial integrity of countries, to preserve, recover, or expand their imperialist positions.

The rabid reactionaries, that is, the military party (the Pentagon),

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military enterprises, monopolies interested in the export of capital and goods, and numerous organisations of a fascist trend, exert tremendous pressure on those who stand at the helm of government in the USA. The military party has become a tremendous power; a considerable part of the productive forces is employed in the interests of the war machine; tens of milliards of dollars, two-thirds of the whole budget (as against 7 per cent before the war) goes on military expenditure. This party commands an army of almost three millions, spreads its claws into dozens of countries which contain hundreds of American military bases, and where hundreds of thousands of US troops are stationed.

The western press reports that Johnson has somewhat altered the functions of the American political machine. He has encouraged the tendency to concentrate power in one set of hands, in this case his own. He has introduced a new doctrine into foreign policy which is dangerous for the cause of peace. This new doctrine is Johnson's 'globalism', consisting in the indiscriminate treatment of the whole of the territory of the capitalist world as the zone of US interests. The United States usurps for itself the right to intervene wherever, in the opinion of the American ruling circles, their interests are affected, making use of a method which is monstrous in its shamelessness and its absurdity of calling the communists and all their other enemies 'enemies of freedom' and themselves the 'defenders' of freedom. They try to get the maximum possible advantage for themselves out of temporary disagreements in the international communist movement. 'Globalism' is expressed in an attempt to impose 'American law' everywhere, irrespective of geographical latitude and regardless of distance. The USA has converted itself into the gendarme, not only of the American hemisphere but of the whole of the capitalist world. . . .

The policy of American imperialism, in particular in Viet Nam, has the political and moral support of the ruling circles of Britain. The British government is itself carrying on a criminal war against the people of Oman, and is trying to preserve neo-colonialist Malaysia in opposition to the will of the people. West Germany supports the stranglers of the liberation movement of the African people, the reactionary regimes of Salazar in Portugal and Verwoerd in South Africa. Belgium, along with the USA, is financing and encouraging the puppet Tshombe, who is waging a criminal war against the Congolese people. Japan has concluded a military-political alliance with the South Korean reactionaries, directed in the long run against the national liberation movement in South-East Asia. Other capitalist countries have become more active in the same direction. . . .

The imperialists, who believe only in force and extreme methods of pressure, see in the might of the Soviet Union the main obstacle in the way of carrying out their aggressive plans. It is therefore no coincidence that recently there has been an intensification of publicity for the imaginary superiority of the USA in the field of rocket-nuclear armament. Meticulous calculations are made of how many hundreds of millions of people would be destroyed in the course of a thermo-nuclear war. This is wasted effort. Nobody will succeed in intimidating the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist countries.

Our communist party attaches tremendous importance to the further

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strengthening of the defensive power of the Soviet Union. The Soviet army is equipped with modern types of weapons produced on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology. The central committee of the party and the Soviet government have taken a number of measures to improve the management of the defence industry. Our armaments industry is on the level dictated by the international situation and by the latest developments in military matters.

The equipment and upkeep of the armed forces requires huge funds in these days. The party and the government would like to direct these funds to the peaceful branches of the economy, but in the present circumstances to economise on defence would be to act contrary to the interests of the Soviet state. Eventually, if the defensive capacity of the country should be weakened, we would have to pay a heavy price. The Soviet people fully appreciate the necessity for this expenditure and entirely support the measures of the party and the government for the strengthening of the defensive might of our fatherland. . . .

Socialism, communism, social progress, and national independence flourish where there is peace. That is an objective truth. It is true that, relying on this fact, the ideologists of imperialism say that their countries 'cannot' coexist with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. But objections of this kind cannot affect the policies of the socialist countries. The revolutionary processes in the capitalist countries are the result of internal contradictions and not of the relationships of coexistence in the international arena. Further, conditions of peaceful coexistence are advantageous for the people of all countries, both socialist and capitalist, and therefore the whole of the human race supports them. Finally, peaceful coexistence is not a gift from imperialism to the peoples, but a consequence of the superiority of the forces of socialism over those of imperialism, the result of the real balance of forces in the world, and it is supported by the Soviet Union, the commonwealth of socialist countries, and world public opinion. The alliance of these forces is a sure guarantee for the observance of that principle today and a guarantee of its triumph tomorrow.

Therefore the Soviet Union in its foreign policy starts out from the fact that in order to have peaceful coexistence it is not necessary to stop the fight for national and social liberation. For this it is necessary to fight resolutely against the aggressive policies of imperialism, against its interference in the internal affairs of countries, against its efforts to crush the liberation fight of the peoples; it is necessary to fight for the relaxation of international tension, for universal and complete disarmament. That fight is being carried on and will be carried on by the CPSU and the Soviet state. The policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems makes it possible to preserve peace under the conditions of the national-liberation and social revolutions which are inevitably developing over the whole planet.

(*These are extracts from the leading article in Kommunist*, 1965, *no.* 12.)

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Volume III, Number 4 *Summer 1965*

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